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ABSTRACT 
PHANTOM RHETORICS: FROM PATHOS TO AFFECT 
 
by 
 
Julie D. Nelson 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of Professor Dennis Lynch 
 
 
 
Despite much interest in scholarship on affect and emotion in the field of rhetoric 
and composition in the last several decades, scholars have not yet used this 
scholarship to revise or extend rhetorical understandings of pathos. In our field, 
pathos is still primarily conceived as a linguistic tool and is rarely theorized as 
more than a rhetorical appeal. This conception of pathos overlooks the varied 
roles of emotions in rhetorical situations (e.g., how embodied or mediated 
emotions persuade). I argue that extending studies of pathos to include affect 
theory reveals more complicated rhetorical functions of pathos. But rather than 
treat “affect” and “emotion” as separate concepts and phenomena (like many 
scholars in our field), I argue it is the relationship between affect and emotion 
that ought to be better theorized to complicate current understandings of pathos. 
After close analysis of how affect and emotion have been studied in our field, I 
put forth a theoretical framework for rhetorical study of affects and emotions 
which 1) approaches rhetoric ontologically, 2) reconnects affect to assemblage 
theory, and 3) defines bodies (human and nonhuman) via their capacity to affect 
and be affected. I apply this framework to a case study of an outbreak of mass 
psychogenic illness (previously called “mass hysteria”) among a group of mostly 
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high school girls in LeRoy, NY in 2011. I begin my analysis of this case by looking 
for the affects and emotions at its center. Looking for pathos beyond the texts 
and discourses surrounding the case, this project examines the rhetoricity of 
bodies, bodily processes, assemblages, and media. This project seeks to broaden 
current understandings of pathos, to illustrate what it might look like to study 
pathos as the core of rhetorical studies.  
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Introduction 
 
Rhetorics of Emotion 
  
In October 2011, a high school cheerleader in upstate New York woke up 
from a nap with a stutter. Before long, Thera Sanchez’s stutter escalated into 
Tourette-like symptoms; twitches, jerks, and vocal outbursts became so 
disruptive that Thera had to stop going to school. In the following weeks, eleven 
more girls at LeRoy High School presented similar symptoms, and parents 
became frantic as the school district rushed to determine the cause of the illness. 
The New York State Department of Health began an investigation but concluded 
no environmental or infectious causes could be found. By the spring of 2012, 
twenty-four people1 in the area had developed the same debilitating symptoms, 
and the national news media began reporting on the case, calling it a “mystery 
illness.” Several of the girls appeared on the Today Show, CNN, and Dr. Drew. 
Through stutters, jerks, and snorts, the girls plead for answers to their “mystery” 
symptoms.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Reports suggested the final count of afflicted people may have even been higher. 
In addition to the high school girls in LeRoy, several other people reported 
symptoms in the neighboring Town Cornith, NY, including a 36-year-old woman 
and boy. 
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Shortly after the case gained national attention, several experts and 
physicians came forward to claim the illness was not mysterious at all. It was a 
case of mass hysteria. Despite centuries of documented cases, outbreaks of mass 
hysteria continue to transfix us.2 In part, this is likely because mass hysteria is a 
diagnosis of exclusion. Such diagnoses are made only when all other potential 
causes are ruled out since symptoms vary from case to case. But it also seems to 
be the nature of the illness—it is psychologically rooted, manifests physically, and 
yet arises and is transmitted among a group people—that makes it such a 
compelling site for analysis. 
 Public and media response to this story was, not surprisingly, great. 
Healthy girls, with bright futures, were stricken suddenly with a debilitating 
syndrome—girls who seem like they could easily be our daughters, sisters, or 
friends. And the inability to identify a more tangible cause for the outbreak only 
intensified the reaction. There seemed to be no rational explanation: how can 
what seems to be a psychological disorder be contagious? Susan Sontag’s words 
in Illness and Metaphor ring true: “Any disease that is treated as a mystery and 
acutely enough feared will be felt to be morally, if not literally contagious” (6). 
Not only did it appear that the disease was actually contagious as more girls 
developed symptoms, but the moral mythology of this particular disorder took its 
toll. We tend to think of hysteria as an excess of emotion—a crazed and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 New cases of mass hysteria are reported monthly. Some of the most recent 
publicized cases include over 300 students in Portuguese schools who suffered 
symptoms of rashes, difficulty breathing, and dizziness (2006); female students 
at a Catholic School in Mexico City who had difficulty walking, fever, and nausea 
(2007); and students at an all-girls school in Brunei who suffered from 
screaming, crying, and shaking (2010). 
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uncontrollable outpouring of feeling. While the sole hysterical woman doesn’t 
pose much of a threat to society at large, an episode of “mass hysteria” seems to. 
Groups of girls, in themselves, often evoke fear; we hear stories of pregnancy 
pacts, social bulimia, and cutting parties—similar to masochistic behavior 
depicted in Hollywood portrayals like The Virgin Suicides. Rather than read 
these incidents as narratives of self-loathing, depression, or peer pressure, 
incidents like these are often read as unpredictable examples of girlhood 
irrationality. Fear of contagion, but also what this event says about girlhood, “the 
world today,” and “this generation” dominated stories about the LeRoy girls.  
 Learning one’s diagnosis, Sontag suggests, can be “demoralizing.” Several 
of the girls and their families publicly rejected hysteria as a diagnosis and 
embraced alternative theories. Anti-vaccine groups suggested the HPV vaccine 
Gardasil was responsible; Erin Brockovich and her team insisted the outbreak 
was a result of a train that derailed in the ‘70s, spilling thousands of gallons of 
cyanide and trichloroethylene only three miles away from LeRoy High School; 
and one doctor publicly declared the phenomenon an outbreak of PANDAS 
(pediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorders associated with streptococcal 
infections). Some internet commenters—in something of a digital witch hunt—
even suggested the girls were possessed by the devil.   
For several news cycles, the media was transfixed. Exposés in the New 
York Times and Slate delved into the girls lives, creating narratives that often 
embodied elements of Aristotelian tragedy: using “language embellished with 
each kind of artistic ornament” and arguably, “through pity and fear effecting the 
proper purgation of these emotions” (bk. VI). As videos of the girls’ interviews 
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were spread around mainstream and social media, a complicated dialogue 
emerged as voices of experts, conspiracy theorists, family members, and TV 
personalities intersected. And a careful viewer could see the girls’ words and 
movements co-adapt with the various strands of discourse they consumed.  
 Rhetorically, there are a lot of interesting aspects to this case; there is 
much to consider about how the discourse of physicians, news media, and the 
girls themselves interacted to create the rhetoric surrounding this event—a 
rhetoric that captivated audiences, spread suspicion and fear, and kept this story 
relevant for several weeks. When looking specifically at the emotional and 
affective elements of this case, of which there are many, rhetoric scholars might 
first ask, what kinds of emotions and affects have been attributed to the girls? 
Among all of the professional and popular discourses, we might consider how the 
girls are variously represented and how those tropes and archetypes reflect a 
historical tendency to mark young women with psychological illness as hysterical 
or mad. We might look at the persistence of these archetypes and tropes, given 
the advent of youtube, where girls posted videos of themselves and where the 
public could easily follow, interpret, annotate, and diagnose the 
text/performance/mediation publicly. An even more critically-minded 
rhetorician might consider the politics of this event: who benefits from particular 
representations of the girls and why? How do particular kinds of media propagate 
various views and what rhetorical devices do they draw on to convince audiences? 
And to what ends?  
 Still, another question remains, one that is less frequently pursued in 
rhetorical study: not where is the rhetoric located (in this case, of mediated mass 
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hysteria) and what does it do, but how is it transmitted and circulated? The latter 
question is of particular interest to those studying affect and emotion, and it is 
one of the main questions that is pursued in the following chapters. Put 
otherwise, pathos plays a clear role in the rhetoric of this event; it was central in 
portraying the girls, depicting the illness, and in capturing the attention of the 
viewing public. But are current conceptions of pathos complicated enough to 
untangle and capture affect and emotion’s roles in this event?  
 This dissertation takes up this question carefully and, in short, I suggest 
the answer is no. Despite an increased interest in affect and emotion scholarship 
in the field, these new advances haven’t been used to reshape the concept pathos; 
pathos is still conceptualized in terms of discrete rhetorical situations made up of 
autonomous rhetors and audiences. But the event in LeRoy is made up of many 
rhetors, audiences, and other environmental, material, and mediated influences. 
It doesn’t have a clear, linear progression. The origins and purposes of the affects 
and emotions in the event are often ambiguous, and some “emotions” even seem 
to be operating separately from human intervention. Take for example, the 
pervasive fear that surrounds this event. There is no single, clear object that 
inspires fear nor is there one source of fear; rather it emerges from places like 
news media scare tactics, the cultural mythology surrounding hysteria, the fear of 
contagion, fear of the unknown, wild conspiracy theories, the girls; interviews, 
the school board’s lack of answers, etc.  
The movement of fear is similarly dispersed among many constituents in 
the event; the rhetorical direction, purpose, and effect of fear can’t be easily 
determined. This pervasiveness of emotion, I assert, is better captured through 
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joint theories of affect and emotion which emphasize how emotions and 
situations overlap, are recursive, and malleable. As an addition to studies of 
emotion in the field, affect theory better addresses how people and things gather 
together to create what we understand to be a rhetorical event. Affect theory, I 
suggest, supplements emotion theory to expand current notions of pathos—not 
just expanding our understanding of how pathos works but also helping us figure 
out how we, as rhetoricians, might more productively intervene in complex 
rhetorical events like the one in LeRoy.  
Studying a complex event like this rhetorically means expanding our 
understanding of rhetorical situations (or objects of study), not only outward (as 
scholars like Jenny Edbauer Rice, Thomas Rickert, and Byron Hawk have 
suggested) to include environments, objects, and matter, but also to extend our 
understanding backward and forward temporally, to account for the unfolding of 
an event whose beginning and end may extend years beyond its “center.” The 
LeRoy outbreak doesn’t end once the news media goes quiet, just as it didn’t 
begin with the first news story. While public interest in the story has waned, there 
remains much to consider in this case, as several scholars from other disciplines 
have begun to explore (e.g., neurologist Thomas Pollak’s (2013) critique of how 
psychogenic movement disorder was diagnosed in LeRoy; anthropologist Ryan 
Cook’s (2013) ethnographic study of the case; or historian Robert Bartholomew 
and psychologists Simon Wessely and G James Rubin’s (2012) analysis of the role 
social media played in transmitting symptoms). 
 What I’m suggesting, then, is that rhetorically we might shift our focus 
from studying the discourse external to the cause and medium of the outbreak 
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itself to studying the affects and emotions at its center; to consider the rhetorical 
event not just in the aftermath of this psychological phenomenon but as 
beginning years before the first tic; and to see the girls not as victims of a 
convergence of psychological, social, and physical variables—and then the 
sometimes-cruel exploitation of their experience—but to see them as rhetorical 
agents (drawing on recent reconfigurations of agency, e.g. by Jane Bennett and 
Marilyn Cooper). While I’m not suggesting that the girls consciously chose to 
develop the illness, they weren’t randomly afflicted. An article from Slate even 
hints at the girls’ agency: “Some scholars have also argued that hysterical 
episodes allow women to take a break from daily drudgeries, or to rage against 
patriarchal cultures within the safe bounds of demon possession or poisoning. If 
girls can find no outlet for reckless abandon, in other words, they’ll create one.” 
Though these claims are sweeping, they also suggest we might see the girls tics as 
(rhetorically) purposeful, in a sense, just as we might see their bodies as unique, 
central sites of inquiry.  
Of course, bodies and embodied rhetorics aren’t new to rhetorical studies. 
Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley’s 1999 collection Rhetorical Bodies marked a 
heightened rhetorical interest in bodies and materiality, yet therein bodies are 
often considered only as points of origin and articulations of positionality. In the 
“Afterword,” Crowley asserts that one of the most important things about body 
theories is that they highlight “the interestedness of boundary-drawing and 
distinction-making” (363). This is useful in showing that some one profits when 
distinctions and boundaries are made; she asserts, “no body is disinterested” 
(363). While this is certainly true, considering bodies primarily in terms of their 
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positionality (as they wear culturally constructed significations like race, class, 
and gender) prohibits us from thinking of bodies as always moving and changing, 
as Brian Massumi has argued. To accept bodies as the static point of origin for 
rhetoric, rather than seeing bodies as co-adapting along with environments, 
movements, and feelings, is to accept a narrow view of bodies. More recently, 
Debra Hawhee has echoed this concern in Moving Bodies:  
The bind for body theorists is that bodies become a problem when 
they come to ‘stand in’ for subject positions . . . Contemporary 
theory thus has a tendency to freeze bodies, to analyze them for 
their symbolic properties, thereby evacuating and ignoring their 
capacity to sense and to move through time. (7)  
The frozen body is particularly problematic for studies of pathos, which for too 
long have considered “the body” to be its container—literally and figuratively 
containing emotion. In this formulation, emotion either originates within the 
body, becomes the impetus for rhetoric, and moves outward, or someone else’s 
emotion is taken into the body through rhetorical means.  
 No doubt a study of bodies will run up against what Hawhee calls “the 
limits of humanistic approaches to the body,” yet I, like she and others, see 
pushing those limits as a rhetorically useful exercise (7). 3  If we restrict our 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 We can also see this sentiment in debates about agency, from, for example  
Marilyn Cooper (2011) who writes, “I suggest that neither conscious intention nor 
free will—at least as we commonly think of them—is involved in acting or 
bringing about change” (421), and in debates about the rhetorical situation, from, 
for example, Jenny Edbauer Rice (2005): “Rather than primarily speaking of 
rhetoric through the terministic lens of conglomerated elements, I look towards a 
framework of affective ecologies that recontextualizes rhetorics in their temporal, 
historical, and lived fluxes” (9). 
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understandings of what is rhetorical to the verbal and written discourse 
surrounding an event, we risk seeing bodies as static texts or as emotion’s point 
of origin; we fail to see how bodies’ movements and affects could be considered 
rhetorical and how more traditional forms of discourse are consumed by and 
reflected in bodies. To see bodies as generative rhetorical sites rather than static 
texts and/or social positions is important for understanding how rhetoric 
manifests and moves. These considerations are necessary for revising a theory of 
pathos.  
 
A Note on Terminology 
 Already in this chapter, I’ve used a range of terminology to describe the 
sensory, embodied, visceral, and noncognitve aspects or dimensions of rhetoric. 
My choice to use and move among three terms—pathos, emotion, and affect—
might be puzzling. However, this choice doesn’t mean I’m using them 
interchangeably or without concern for their differences and how they’ve been 
used in the past, commonly, and by other rhetoricians. Rather it is precisely these 
differences, I suggest, that allow us to study—to dig deeper into—complex 
rhetorical studies. In other words, this dissertation relies on harnessing the 
differences and possible relationships between these terms to suggest a 
theoretical framework for a revised approach of pathos—an approach that doesn’t 
just take pathos into account but puts it at the center of any investigation into 
complex rhetorical objects of study.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The main task of this dissertation—drawing out a more complicated theory 
of pathos—requires a close examination of how emotion and affect scholarship in 
other fields has been received and used to various ends in our field. Ultimately, I 
want to present pathos as an umbrella term that both emotion and affect 
inform—for rhetorical purposes. While emotion scholarship already fits under 
that umbrella in many ways (advances in cognitive and social approaches to 
emotion, for example, mostly align with how pathos has been traditionally 
understood), scholars often place affect scholarship purposefully outside of that 
umbrella. This is because pathos is generally understood to be an appeal the 
human rhetor uses, and affect is generally understood as being external to human 
control—and often even external to human (re)cognition. Both of these 
assumptions are precisely what I hope to trouble.  
Definitions of “affect” and “emotion” are plentiful inside and outside our 
field. In the pages that follow, I’m not interested in privileging one over the other 
as much as considering what various definitions may offer rhetorical studies. 
When I use the terms “affect” and “emotion,” I’ll be referring primarily to 
particular theories of each concept (e.g. cognitive-evaluative and social 
constructionist approaches to emotion, and affective theories inspired by 
Massumi, Jameson, and Lacan).  
My definition of pathos is, of course, more important for the work that 
follows. I understand pathos, first and foremost, as a rhetorical term. When I use 
“pathos,” I’m referring to the rhetorical concept that has traditionally been 
understood as an appeal to emotion, the third intrinsic proof (alongside ethos 
and logos). I see pathos as intimately tied to practical reasoning and public 
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deliberation, reflecting Edward Corbett and Rosa Ebberly’s (2000) claim that 
pathos is the “emotional impact of reasoning or argument on the listener reader” 
(72). But I also recognize the sometimes-intangible power of pathos, echoing 
sentiments like Cicero’s: “the two principal qualities required in an orator, are to 
be neat and clear in stating the nature of his subject, and warm and forcible in 
moving the passions; and as he who fires and inflames his audience, will always 
effect more than he who can barely inform and amuse them” (Brutus 89). To 
inflame the minds of an audience, to dwell in pathos, the rhetorical tradition 
suggests, a rhetor interprets the emotional state or disposition of an audience and 
then inspires emotions or emotional patterns that turn the audience in whatever 
direction the case demands. Because emotions have objects, following Aristotle’s 
approach, a savvy rhetor can alter the temporal and spatial proximity to those 
objects and change an emotion’s intensity within the audience’s ongoing 
reactions to a discourse or text. The ethical responsibilities of invoking pathos are 
also important to note, since use of pathos is always attached to a rhetorical 
purpose, which ideally contributes to community and civic wellbeing. In this 
regard, it is good to remember the close etymological relations among ethos, 
ethics, and dwelling and their inseparable relations to feeling. 4  
Traditionally, pathos has been associated with the emotions—not affects. 
When I use “pathos” in the first two chapters of this dissertation, I’m using it as it 
has been conventionally understood. In the final two chapters, wherein I attempt 
to revise a concept of pathos, I suggest we can also identify affects (variously 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 This is emphasized in Martha Nussbaum’s work on emotion and ethics, which I 
discuss briefly in Chapter One.   
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defined as bodily intensity, becomings, the aesthetic feeling of an era, 
identifications, exigences, and constraints) in rhetorical situations. It’s important 
to note that I don’t see the realm of affect as beyond the scope of emotion or as 
“logically” independent of emotion (as Massumi seems to suggest); this realm 
simply hasn’t been pursued extensively within the framework of emotion studies 
nor have the respective terminologies of affect and emotion been explored in 
proximity. Affect scholarship, taken as a whole, captures some aspects of 
experience that haven’t yet been explored in emotion scholarship but not because 
of something inherent in either concept, or so I will argue. 
Two other terms—rhetorical situation and rhetorical event—will be used in 
this dissertation to discuss how pathos has been traditionally theorized and to 
name and study the outbreak of mass hysteria in LeRoy. When I write about the 
“rhetorical situation,” I am using it as Lloyd Bitzer has defined it (as structured 
by exigence, audience, and constraint); I use this understanding as an example of 
a common or traditional way that the rhetorical situation has been defined in the 
field. I recognize that there have been many critiques5 of Bitzer’s theory; some 
have suggested that Bitzer has a too realist worldview (that his theory seems to 
capture an essential structure in real-world interactions rather than being an 
analytic tool) and others have suggested the spatiality and temporality of the 
situation he defined is too limiting. In order to acknowledge these critiques 
without abandoning what is structurally useful about Bitzer's rhetorical situation, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Richard Vatz’s “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation” is, of course, the most 
famous critique of Bitzer, but scholars like Barbara Biesecker in “Rethinking the 
Rhetorical Situation from within the Thematic of Difference” and Jenny Edbauer 
Rice in “Unframing Models of Public Distibution: From Rhetorical Situation to 
Rhetorical Ecologies” have also addressed the limitations of Bitzer’s theory.  
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I use the provisional term, “rhetorical event,” when discussing my case study. 
While “situation” has often been understood to mark a discrete, isolated period of 
time, “event” seems, to me, to be more spatially and temporally expansive. It may 
also allow me to keep some of the structural coherence of Bitzer's situation, while 
at the same time attending to the ways in which situations layer and overlap. 
 
The Pathetic Tradition, in Brief6  
Pathos has always been at the core of rhetoric. In classical rhetoric, pathos 
or the passions are portrayed both in Plato’s chariot allegory as the dark horse 
which “has a share of badness is heavy, sinking toward the earth and weighing 
down the charioteer by whom he has been not beautifully reared” (Phaedrus 
247b) and in Aristotle’s Rhetoric as intimately tied to persuasion: “The emotions 
are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are 
also attended by pain or pleasure” (bk II, ch. 1, 1378a). Even though Aristotle’s 
approach to pathos—based on a tripartite logic7 to analyze the structure of 
emotions—brought emotion within the sphere of enthymemic reasoning, the 
passions still were more often described as out of our control: passion is 
described throughout The Republic, for example, as “intoxicating,” “lawless,” and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Given the brevity of this introduction, I’m admittedly skipping over many 
important historical influences that inform current understandings of emotion, 
including Christianity, Descartes, psychoanalysis, faculty psychology, etc. For a 
brief historical overview, see “The “History of Emotion’ and the Future of 
Emotion Research” by Anna Wierzbicka.  
7 Aristotle describes how he will analyze each emotion in Book II: “In regard to 
each emotion we must consider (a) the states of mind in which it is felt; (b) the 
people towards whom it is felt; (c) the grounds on which it is felt” (bk. II, ch 1, 
1378a). 
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“slavish” (bk. IX). Or in contrast to Aristotle’s suggestion that we make use of 
emotions rhetorically, Gorgias highlights the more sinister role emotions play in 
rhetoric: “For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, 
and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case of 
speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others make the hearers 
bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion” 
(Ecomium 42). Here, Gorgias compares the effects of speech to the effects of 
drugs on a body, suggesting the emotions (distress, delight, fear) are what 
“bewitch” us. Logic, it seems, doesn’t enrapture our bodies and minds in the same 
way.     
 Speed forward two millennia and scholars continue to rely on classical 
understandings of pathos, though developing them in accord with the mission of 
the “new rhetorics.” Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification, for example, in 
which “you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, 
gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” has 
clear affective implications (Motives 55). To identify with someone in this way 
acknowledges the emotional dimension and embodied nature of lived experience, 
but it also points to something more, something recent theories call “affective 
investment.” Similarly, Edward Corbett (1969) noted the increased focus on—but 
also the risk of—a rhetoric that privileges pathos. He makes a clear distinction 
(using the metaphor of a hand) between traditional and “new” kinds of rhetorics:  
  The open hand might be said to characterize the kind of persuasive  
  discourse that seeks to carry its point by reasoned, sustained,  
  conciliatory discussion of the issues. The closed fist might signify  
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  the kind of persuasive activity that seeks to carry its point by non- 
  rationale, non-sequential, often non-verbal, frequently provocative  
  means. (“Rhetoric” 288) 
The closed fist (perhaps a contemporary dark horse in Plato’s chariot allegory), 
he suggests, attends to the emotional dimension, yet there is an element of 
volatility that makes the closed fist seem more than just emotional; it is 
provocative, if not untamed.  
In the last few decades, we’ve seen a surge of scholarship on emotion in 
our field. Some of the earliest works on emotion in rhetoric and composition 
emerged in the late ‘80s from Susan McLeod (1987, 1995) and Alice Brand (1989, 
1990). Their work focused primarily on the emotions that writers feel before and 
during the act of composing; they suggested that if we could examine expert 
writers’ emotions, we might be able to help our students compose better, more 
efficiently, or even find a cure for writer’s block. Two important collections for 
this area of scholarship were published during this time: Presence of Mind: 
Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive (1994) edited by Alice Glarden 
Brand and Richard Graves and The Spiritual Side of Writing: Releasing the 
Learner’s Whole Potential (1997), edited by Regina Paxton Foehr and Susan 
Schduring. These early works on emotion have clear expressivist undertones; 
they suggest that writers might be more successful and produce more “authentic” 
writing if they can tap into their emotions for inspiration. These works tend to 
consider emotions as personal, internal forces.  
Not surprising, given composition’s social turn in the following decade, 
work on emotion became more concerned with the social construction and 
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political stakes of experiencing and expressing emotion in the contexts of reading 
and writing. Lynn Worsham (1998) and T.R. Johnson (2001) are among those 
who consider how we are schooled in emotion and its political implications; they 
see emotion as embedded in our social and educational structures and 
dispositions. These considerations are taken up additionally by scholars who have 
examined the emotional labor of writing program administration and the 
emotional effects of disciplinary marginalization (see Micciche and Jacob’s 2003 
collection, A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion & Composition Studies). More 
recently, scholars like Micciche (2007) and Edbauer Rice (2005) have applied 
emotion and affect scholarship from across the humanities and social sciences to 
our field, suggesting emotions and affects exist between people, in language, and 
in our bodies. While the late ‘90s and early ‘00s saw an increased interest in 
emotion studies, it seemed to wane when scholars’ attention turned to studies of 
affect. In the last decade, the great influx in affect scholarship in our field would 
seem to suggest that affect theories offer the field something emotion theories 
don’t. I’ll suggest, however, that the influx of “affect” and waning of “emotion” 
reflects less about the usefulness of each concept and more about how each 
concept has been brought into, used, and theorized in our field. 
The main theoretical move that has contributed to the decline in emotion 
scholarship is the conceptual divorcing of affect from emotion. Many scholars 
attribute this move to this oft-cited distinction from Brian Massumi:  
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Affect is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion. But one 
of the clearest lessons of this first story8 is that emotion and affect—
if affect is intensity—follow different logics and pertain to different 
orders . . . Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, 
consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and 
semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-
reaction circuits, into function and meaning. (Parables 27-8).  
Since affect is most closely defined as intensity, emotion is affect tamed and 
named. The distinction Massumi makes between affect and emotion, which many 
scholars in the field have held onto so very tightly, keeps us from developing 
more complicated notions of pathos. When scholars accept Massumi’s distinction 
as fixed, they often see no need to consider emotion at all, since emotion is 
“qualified,” “conventional,” or “captured.” Given its long pathetic tradition, 
rhetoric is already primed for participating in the affective turn,9 yet rather than 
using affect theory to extend theories of pathos, most scholars seem to have 
abandoned emotion for affect.  
However, exploring the distinction between affect and emotion, what 
exists between feeling and articulation, is of great interest to rhetoric as we 
pursue nonrational and nonlinguistic forms of persuasion and communication. 
As Michael Hardt explains in the Forward to The Affective Turn,  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Here Massumi is referencing the first case study in his book, which I will discuss 
in detail in Chapter Two.  
9 The “affective turn” was coined by Patricia Clough in her 2007 collection of the 
same name.  
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[T]he perspective of the affects requires us to constantly pose as a 
problem the relation between actions and passions, between reason 
and the emotions. We do not know in advance what a body can do, 
what a mind can think—what affects they are capable of. The 
perspective of the affects requires an exploration of these as yet 
known powers. (x)  
From the perspective of the affects, we can see how pathos in the LeRoy case is 
not to be found just in the language of mystery and contagion, in the scare tactics 
used to engage audiences, in bating interview questions, or in the discourse 
among experts and the girls’ families. We are similarly persuaded emotionally by 
bodies fighting to control themselves, whose symptoms mimic and evolve 
together. Beyond language, beyond discourse, and yet interwoven within them, 
we’re persuaded emotionally through the bodies in this event. This dissertation—
through examination and critique of how emotion and affect have been studied in 
the field—offers a framework for studying pathos that acknowledges emotion’s 
and affect’s work within and beyond the rhetorical appeal.  
 
Chapter Overview 
Despite many scholars in rhetoric and composition who have embraced 
the resurgence of emotion studies in the last few decades, pathos is still primarily 
theorized as a rhetorical appeal. This formulation is useful only for studying 
rhetorical situations with discrete borders, beginnings and endings—not the 
rhetoricity of an event like the one in LeRoy wherein pathos plays many roles. 
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Chapter One, “Pathos Reconsidered,” begins by looking at two of the major 
advances in studies of emotion in the last few decades—cognitive-evaluative and 
social constructionist approaches to emotion—and examines how these advances 
have been received in our field.  
These approaches have been taken up in two primary ways: rereading 
Aristotle’s concept of pathos and creating pedagogies that call our attention to or 
invoke emotions. I suggest that while the practice of rereading (which often 
brings cognitive and social approaches to emotion to bear) has brought our 
attention to often-overlooked areas of Aristotle’s theory, this scholarship hasn’t 
yet considered what it would mean to use this more nuanced understanding of 
pathos in practice. Through a look at two examples of pedagogies of emotion 
from Laura Micciche and Megan Boler, I illustrate the difficulties of reconciling 
cognitive and social approaches to emotion. Micciche and Boler incite particular 
emotions (empathy and discomfort) in their students, but the structural logics of 
these particular emotions seem unequipped to meet the goals of their 
pedagogies—to create more critical readers and writers. Finally, I’ll suggest that a 
revised theory of pathos also requires reconsidering the rhetorical situation. 
Emotion is often considered to be the cause and effect of a rhetorical situation, 
yet as advances in emotion studies detailed in this chapter suggest, emotions play 
more varied roles (cognitively and socially) in persuading us. I end this chapter 
by suggesting affect theory allows us to imagine more complicated 
understandings of pathos, in which emotions and affects are organizing 
rhetorical forces.  
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Chapter Two, “Rhetorical Affects: Invoking Affect Theory in Rhetorical 
Studies,” examines how scholars in our field have primarily understood and used 
affect theory. I begin by considering the wave of affect theory that has seemed to 
overtake studies of emotion, and I look more closely at the conceptual distinction 
between affect and emotion in our field. Through a close reading of Massumi’s 
definitions of affect and emotion, I suggest that it’s the very relationship between 
the two concepts that Massumi and we might be more interested in. Because 
Massumi’s theory of affect focuses on bodily intensity—a force that cannot be 
captured in language—it often seems to describe a phenomenon that exists 
beyond the scope of rhetorical study; thus, I suggest we also consider other 
theories of affect that might be more easily integrated in our field. Fredric 
Jameson’s theory of affect (which describes the affects embedded in the 
postmodern era) highlights how we can see affects as recursive in a rhetorical 
situation, complicating traditional conceptions of rhetorical situations. Finally, 
because neither Massumi’s nor Jameson’s theories of affect deal with the 
individual’s affective experience, I turn to Jacques Lacan’s concept of desire 
(which is closely related to affect) to give insight into why and how individuals 
become affectively invested in groups, things, and events. To set up the work of 
the following chapter, I suggest that a revised theory of pathos should also 
consider the role affects and emotions play in defining projects, sustaining 
rhetorical events, and in applying rhetorical theories to studies of objects and 
events that might not always have been considered rhetorical.  
Chapter Three, “Persuasive Bodies, Phantom Rhetorics: A Theoretical 
Framework,” begins with a look at theories of phantom limbs to reveal several 
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ways of theorizing bodies that prohibit their study, for example making finite 
distinctions between what is and is not of a body, clinging to an idea of a whole 
body, and defining bodies by what is visibly present. I suggest we resist theorizing 
affect and matter as antithetical (in other words, accepting that matter is seen, 
touched, and used, and that affect is not). This chapter puts forth a framework to 
better study affect, by 1) approaching rhetoric ontologically, 2) reconnecting 
affect to assemblage theory, and 3) defining bodies (human and nonhuman) via 
their capacity to affect and be affected. In order to study something like an 
outbreak of mass hysteria, we have to figure out first what to study. Taking an 
ontological approach (and specifically invoking John Law and Vicky Singleton’s 
theory of “fire object”) allows us to identify how mass hysteria’s multiple objects 
have different (and sometimes conflicting) rhetorical aims and effects, in addition 
to different emotional and affective influences. To address a common complaint 
in our field—that we can’t ascertain what affect does rhetorically—I argue that 
revisiting Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s assemblage theory (specifically 
looking at the concepts “double articulation” and “territorialization”) makes 
affect rhetorically visible and purposeful, highlighting that affect assembles 
rhetoric, bodies, objects, etc. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s theory of bodies can 
help us see affect as transitive and not representational; affect is captured in a 
body’s movement from one state to another, correlated with an increase or 
decrease in a body’s (rhetorical) power to act.  
The final chapter, “A Rhetorical Analysis of Mass Hysteria,” applies the 
theoretical framework put forth in the previous chapter to the LeRoy case. I begin 
by describing what makes this case a particularly unique incident of mass 
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hysteria. In addition to the news media playing a large role in contributing to the 
diagnosing of the girls and in shaping the narrative on a national scale, social 
media (specifically faceboook and youtube) became central sites for both the 
transmission of symptoms but also for the girls’ attempts to take control of their 
own story. Following much of the scholarship that is the basis for this 
dissertation, I explain my methodology for the analysis of the case is somewhat 
unorthodox. Rather than focusing my analysis solely on the central texts of the 
case (e.g., the New York State Department of Health’s report and news media 
coverage), I use these texts (in conjunction with historical and medical 
scholarship on hysteria and the very recent scholarship on the case) to identify 
places in the development of this event that are particularly interesting for a 
rhetorical analysis of affect and emotion. Through an application of the 
framework put forth in Chapter Three, I conclude that 1) the way we choose and 
define complex rhetorical projects has emotional and affective repercussions, 2) 
assemblage theory helps us understand how particular parts of the event that 
might have seemed external are subsumed in it, and 3) an understanding of affect 
that grows out of Spinoza, Deleuze, and Guattari places affect at the very core of 
rhetoric and what is rhetorically possible. Through this configuration, we can 
imagine pathos as the very basis for what is rhetorically possible, as discourses 
and bodies come into being through their affects. This framework reveals pathos 
as an entry point into studying complex rhetorical events and asks us to construct 
different kinds of rhetorical projects that might consider, for example, a tic, 
verbal outburst, or illness as rhetorical.  
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I end with a Postscript that briefly summarizes what I consider to be the 
main tenets of a revised theory of pathos. I suggest this would involve 1) 
accepting affect and emotion as intimately related, 2) acknowledging and making 
rhetorical use of the varying theoretical approaches to affect and emotion, and 3) 
seeking out the study of rhetorical objects that are malleable, mediated, qne 
bodily, in order to better capture the central roles of affect and emotion in 
rhetoric. Finally, I offer three openings that might be pursued in future research, 
including 1) the ethical implications of a revised theory of pathos, 2) further 
analyses of psychoanalytic theories of affect, and 3) more serious studies of bodily 
processes as rhetorical. 
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Chapter One 
 
Pathos Reconsidered 
 
I suspect in fact that one of the reasons so much 
research on the emotions has appeared in the 
academy over the last twenty years is that it has 
served as compensation for the anesthetization of the 
emotions in academic life, a profession saturated with 
stringent rules of emotionless rationality in relation to 
research itself and to writing.  
–Kathleen Woodward, Statistical Panic 
 
 
There is nothing reprehensible about being moved to 
action through our emotions; in fact it is perfectly 
normal.  
–Edward Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern 
Student   
 
 
There’s no doubt that studies of emotion and affect have become more 
pervasive in the humanities and social sciences in recent decades. The first 
epigraph to this chapter reminds us that the turn to emotion and affect isn’t an 
accident; given our particular historical, cultural, and academic positionings, 
studies of emotion have become more relevant, perhaps even necessary. Yet the 
second epigraph reminds us that even though theories of emotion have been 
greatly complicated in recent years, it wasn’t that long ago that persuasion via 
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emotion could be considered “reprehensible.” It wasn’t that long ago that 
emotional appeals were treated as suspect, as appealing to something “lower” in 
our nature.  
While Corbett highlights the lingering mistrust of emotions, Woodward 
echoes a theme that resonates especially in rhetoric and composition—where 
many scholars (e.g., Susan Miller (1992); Eileen Schell (2006); Kathleen Welch 
(2003); Janine Rider and Esther Broughton (2004)) have written about the 
physical and emotional marginalization of our discipline. These scholars draw on 
rhetoric and composition’s history and struggle to become recognized as a 
discipline and touch on the lingering emotional effects of working in English 
departments or across campuses with academics who might still see rhetoric and 
composition as concerned more with service10 than serious scholarly pursuits. 
This marginalization has not just material repercussions (as academics fight for 
resources) but also emotional repercussions if rhetoric and composition scholars 
feel they need to prove their legitimacy. 
Focusing more on the emotional work in our classrooms, scholars like 
Lynn Worsham (1998), T.R. Johnson (2001), and Thomas Rickert (2007) have 
called our attention to how contemporary culture and media shape our work as 
composition teachers. Suggesting that the emotional experiences of learning and 
writing are fundamentally different given technological advances and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For scholarship on the emotional labor of writing program administration see 
Tom Kerr’s, Alice Gillam’s, and Mara Holt, Leon Anderson, and Alber Rouzie’s 
essays in A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies, eds. 
Laura Micciche and Dale Jacobs. See also Chris Drew et al.’s “Affect, Labor, and 
the Graduate Teaching Assistant: Can Writing Programs Become ‘Spaces of 
Hope’?” for considerations of the emotional labor of graduate students.  
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seeming influx of violence in educational settings, these scholars suggest we find 
better ways to help students learn and write in settings that might be more 
emotionally complicated (student emotions ranging from complete apathy to 
rage) than in previous generations. The fact that so many scholars have been 
interested in examining the emotions attached to our disciplinary and 
pedagogical work suggests that attention to emotion helps us better investigate a 
number of overlooked areas in our field.  
Given the influx in scholarship on affect and emotion in the humanities 
and social sciences, we might expect rhetorical theories of pathos to be greatly 
expanded in recent years. We might expect that scholars would use the studies of 
emotion in neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, etc. to reform a theory of 
pathos, but this has not yet been the case. While scholars in our field have used 
this burgeoning area of scholarship to reread canonical texts and to consider 
more carefully how emotion plays into our teaching (for students and teachers), 
they don’t easily translate into, or in aggregate compose, a theory of pathos that 
would provide clues for how we can better read and move an audience 
emotionally. This scholarship informs a more nuanced understanding of the 
nature of emotions but is usually discussed separately from theories of pathos.  
This chapter begins by explicating the two major movements in 
retheorizing emotion in the last several decades (cognitive-evaluative and social-
constructionist approaches to emotion) and then considers how they’ve been 
received in the field. Through a look at examples of rereading the concept pathos, 
I’ll suggest that scholars have used advances in emotion scholarship primarily to 
bolster—extend somewhat but certainly not transform—existing theories of 
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pathos. Then I’ll draw out some of the difficulties of reconciling cognitive and 
social theories in practice by looking at pedagogies of emotion. I’ll end this 
chapter by suggesting a revised theory of pathos would need to account for how 
pathos works in emergent, malleable rhetorical events.  
 
Influential Emotion Scholarship 
Two theoretical approaches have dominated scholarship on emotion in the 
humanities and social sciences in the last several decades: cognitive and social 
approaches. The first, influenced mostly by scholarship in psychology, philosophy 
and neuroscience,11 suggests that emotion is intelligent, rational, and intentional; 
it opposes an understanding of emotion as an unsophisticated, natural force. It 
asserts that rather than being at the mercy of emotional waves and whims, 
humans have the ability to recognize how emotion works practically and 
existentially. The second move emphasizes the cultural, political, and historical 
aspects of emotion. Coming from disciplines like anthropology, cultural studies, 
and women’s studies, this vein of scholarship emphasizes the contextuality of 
emotion and its relation to social position and identity. This social and cultural 
approach highlights the emotional structures and customs that are embedded in 
a particular place and time and experienced differently depending on one’s social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio in Descartes’ Error, for example, wrote 
extensively on emotions, claiming that feelings functioned no differently in the 
brain than other percepts. His main contribution was perhaps the speculative 
connection he formed between emotion and practical reasoning, arguing that 
emotions help fill in the inevitable gaps between what we know and what we 
would need to know to make a certain judgment or decision to permit practical 
judgment in an imperfectly understood world. 
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position and identity. Unlike cognitive theories which emphasize individuals’ 
reasoning and evaluative faculties (albeit in social contexts), social and cultural 
theories turn us outward to see how emotional pedagogies and mores are and 
become embedded in our culture. This section examines the major tenets of each 
approach as they might inform rhetorical studies.  
One of the central claims of cognitive theories of emotion is that emotion 
is an evaluative judgment. Philosopher Robert Solomon in his seminal book The 
Passions Emotions and the Meaning of Life (1976) asserts: “An emotion is a basic 
judgment about our Selves and our place in our world, the projection of the 
values and ideals, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and 
through which we experience our lives” (126). Emotions, then, are a structured 
way of understanding our worlds, based on beliefs, judgments, and values. 
Rather than understanding emotions as separate from the actions and 
interactions we experience, emotions make sense of those experiences: 
“[Emotions] are not reactions but interpretations. They are not responses to what 
happens but evaluations of what happens. And they are not responses to those 
evaluative judgments but rather they are those judgments” (127). Emotion, 
therefore, is a “conceptual scheme,” “a worldview and a system of metaphors” 
(Solomon 61). Solomon goes on to explain the logic of particular emotions, 
analyzing their specific direction, scope, strategy, mythology, etc. (mirroring but 
developing Aristotle’s tripartite analysis of emotions in Book II of the Rhetoric). 
Both Solomon and Aristotle highlight that emotions have objects and occur 
because of certain kinds of circumstances, interactions, and power dynamics. 
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Extending Solomon’s theory, philosopher Martha Nussbaum in Upheavals 
of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001) claims emotions are not only 
evaluative in nature but also emphasizes the centrally moral dimension of 
emotion: “Instead of viewing morality as a system of principles to be grasped by 
the detached intellect, and emotions as motivations that either support or subvert 
our choice to act according to principle, we will have to consider emotions as part 
and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning” (1). Nussbaum sees emotions as a 
call to respond ethically; they are a part of “the good life”—our conception of what 
it means to live well with others. This resonates especially with pathos since 
rhetoricians have long debated the importance of invoking emotion ethically and 
responsibly.   
However, cognitive theories, critics12 have argued, in privileging the 
mental aspects of emotion, often ignore—or are too quick to dismiss—the role of 
bodies. Because they are responding to prominent influences like the James-
Lange theory and the hydraulic model of emotion13—which reinforce that 
emotion is based in bodies and more importantly, that bodies cannot be trusted—
Solomon and Nussbaum emphasize that emotions are mental phenomena with 
direction and intention. Early bodily theories of emotion reinforce what Solomon 
calls “The Myth of the Passions,” wherein emotions are “animal intrusions and 
physiologically based disruptions,” “sporadic and ‘irrational’ intrusions,” or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Some of cognitive theory’s major critics are William Lyons (1980), Ronald de 
Sousa (1987), Peter Goldie (2000). 
13 For more on the James-Lange theory and the hydraulic model see Michael 
Hyde (1984), Matthew Ratcliffe (2005), Robert Solomon (2007). Solomon uses 
the “hydraulic model” to serve as a visual reminder that his opposition indulged 
in a too mechanical view of human existence. 
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”threatening or overwhelming ‘forces’” (xiv). Nussbaum similarly identifies “the 
adversary” to cognitive theories: “emotions are ‘non-reasoning movements,’ 
unthinking energies that simply push the person around” (24). If emotions are 
movements that can push and pull us to do things outside of rationality, bodies 
become the wild vehicles of emotion. Thus, in distancing themselves from The 
Myth of the Passions, many cognitive theories favored minds over bodies—
resulting in what some critics have called an inverse validation of the Cartesian 
binary.  
The claim that made cognitive approaches resonate with so many scholars 
at the time—that emotion is a judgment—is also a point of contention,14 since 
judgment is so closely associated with mental processes. Solomon (2004), 
himself, nearly thirty years after he published The Passions admits that his 
cognitive theory “veered too far in the other direction,” overlooking the role of 
bodies (85). He suggests that “judgment” is often misunderstood as “overly 
detached and intellectual” but that he’s always recognized that judgments are 
bodily. Instead he claims, “‘Judgment’ is less than adequate not because it is too 
detached or cerebral but because it fails to make fully explicit our active 
engagement in the world” (83). Thus, Solomon focuses his later cognitive theory 
of emotion on highlighting how our (emotional) judgments have a recursive 
relationship with our surroundings, such that they interpret but also influence 
the world around us.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 David Weberman (1996) for example has called Solomon’s cognitive view of 
emotion “subjectivist” because it’s concerned mostly with the individual subject’s 
world, holding that all perceived things are shaped by our subjectivity. 
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Similarly, “judgment” also seems to imply, perhaps inaccurately, conscious 
awareness and intentionality. Because of this association, Ronald De Sousa 
(1987) suggests that the cognitive view of emotion is best understood as a model 
of perception rather than a model of knowledge or judgment: “an emotion can 
genuinely affect not just behavior but even our whole orientation to the world and 
the events of our lives, without the subject having any particular insight into 
either the identity of the emotion or the nature of its influence” (64). The 
problem with accepting emotions as judgments is that we often translate that to 
mean we are fully aware of the emotions we have; accepting emotions as 
perceptions, though, highlights how emotions are a way of understanding the 
world around us without committing us to a too-cognitive, or mentalistic, 
approach. We can never hold all of the emotions that shape us in our minds at 
once. As both Solomon and Aristotle point out, particular emotions function in 
different ways; they have different objects and last for different periods of time. I 
feel love for my mother, but that love isn’t always the foremost emotion I 
experience; it is likely often overshadowed by a series of other more temporally 
and spatially close emotions I experience every day.  My love may abide but it is 
always foregrounded; it isn’t reducible to a number of episodes or times when I 
am more aware of my love.  
 The second major movement in recent emotion scholarship addresses 
some of cognitive theories’ blind spots and focuses on the cultural, political, and 
historical15 construction of emotion. Many social theorists work against the same 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 For more on the history of emotion in rhetoric, see Daniel Gross’ Secret 
History of Emotion.   
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Cartesian assumptions about emotion that the cognitive theorists oppose; 
anthropologist Catherine Lutz, for example, in Unnatural Emotions rejects an 
“overly naturalized and rigidly bound concept of emotion”; instead she sees 
“emotion as an ideological practice rather than as a thing to be discovered or an 
essence to be distilled” (4). The Western distinction between nature and culture, 
Lutz suggests, in which culture is taken to be civilized and rational, contributes to 
the idea that emotion is natural (paradoxically, perhaps even mechanical): 
“emotion can be viewed as a cultural and interpersonal process of naming, 
justifying, and persuading by people in relationship to each other. Emotional 
meaning is then a social rather than an individual achievement—an emergent 
product of social life” (5). An individual’s emotional experience always reflects 
the culture in which she lives—its language for emotion and the ways she is 
taught to understand, feel, and express emotions, given her age, social 
positioning, race, sexuality, etc. In pointing to the constructedness of emotions, 
social theorists often suggest that we are all complicit in regulating our and 
others’ emotions and that paying attention to this regulation might undo some of 
the emotional construction that has had particularly troublesome 
consequences.16 
Feminist scholar Sara Ahmed in Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004) 
builds on this approach to the emotions, suggesting that “emotions are not ‘in’ 
either the individual or the social, but produce the very surfaces and boundaries !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 One poignant example is psychologists Dan Kindlon and Michael Thompson’s 
Raising Cain: Protecting the Emotional Life of Boys, which details the 
(sometimes violent) consequences of a lack of emotional literacy in American 
boys. See also Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod’s collection  Language and 
the Politics of Emotion. 
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that allow the individual and the social to be delineated as objects” (10). Here, 
Ahmed recognizes the limitations of locating emotion primarily within or beyond 
the individual and offers instead metaphors of surface and boundary to 
emphasize how experiences with emotion divide and categorize individuals into 
social groups and cultures.   
Many social theories of emotion also point out the ways in which a 
person’s social and cultural positioning both enable and constrain the expression 
of and experience with emotion. One obvious way we are positioned is through 
gender. In “Engendered Emotion: Gender, Power, and the Rhetoric of Emotional 
Control in American Discourse” (1996), Lutz contends that any discourse on 
emotion is ultimately a discourse on gender:     
As both an analytic and an everyday concept in the West, emotion, 
like the female, has typically been viewed as something natural 
rather than cultural, irrational rather than rational, chaotic rather 
than ordered, subjective rather than universal, physical rather than 
mental or intellectual, unintended and uncontrollable, and hence 
often dangerous. (69)  
Studies show, according to Lutz, that children as young as preschool age have 
learned gendered emotional stereotypes; emotion for women is especially 
culturally constructed, functioning to keep women subordinate and labeled as 
irrational (87). Because women are expected to be more emotional, they are often 
held responsible for the emotional lives of those who surround them. This is a 
common claim that feminist scholars studying emotion address; philosopher 
Alison Jaggar, for instance, supports Lutz’s assertion about the gender disparity 
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in emotional expression: “emotionally inexpressive women are suspect as not 
being real women” (157). Jaggar calls emotions that are incompatible with 
dominant values “outlaw emotions”; anger, for example, is an outlaw emotion for 
women, although the propensity for anger is an important component for male 
expressions of dominance and masculinity. Both Lutz and Jaggar, by pointing out 
the systemic nature of emotions, emphasize emotions as culturally embedded; we 
grow up in patterns of emotional expression and experience that teach us which 
emotions are more or less acceptable, given our identities.  
Each of these approaches presents unique opportunities for theories of 
pathos.  The cognitive approach suggests that a closer study of how particular 
emotions work could help a rhetor more easily incite them or work with them. 
For example, because emotions always have an object, if a rhetor wants to incite 
anger, she might bring the object of anger into presence through anecdotes or 
imagery, but if a rhetor wants to inspire forgiveness toward the object of that 
anger, she might try to distance her discourse from that object and instead 
conjure an object that inspires sympathy. Depending on the emotion, spatial and 
temporal distance from the object of the emotion might intensify or ameliorate it. 
Rhetors are often tasked with trying to either incite an emotion to inspire action 
in an audience or quell an emotion to appease an audience; thus, understanding 
the structures of emotions can be useful when a rhetor decides which emotions 
might be best to invoke and how to work (with) them. If emotions are structured 
cognitively as judgments and serve primarily evaluative purposes, opportunities 
emerge for rhetoricians. Studying the judgments that structure an emotion 
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related to its object gives rhetoricians a clearer place to start when they plan 
pathetic strategies and integrate them with a larger plan and purpose.  
Likewise, social approaches to emotion provide the rhetor with a better 
idea of how social and political contexts might shape the emotions of an audience 
or their willingness (perhaps susceptibility) to developing other emotions. 
Because rhetorical situations always have cultural, contextual constraints, 
thinking more carefully about these constraints might offer clues about which 
emotions would be best to appeal to. For example, many took advantage of the 
emotions inspired by 9/11, perhaps most egregiously George W. Bush who used 
the dynamics of anger and fear to further his purpose in his national addresses. 
Though an extreme case, Bush’s use of pathos,17 combined with an understanding 
of the emotions that dominated American culture at that time, was arguably 
effective. Similarly, following social theorists who assert our emotions are tied up 
in our cultural identities and affiliations, a rhetor might pay particular attention 
to the identities and affiliations of an audience to determine which emotions 
might be most effective in persuading that audience. For example, a rhetor 
addressing a group of female pro-choice activists might incite feelings that are 
accepted and valued in that group (anger, empowerment, strength). Studying the 
cultural contexts of a rhetorical situation as they are attached to the identities of 
those in an audience might help a rhetor more carefully choose her emotional 
appeals.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee even discuss Bush’s use of pathos in their 
Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. They suggest it was important for 
Bush to take advantage of the immediate intensity of emotions following 9/11, 
reflecting a spatial and temporal understanding of emotions.  
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However, it’s not difficult to imagine the potential trouble of invoking 
these two approaches, as scholars try to reconcile emotion as part of the cognitive 
processing of the individual and emotion in social and cultural constructs. When 
we imagine these two forces in a situation, they seem to be heterogeneous: 
cognitive emotions originate inside the individual and social emotions originate 
outside the individual and are imposed on him. This makes it difficult to imagine 
how, in practice, we can integrate these forces within a coherent way of 
addressing emotion rhetorically, as the individual seems to be situated as a 
screen through which emotions unilaterally move in and out. Of course both 
cognitive and social theories are more complicated than this, as scholars from 
both approaches have argued in addressing critiques. Yet there’s little precedence 
for how a rhetor might embrace both approaches to emotion in practice. In part, 
this is a disciplinary issue, since philosophers and social scientists are invested in 
studying particular sites. Rhetoricians who deal with individual rhetors and 
audience members within social and cultural contexts would be interested in how 
these approaches work and interact with each other. A theory of pathos should 
grow out of an understanding of emotion on both cognitive and social levels. In 
the following sections (rereading and pedagogy), we can see how difficult it is to 
integrate productive, coherent ways of invoking these two influences, especially 
in practice.  
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Rereading Aristotle’s Pathos 
 Cognitive and social approaches to emotion have inspired rereadings of 
pathos (mostly but not all neo-Aristotelian) that 1) heighten our awareness of its 
many roles in persuasive communication and 2) complicate our understanding of 
the concept itself. Rereading has, of course, been an important practice in our 
field and there are many varied examples of it;18 here, I’ll turn to a few brief 
examples to exemplify how cognitive and social approaches have influenced 
relatively recent studies of pathos.  
 The first kind of rereading takes the influx in emotion scholarship as an 
occasion to recognize the (often overlooked) role of pathos in the rhetorical 
tradition. We can see this, for example, in Susanna Engbers’ (2007) rereading of 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s use of pathos in her speeches. While several scholars 
have attributed Cady Stanton’s success to her mastery of masculine discourse 
conventions, Engbers asserts that it was also her mastery of feminine-seeming 
appeals to emotion—specifically her ability to conjure sympathy through use of 
vivid, sensory language—that made her speeches so effective. Engbers builds off 
of the social and feminist work of reclaiming emotion, and asserts that pathos has 
often been systemically ignored in the rhetorical tradition. Because, as Krista 
Ratcliffe (1996) has suggested, the Western tradition names emotion as “illogical, 
irrational, nonsensical, untrue, invalid” (19), pathos has often been a more 
cursory focus in rhetorical analysis. The practice of rereading, as many feminist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See Janet Atwill’s Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition 
(1991) or Susan Jarrett’s Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured 
(1991). 
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rhetorical scholars19 have illustrated, often serves to identify and reconsider 
rhetorical and discursive traditions that might be considered more feminine (like 
emotion). Although this vein of scholarship takes advances in emotion 
scholarship as an occasion to highlight the role of pathos, it doesn’t necessarily 
consider the concept anew; while it emphasizes the importance of understanding 
emotions as gendered, it gives few clues as to how we might use that 
understanding in practice.   
The second kind of rereading, however, aims to use cognitive and social 
approaches to more directly reconsider how pathos (especially the Aristotelian 
concept) has been defined and developed rhetorically. This is, of course, a 
delicate task because we have to be careful not to produce anachronistic 
rereadings, as Jeff Walker (2000) reminds us. He asserts, for example, that “the 
Aristotelian account of pathos implies a rhetoric that is not quite ‘Aristotelian,’ at 
least not in the usual neo-Aristotelian sense, and that is quite probably at odds 
with what Aristotle himself preferred” (“Pathos” 76). The recent surge of 
cognitive theories that portray emotions as intentional, he says, is not likely true 
to Aristotle’s original purposes, since the common Greek understanding was that 
emotions could not be “consciously willed or ‘commanded’ into existence” 
(“Pathos” 83). In rushing to reread Aristotle through recent trends in emotion 
studies, some scholars, Walker asserts, have ignored the heart of his theory. 
 However, Walker illustrates through careful study of the enthemyme, in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 For example, Cheryl Glenn’s Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from 
Antiquity through the Renaissance (1997), and Gesa Kirsch and Jacqueline 
Royster’s Feminist Rhetorical Practices: New Horizons for Rhetoric, 
Composition, and Literacy Studies (2012). 
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his 1994 article “The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of the Enthymeme,” how 
cognitive and social approaches to emotion can be better invoked. Because the 
root of enthymeme (thymos or heart) is the “seat of emotions and desires or 
motive, of the sometimes uncontrollable forces of desire and wish that drive 
human intentionality,” Walker suggests pathos had a more important role in the 
enthymeme (or enthymeme construction) than scholars once thought (“Body” 
48-9). He asserts, “the three traditional sources of persuasion-ethos, logos, 
pathos-are not separate kinds of ‘proof’ but simultaneous dimensions of the 
enthymeme” (“Body” 60). Through etymological and historical work, Walker 
emphasizes that Book II of Aristotle’s Rhetoric already uses a social and cultural 
approach to emotion along with a cognitive one. Walker uses contemporary 
theories to highlight what has always been present in and central to Aristotle’s 
work.  
Similarly, Ellen Quandahl (2003) carefully acknowledges the cultural 
context of ancient Greece to assert that Aristotle’s writing on emotions is based 
on his observations of others in his culture. She draws on Aristotle’s identity as a 
teacher of rhetoric to suggest his take on emotions was centrally or substantially 
pedagogical in nature. Aristotle is “an indispensable predecessor for 
acknowledging and working with rather than against emotion in rhetorical 
education” (11). His writing recognizes emotions as situational, yet they also have 
an underlying pedagogical purpose that always considers what is best for citizens 
and orators. Quandahl’s rereading emphasizes the political landscape of 
Aristotle’s time—in addition to considering his daily life and investments in 
Greek society. Like Walker, Quandahl uses the recent resurgence of studies in 
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emotion to reread the role emotions played for Aristotle in his writing—but more 
importantly in his teaching.  
Taking up what has arguably been the most promising rereading of 
Aristotle’s concept pathos to date, Michael Hyde and Craig Smith (1991) examine 
Book II of the Rhetoric in conjunction with Heidegger’s analysis of mood. The 
problem with the (mostly neo-Aristotelian) way Book II is often read, they assert, 
is that it fails to recognize that “emotions function primordially as vehicles for the 
active sensibility of human beings, that they are interrelated and exist along 
continua, and that they have the power to transform the temporal and spatial 
existence of our publicness, our everyday being-with-others” (461). Hyde and 
Smith emphasize that Aristotle presented his discussion of emotions, not as a 
mere list of independent examples, but in pairs (anger-calm, friendship-enmity, 
fear-confidence, shame-shamelessness, kindness-cruelty, pity indignation, and 
envy-emulation) that each form a dynamic continuum. This mode of presentation 
suggests that our attention should be less on the causes of discrete emotions and 
more on the relations between emotions, the dynamic interactions between 
emotions, and how all that affects our experience with them. Thus, a rhetorical 
study of emotions should consider not just how emotions are appealed to but how 
speakers move audiences between emotional pairs. As Hyde and Smith assert, 
“Touching one pathe affects others that are part of the human emotional web; the 
webbing runs along continua that help bring listeners into the same frame of 
mind” (456). If emotions exist on continua, the rhetor’s job is either to push the 
listeners along a continuum from one end to the other or to keep them in a more 
settled, “least affected” state.  
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To accept Hyde and Smith’s reading means that our concept of the 
emotional appeal needs to be expanded to recognize 1) that we are dealing with 
emotional dynamics or patterns of emotion and not discrete emotional 
episodes/states, and 2) that our grasp of what emotions do (push and motivate) is 
deficient and needs to include an understanding of how—exactly—emotions open 
up aspects of the world, rhetorically operating complexly with affect and bodily 
movement. Put otherwise, emotional appeals, they suggest, do not just “motivate” 
thought, belief, and action; they have a much richer role to play in our discursive 
(rhetorical) lives. While Hyde and Smith make a compelling call to reconsider 
and expand Aristotle’s concept pathos, no one has yet responded.  
While Walker and Quandahl’s rereadings use advances in emotion 
research to offer a more nuanced portrayal of Aristotle’s concept of pathos, these 
aspects of his theory of pathos have been there all along. Walker and Quandahl 
don’t reshape the concept pathos as much as they use recent advances in emotion 
research to point out how much of it was overlooked in the first place. Though a 
relatively new focus in rhetorical studies, many scholars across disciplines have 
turned back to point out the complexities of Aristotle’s theory.20 Long before 
cognitive and social approaches, Heidegger famously called Book II “the first 
systematic hermeneutic of everydayness of being with one another,” and it 
became the basis of his theory of Dasein (178). He asserts, “the fundamental 
ontological interpretation of affects has hardly been able to take one step worthy 
of mention since Aristotle” (138).   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Even Freud claimed that psychoanalytic theories of verbal suggestion 
resonated with Aristotle’s Book II. 
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Rereadings of Aristotle’s concept pathos have pointed our attention back 
to the concept itself and how nuanced it is, but except for the yet-pursued 
openings Hyde and Smith’s rereading offers, we don’t get a sense of how to take 
advantage of these rereadings rhetorically. Arguably, this is a matter of the 
purpose of rereading; it’s a practice that puts forth new interpretations of texts 
and doesn’t necessarily put those interpretations into practice. However, 
cognitive and social approaches to emotion have also contributed to recent 
pedagogies in the field.  
 
Pedagogies of Emotion 
 We might expect that in practice, in pedagogy, it might be easier to invoke 
both cognitive and social approaches to emotion, yet the trends I detail in this 
section show how emotion scholarship has been used primarily in cultural 
studies-like analyses of our discipline and pedagogies—an approach that while 
valuable fails to address how we can rhetorically respond to or change these 
emotional conditions. An extension of social inquiries into emotion, much of this 
line of scholarship considers how emotion is disciplined—both on a societal level 
and within the academy. In the collection A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion 
& Composition Studies, editors Dale Jacobs and Laura Micciche assert: “the 
personal and the professional are always interconnected, making the 
commonplace idea that emotion is solely ‘personal’ an untenable and insufficient 
claim because it fails to consider the way emotion refuses to be contained in our 
‘personal’ lives” (6). This resonates with scholars who have written about 
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experiences with professional emotions, for instance shame (J. Brooks Bouson 
(2005), Schell (2006), and Di Leo (2006)). Bouson describes ours as “a time 
when, as the job market is collapsing and tenure is being slowly eroded, the Ph.D. 
degree is becoming an emblem not of intellectual pride but of failure for those 
forced into the dismal world of the adjunct instructor” (625). She asserts a 
“decline of civility in the profession” contributes to public ridicule at conferences, 
disparaging those on the bottom of the academic hierarchy (627). This vein of 
scholarship explores the emotional, social conditions that academics navigate 
and in naming particular emotions, brings the scholarship within the purview of 
cognitive approaches to emotion. While these inquiries into disciplinary and 
academic emotions are important for better understanding our (emotional) work 
in this culture, they don’t discuss the role pathetic appeals or strategies might 
have in the (re)construction of these emotional conditions.  
 Several scholars assert that academic emotional conditions might be most 
tangible in our classrooms.21 The most frequently cited work on pedagogies of 
emotion in the field is Lynn Worsham’s “Going Postal” which critiques our 
cultural education in emotion, describing the “hidden curriculum” of emotion in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21  Another important consideration for theorizing pathos in the classroom is 
through our use of textbooks. See Gretchen Fletcher Moon’s 2003 article “The 
Pathos of Pathos:  The Treatment of Emotion in Contemporary Composition 
Textbooks” for an overview of how textbooks in the field tend to deal with pathos. 
A particularly strong example of introducing pathos to students is Sharon 
Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. 
They achieve an important balance in presenting emotions as personal, 
embodied, rational, and intelligent. They reframe the way pathos has been 
situated historically, suggesting the ancients often attached emotional appeals to 
the logical and thought emotions had “heuristic potential” to move an audience 
from one place to the next.  
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capitalist society; emotions like “grief, hatred, bitterness, anger, rage, terror, and 
apathy” dominate our affective lives (217). Composition and cultural studies 
responded to this violent emotional culture with “radical pedagogy,” but 
Worsham asserts it rarely accomplishes the decolonization it intends. Both 
critical and experiential pedagogies tend to still ascribe to uncomplicated theories 
of emotion, if they attend to emotion at all: 
Critical pedagogy fails to be sufficiently critical; it does not carefully 
consider, through a subtly articulated discourse of emotion, how 
students have been taught to name their affective lives, how they 
might begin the process of renaming and rephrasing. Critical 
pedagogy does not make emotion and affective life the crucial 
stakes in political struggle. With its rhetoric focused on pleasure 
and empowerment, critical pedagogy works against itself to 
remystify not only the objective conditions of human suffering but 
also the varied experience of suffering. (235)  
Worsham gets closest to explaining how these larger cultural/emotional 
phenomena play out in our everyday work, yet she also points to several obstacles 
that stand in the way of more nuanced applications of emotion studies, for 
example, a lack of attention to primary schooling in emotion, a lack of emotional 
vocabularies,22 or the gendered division of (emotional) labor. Worsham’s main 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Many affect and emotion scholars have made the claim that a lack of 
vocabulary to describe affective and emotional experience prevents us from more 
complicated understandings. Teresa Brennan (2004), for example, asserts, “It 
then behooves us, as a species, to reconnect language and understanding with the 
fleshly and environmental codes from which our consciousness had split by 
fantasy and illusion” (148-9). Additionally, see Massumi (2002), Boler (1999), 
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critiques of critical pedagogy lie in the penchant to recognize emotion as either a 
positive or negative force. In highlighting the relationship between being 
“sufficiently critical” and cultivating “pleasure and empowerment,” we see the 
tendency to align emotion either with the negativity of critique or the positivity of 
empowerment.23  
This tendency underlies much of the scholarship on pedagogy and emotion 
in the humanities, as we can see in, for example, Dale Jacob’s (2005) a pedagogy 
of hope, Laura Micciche’s (2007) a pedagogy of wonder, Megan Boler’s (1999) 
pedagogy of discomfort, or Katarzyna Marciniak’s (2010) pedagogy of anxiety. 
Through the “difficult emotions” of fear or discomfort, scholars suggest students 
will recognize truths about the world, conjure more self-awareness, and learn to 
be more “critical” about the discourses that surround them. Through pedagogies 
that focus on more positive (e.g., hope, wonder) emotions, scholars suggest 
students will develop a kind of curiosity that allows them to see their worlds 
anew. Both of these sets of pedagogies promise a kind of emotional 
enlightenment, forged through a path of negative emotional analysis or positive 
emotional invention. Focusing on emotion as inherently positive or negative 
distracts us though from grasping a more complicated understanding of 
emotion—one that a concept of pathos could grow out of. I’ll describe an example 
of a positive and a negative emotional pedagogy, and then show how they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Micciche (2007), and “Contemporary Vocabularies of Emotion” by Ellen 
Bersheid, or “Emotion and Culture: Arguing with Martha Nussbaum,” by Anna 
Weirznicka. 
23 Interestingly, “affect” also tends to be theorized as either “good” or “bad,” as 
Claire Hemmings (2005) has noted; she asserts scholars tend to use “affect” with 
“the pessimism of social determinism (including bad affect) or the optimism of 
affective freedom (good affect)” (551). 
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struggle to reconcile an understanding of emotion as simultaneously cognitive 
and social.  
The primary emotions considered in Micciche’s Doing Emotion: Rhetoric, 
Writing, Teaching are empathy and wonder. Because she emphasizes how 
emotion is performative, enacted and embodied, she writes about a “deep 
embodiment pedagogy,” which grows out of cultural and performance theory, 
and which asks students to embody or perform others peoples’ emotions. One of 
the exercises asks students to record someone else’s everyday conversation, 
transcribe it, and then perform it. This exercise encourages students to feel 
empathy for what it’s like to live in another person’s body and social position: 
“Rather than studying emotioned bodies as textual features for analysis, a 
performative approach attempts to make physical the realities of being a certain 
kind of body in the world” (56). In another example, students record themselves 
reading a passage of a text aloud, compare their reading to others, and then 
perform others’ readings. Taking on another person’s physical and cultural 
identity through performing a text pushes students out of passive interpretation 
and analysis: “Deep embodiment . . . opens us to experimentation with 
inhabiting, as much as possible, another’s embodied emotions through an 
intimate relation to words as well as through bodily-based performance of those 
words” (60). Micciche uses a social approach to emotion by emphasizing that all 
bodies are situated in social and cultural contexts. The empathy that students 
experience, Micciche suggests, can fuel students’ critical and rhetorical work, 
drawing on the inventive capacities of emotion. Courses that are “highly charged” 
and “emotionally sensitive,” she suggests, might benefit from “classroom 
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activities that ask students to perform one facet of an illness, character, or author 
(as well as what they perceive to be an alternative characteristic) with a particular 
focus on the emotionally entailed in each performance” (69). Through the 
practice of empathy and in cultivating wonder (efforts that reflect a cognitive 
approach of identifying particular emotions but also a social approach by 
emphasizing that bodies are always socialized), deep embodiment pedagogy 
promises to incite new experiences and ideas for students. 
 Focusing, instead, on inciting critical readings through more negative 
emotional experience, education scholar Megan Boler puts forth her theory of a 
“pedagogy of discomfort” in Feeling Power: Emotions and Education. Boler 
asserts fear is the primary emotion when it comes to not seeing, ignoring, and 
dismissing the injustices that surround us. This “emotional selectivity” is what we 
use to repress and sanction “unacceptable” emotions, but we must, she says, 
“examine how our modes of seeing have been shaped specifically by the dominant 
culture of the historical moment” (179). Thus, Boler makes the practice of what 
she calls “collective witnessing” central in her pedagogy of discomfort; to engage 
in an emotional critical inquiry students must “collectively witness” (rather than 
individually reflect on) “how emotion shapes what and how they see—and don’t 
see” (177). Boler gives examples of looking at photos of lynchings or the video of 
Rodney King’s beating to examine the privileges of spectatorship. Essentially, this 
pedagogy asks students and instructors to collectively question their beliefs and 
values, to reveal “visual habits” or “habits of inattention” that keep us from 
witnessing our surroundings. In asking students to recognize and name the 
emotions felt in witnessing violence, Boler emphasizes a cognitive approach to 
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emotions, alongside considerations of the historical and cultural moment. The 
goal of Boler’s pedagogy is to create a collective experience of discomfort that she 
hopes will help students dwell in ambiguity, to inspire more critical readings of 
cultural events. 
 What these pedagogies offer, unlike the scholarly practice of rereading 
rhetoric’s past, is a look at what it means to incite emotion. While Boler and 
Micciche aren’t in a conventional rhetorical situation per se, they use pathos to 
incite particular emotions through the scenarios and experiences they ask 
students to participate in. Boler and Micciche use both cognitive and social 
approaches to emotion in the hopes of inciting discomfort and empathy, albeit 
with different emphases in each case. In choosing particular kinds of emotion, 
they suggest they are invoking a cognitive understanding of emotion, yet neither 
spends the time to consider the logics of these emotions—how they work and are 
best developed. Rather Micciche’s and Boler’s logics seems to rely on socially 
expected responses to particular objects. For example, the social expectation is 
that witnessing violence makes you feel uncomfortable, and “taking a walk in 
another person’s shoes” makes you feel empathy. And upon this witnessing or 
embodying, Boler and Micciche hope students will be propelled into 
social/political action of some kind. However, we know from cognitive theory 
that an emotion like empathy, for example, is very complicated. Empathy can 
quickly turn into resentment or relief depending on the object of empathy. As 
Dennis Lynch has suggested in his writing on empathy: 
Those who start from positions of privilege seem to have no clear 
motivation to empathize with others less fortunate, at least 
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motivation that is in line with “their” interests, while those who 
start from positions of relative disadvantage only stand to lose more 
ground by giving ground— through empathy—to their opposition. 
The social field is not even, and, given this critique, the call to 
empathize can suddenly seem inadequate, as if hidden in that call 
were the bound-to-fail message, “Just listen, and in time the 
dynamics of power will flatten themselves out” (9). 
The uneven social field Lynch mentions would likely play out in the composition 
classroom: if I’m performing/embodying the actions of someone who I deem is 
better off, my empathy can quickly turn into resentment; if I’m 
performing/embodying the actions of someone who I deem is worse off, my 
empathy can quickly turn into self-satisfaction or even relief as I’m reminded of 
my good fortune. Empathy is also a difficult emotion to maintain; in the moment 
of the embodiment exercise and shortly thereafter, I might feel empathy but with 
temporal and spatial distance from the object of empathy (the experience of the 
exercise), it diminishes. Thus, empathy alone—or reduced in this manner of 
execution—might not be best suited to inspire social and political engagement. 
Without a more detailed analysis of empathy, Micciche fails to fully take 
advantage of a cognitive approach to emotion. In hoping that the “positive” 
experience of empathy will result in a classroom environment that is both more 
critical but also aware of their social stratification, Micciche seems to ascribe to 
what Lynch calls the “bound-to-fail message”: “Just listen, and in time the 
dynamics of power will flatten themselves out.”  
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Similarly, a cognitive look at “discomfort” uncovers the potential difficulty 
of invoking it in the classroom. In part this is because discomfort works more like 
a mood than an emotion; its object tends to be broad or ambiguous. We can 
imagine how a first-year student might view something like the video of the 
Rodney King beating and feel discomfort, yet the object of that discomfort is 
likely broad or undetermined. That discomfort could arguably be directed at 
police officers, Rodney King, the history of American racism, the justice system, 
the teacher who is showing the video, etc. Like depression or anxiety, discomfort 
rarely has a clear object. This discomfort could easily manifest as a vague 
mistrust or suspicion of society in general—hardly the kind of emotional 
experience that would inspire one to enact social and political change. Because 
discomfort functions more like a mood than an emotion, it tends to be more 
difficult to identify and change.  
These pedagogies hope emotional experience will inspire students to feel 
something new that will lead to more critical, socially aware reading and analysis. 
However, it’s unclear the extent to which the emotional structures of empathy or 
discomfort will incite the kind of change that is desired. The tendency to cast 
emotion as primarily positive or negative overshadows the more subtle work of 
emotion. The assumption seems to be that a positive or negative emotional 
experience will lead to more complicated reading and writing. But couldn’t a 
neutral emotional experience (sans shock value) or more complex patterns of 
emotion also produce more complicated reading and writing? Though both 
Micciche and Boler clearly benefit from cognitive and social approaches to 
emotion, it becomes clear in their writing how difficult it is to invoke both of 
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these approaches together in practice; both scholars lean on a tenuous 
understanding of emotions as cognitive in hopes it will reveal social and cultural 
disparities and manifestations of emotions. 
 
 The Current State of Pathos 
Though it was likely the hope of Walker, Quandahl, and Hyde and Smith 
that scholars would take up and carry forward their work to reconfigure a theory 
of pathos, that hope has not yet been realized. Their work—scholarly and 
provocative as it is—just left us wanting more to figure out what it might mean to 
put into practice claims like “reason and affect are inseparably interwoven” 
(Walker 60), “our study of the moral/emotions must be centered in discourse” 
(Quandahl 21), or “[t]he use of [Aristotle’s] complex and subtle descriptions [of 
the emotions] allow critics to correct past analyses of emotional appeals by 
adding dimensions that have been ignored for too long and, as we hope we have 
made clear, are absolutely crucial to the public character of our being-with-
others” (462). Likewise, scholars who’ve investigated pedagogies of emotion 
likely hoped that a better understanding of how we are educated in and through 
emotion would lead to more careful and productive understandings of emotions 
for students and instructors. While progress has been made in this regard, this 
line of scholarship doesn’t easily translate into better understandings of how we 
or our students can better use pathos in our own works.  
The scholarship on rereading pathos and emotional pedagogies point out 
the opportunities and obstacles that cognitive and social approaches to emotion 
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present for rhetoric. Because cognitive approaches to emotion are more focused 
on the circumstances that give rise to particular emotions, as the subject 
experiences them, it’s less clear what happens to these seemingly private 
emotions as they relate to the environment, people, and objects that surround, 
pervade, or constitute the subject. Cognitive theories are less equipped to theorize 
collective experiences with emotions, to explain how personal, evaluative 
judgments influence the world outside of the subject. Social approaches also raise 
obstacles, particularly for rhetors making assumptions about the identities of an 
audience; we have to be weary of Hawhee’s warning about freezing bodies. 
Reading bodies primarily in terms of their social positionality ignores how bodies 
are in constant movement—moving among situations and taking on varying 
identities. When we make assumptions about the emotions that persuade a pro-
choice woman, for example, we risk freezing her, forgetting about the many other 
identities and bodies in which she has lived and will live. We know that emotions 
function simultaneously on the levels of the cognitive and social; the task that 
remains is figuring out how these two different views of the emotions relate to 
and influence each other.   
Pathos has always been concerned with movement: moving an audience 
from one emotional state to another or moving an audience toward a judgment or 
action. The movement of emotion in cognitive and social approaches is still 
relatively uncomplicated, however (as it is perceived primarily moving in and out 
of the human subject). Social and cognitive approaches inspire an understanding 
of the rhetorical situation that upholds a distinct division between the human and 
outside world. Within this relatively fixed situation, emotions move in a few 
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directions: from the context of the situation to the rhetor and audience, from the 
audience to the rhetor, and from the rhetor to the audience. With an identifiable 
rhetor, audience, and argument, the work of pathos is easier to identify. 
However, in complex situations, when emotion is not clearly emanating from an 
audience or imposed by the rhetor, when it would seem emotion exists externally 
from human intervention, the work of pathos is diverse and often oblique. 
Current theories of pathos aren’t designed to untangle emotion in a case like 
LeRoy, in which there are so many overlapping situations and pervasive emotions 
that don’t have clear origin points, rhetorical purposes, or that have varied 
rhetorical purposes.  
Accounting for the many roles emotion plays in a case like LeRoy might 
seem like a better job for affect theory, which is primarily concerned with the 
emergence of affects, feelings, and emotions—as they form relations among 
human and nonhuman bodies. However, affect has often have been studied 
separately from (if not considered in opposition to) studies of emotion in our 
field. But as I’ll suggest in the next chapter, affect and emotion are not actually in 
opposition. Turning to affect theories reveals different rhetorical manifestations 
of emotions and affects that are useful for a revision of pathos. Because affect is 
focused on an emergence and movement that is often separate from the human 
subject, affect theory gives a better account of how emotions come into being in 
complex situations, when emotions aren’t clearly emerging from a rhetor or 
audience.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Rhetorical Affects:  
Invoking Affect Theory in Rhetorical Studies 
   
 
Just as scholarship on emotion was taking hold in rhetoric and 
composition in the late ‘90s and early ‘00s, a wave of affect scholarship washed 
over our field. This wave, which has been prominent in disciplines across the 
humanities, has in many ways replaced interest in emotion studies in our field. A 
brief look at articles published in the last decade suggests that scholars see a lot 
of potential in affect, especially as rhetoricians have pursued the study of 
nontraditional texts and discourses, e.g. music (Rickert 2005; Hawk 2010; 
Halbritter 2010), animals (Hawhee 2011; Muckelbauer 2011; Davis 2011), and 
objects (Barnett 2010).  
If the difficulty of invoking advances in emotion scholarship could be 
summed up as a struggle to reconcile two varied approaches that capture two 
(seemingly separate) parts of the rhetorical situation, the difficulty with invoking 
affect theory is that it’s often defined such that affect can’t be contained or 
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expressed in terms of the rhetorical situation, at least traditionally defined. 
Because affect is commonly understood as being nonlinguistic and pre-cognitive, 
it seems to exceed the capture of rhetorical theory—an impression that usually 
grows out of Massumi’s work on affect and his influence on the field. The 
integration of Massumi’s work in our field frequently focuses on a distinction 
between affect and emotion, using it to suggest that affect is separate from 
emotion and thus has more potential. This chapter, through a closer look at 
Massumi’s work on affect, troubles that distinction which is so often cited in 
affect scholarship in our field.24  
Massumi’s theory gives us some vocabulary to talk about the more 
visceral, bodily, or fleeting aspects of rhetoric, yet because it aims to capture 
something noncognitive, beyond language and discourse, it isn’t easily explained 
in rhetorical terms. However, other theories of affect have been used in the field 
to highlight different roles for affect in rhetoric, namely Fredric Jameson’s. His 
affect theory has been used primarily for pedagogical purposes, but I’ll suggest 
that we can also use Jameson’s theory to better understand the recursivity of 
affect in the rhetorical situation—how affect both propels and contains a 
rhetorical situation. However, because both Massumi and Jameson theorize 
affect as impersonal, it’s often difficult to imagine how the individual becomes 
tied up in affect (aside from a vague understanding of how affect operates 
through a kind of crowd mentality), so I’ll turn finally and briefly to Lacan’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 For example in Cory Holding (2007), Jenny Edbauer Rice (2008), Ashley 
Falzetti (2008), Catherine Chaput (2010), Byron Hawk (2004).  
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concept “desire” to consider how affects manifest in the investments and 
motivations of a rhetor or audience.  
Before I turn to Massumi, Jameson, and Lacan, I’ll look at how affect 
theory has primarily been defined and used in the field. In this brief explication I 
hope to show why it has thus far seemed to be beyond the purview of the concept 
pathos. Because “affect” is often used in the field to denote another realm25 (like 
the social, cultural, material, or environmental), much of this scholarship focuses 
on acknowledging its existence and influence but stops short of considering how 
we can take advantage of affect rhetorically. A rhetorical understanding of affect 
requires a study of the role affects play in the production, development, and 
movement of rhetoric—the sort of study I begin in this chapter.  
 
Affect: Defining the Indefinable  
“Affect,” as any scholar devoted to studying the phenomenon will likely tell 
you, breaks us out of a humanistic approach to rhetoric. Unlike emotion which 
struggles with the long standing (mis)conceptions of being too personal, 
irrational, or weak to be worthy of study, affect by definition can never be 
personal, irrational, or weak; its indeterminacy makes it a force whose influence 
can never be fully grasped and whose effects can never be fully represented. And 
it is this very indeterminacy that makes affect theorists see such great social and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Take for example Sharon Crowley (2006), Donna Strickland (2007), Jonathan 
Alexander and Jacqueline Rhodes (2010), or Jeff Pruchnic and Kim Lacey (2011) 
who call attention to affective features of writing and rhetoric but only as 
tangentially produced by or related to the main focus of their projects. 
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political potential in its study. Historian Ruth Leys in “The Turn to Affect: A 
Critique” asserts that what motivates affect scholars is their desire to reveal a 
kind of alternate history, contesting the historical privileging of rationality. 
Political, ethical, and aesthetic judgments have always had an affective 
component that we are only just recently willing to acknowledge. Leys writes of 
the affect scholarship, generally: 
The claim is that we human beings are corporeal creatures imbued 
with subliminal affective intensities and resonances that so 
decisively influence or condition our political and other beliefs that 
we ignore those affective intensities and resonances at our peril—
not only because doing so leads us to underestimate the political 
harm that the deliberate manipulation of our affective lives can do 
but also because we will otherwise miss the potential for ethical 
creativity and transformation that “technologies of the self” 
designed to work on our embodied being can help bring about 
(436).  
For many affect scholars, there are real ethical and political stakes in ignoring our 
affective lives. Summarizing the work of “the new affect theorists” (Nigel Thrift, 
Eric Shouse, Brian Massumi, and William Connolly), Leys asserts that affect is 
seen as separate from and prior to ideology, giving affect a unique position from 
which to critique and transform ideology. For these theorists, Leys claims, affects 
“are nonsignifying, autonomic processes that take place below the threshold of 
conscious awareness and meaning . . . affects are ‘inhuman,’ ‘pre-subjective,’ 
‘visceral’ forces and intensities that influence our thinking and judgments but are 
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separate from these” (440). Affects are noncognitive bodily states or processes, 
yet they can also extend through and beyond bodies, as Patricia Clough suggests 
in her introduction to The Affective Turn, “Affect is also theorized in relation to 
the technologies that are allowing us both to ‘see’ affect and to produce affective 
bodily capacities beyond the body’s organic physiological constraints” (2). Thus, 
affects are not exclusive to humans; they don’t belong to anyone or anything but 
rather circulate among us.  
While the influence of affect theory in our field has been clear for some 
time, figuring out what it means—or has meant—for us is less so. As theories of 
affect gained attention across the humanities in the last several decades, scholars 
have taken up “affect” and used it as synonymous with emotion or to describe 
physical feeling, social force, or intensity.26 Likewise, when scholars in rhetoric 
and composition first started writing about affect, it was often used 
interchangeabley with or as a supplement to emotion. Susan McLeod (1987, 
1995) and Alice Brand (1989, 1990) published a number of articles on the 
affective aspects of writing and teaching, wherein affects were, or seemed, 
undifferentiated from emotions. Richard Fulkerson (1998), Lynn Worsham 
(1998), and Robert Hariman and John Lucaites (2001) similarly tended to 
conflate affect and emotion. Worsham’s oft-cited reference to emotion as “the 
tight braid of affect and judgment, socially and historically constructed and 
bodily lived” illustrates how fused affect and emotion were for scholars at that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 For example, Christa Albrecht-Crane (2003), in her description of the concept, 
captures the visceral, sensual connotations that affect often has in our field: 
“Affect, then, involves sensations and resonances we engage in, on a daily basis, 
that act on our bodies in such a way that we feel a sort of vibration with other 
bodies” (“Affirmative” 577). 
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time (“Going” 216). Only since scholars in the field have begun to invoke 
Massumi’s theory of affect in the last decade has a stark and more clearly 
delineated distinction between affect and emotion emerged.  
 
Reviewing Affect  
Marking perhaps the height of interest in affect in the field, between 1998-
2008 CCC, JAC, and QJS published extended book reviews whose purposes were 
in part to introduce readers to the term “affect” but also to consider its purpose in 
the field. These reviews27 expose a number of reasons why affect hasn’t yet been 
harnessed specifically to re-evaluate the concept pathos—ranging from assertions 
that affect is not rhetorical to acknowledging the complicated disciplinary and 
political choice of choosing “affect” over “emotion.” 
The first and most amusing review suggests that affect isn’t rhetorical, or 
rather that the concept affect takes us beyond the purview of rhetoric, proper. 
Richard Fulkerson’s 1998 review “Call Me Horatio: Negotiating Between 
Cognition and Affect in Composition”28 in CCC marks the very beginning of affect 
theory entering the field. As his subtitle suggests, Fulkerson sees affect and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 An additional review by Jeff Pruchnic (2008) in Criticism, “The Invisible 
Gland: Affect and Political Economy,” won’t be detailed in this section since the 
audience for the review extends beyond those in our field, yet it’s another strong 
example of a scholar trying to make sense of the implications of the “affective 
turn.”   
28 Fulkerson reviews Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the 
Cognitive, eds. Alice Glarden and Richard Graves; The Spiritual Side of Writing: 
Releasing the Learner’s Whole Potential, eds. Regina Paston Foehr and Susan 
Schiller; Notes on the Heart: Affective Issues in the Writing Classroom by Susan 
McLeod; and Getting Restless: Rethinking Revision in Writing Instruction by 
Nancy Welch. 
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cognition as competing forces, and he asserts that we attend to affect at the 
expense of the cognitive and rhetorical. When he imagines what a composition 
class inspired by noncognitive/affective practices might look like, he writes:  
Clearly, the goal would change. Instead of trying to make students 
more effective users of language to have rhetorical impacts on 
others, I would be interested in the effects writing could have on the 
students themselves. Students might still write for readers, but the 
goal would be rendering experience for sharing rather than 
informing or persuading. (113)  
Fulkerson is, of course, working with an early understanding of affect that grows 
out of expressivist approaches to composition; his weariness toward affect 
exemplifies both the difficulty affect and emotion scholarship had being accepted 
into the mainstream (especially with the dominance of social and cognitive 
approaches to teaching composition) and the scholarship’s inability to dissociate 
from an expressivist tradition. Fulkerson laments the danger of an affective 
pedagogy: “This would not be a postmodern or socially engaged classroom. By 
and large it wouldn’t have students writing about issues of class, race, and 
gender, or public policy (unless from a purely personal point of view)” (113). For 
Fulkerson, affect is not only too personal but also too spiritual, whimsical, and 
meditative to be of much use in rhetorical studies and education.   
 Nine years later, however, we can see that the affective terrain has shifted, 
as scholars in the field have a more centralized understanding of affect—one that 
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is not simply personal—or emotional. Cory Holding in “Affecting Rhetoric”29 in 
CCC asserts, affect is rhetorical but almost impossible to harness. Turning to 
Corbett’s distinction between the rhetoric of the open hand and the closed fist, 
she explains how the closed fist is emblematic of a “body rhetoric” or a “gut force” 
that affect propels. Because affect theory turns our attention to beginnings and 
becomings, Holding sees it as particularly useful in considering bodies’ role in 
rhetorical invention. She suggests there’s a lot of potential in studying bodily 
experiences like entrainment30 as rhetorical. This kind of study, Holding writes,  
in turn can be said to position bodies (if, for instance, pheromones 
and images can serve as direction-givers to the subject that absorbs 
them), which, when taken to the political domain, does present 
something of a case for attending to visceral force through 
rhetorical invention. (322)  
Holding asserts we can’t afford to ignore the “gut” or visceral forces in rhetoric, 
 but acknowledges the difficulty of harnessing it rhetorically or fully 
 understanding the range of its influence.  
The third review highlights the political and disciplinary investments in 
choosing “affect” vs. choosing “emotion” as key methodological terms in our 
studies. In 2008, JAC published a review by Ashley Falzetti, “Political Affects: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Holding reviews The Transmission of Affect by Teresa Brennan; Toward a 
Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentatlism by Sharon Crowley; and 
Impersonal Passion: Language as Affect by Denise Riley 
30 A process through which bodies synchronize with internal/biological and 
external rhythms, e.g. your body’s adjustment to the cue of sunlight in the 
morning.  
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Transdisciplinary Trajectories of Affect and Emotion.”31 Falzetti asserts that what 
“affect” means in the literature is “highly contested,” “[y]et it is apparent that 
those who study affect are interested in close analysis of the body, emotion, and 
social politics” (302). While scholarship on affect and emotion overlaps in 
methodology and scope, scholars studying these two veins have little interaction. 
This contentious relationship is perhaps the most obvious reason why affect 
hasn’t been used to extend our understanding of pathos, since pathos has always 
been theorized in terms of emotion.  
 The final review most thoroughly explores affect in rhetorical terms. Jenny 
Edbauer Rice’s review “The New ‘New’: Making a Case for Critical Affect 
Studies”32 (2008) in QJS makes a case for what she calls “critical affect studies” 
(CAS) in rhetoric, considering affect’s potential in public and civic interaction. 
Rather than conceptualizing the public sphere solely as a “deliberative space” in 
which people communicate directly and transparently, she asserts we ought to 
consider the “affective linkages and associations” that already exist in any public; 
affect encourages us, in other words, to consider what underlies and slips 
between our various civic interactions.  
 Unlike most of the previously cited work in this chapter on affect—which 
emphasizes its inaccessibility through language and cognition—Edbauer Rice 
maintains that affect can be rearticulated in public discourse; she, like Holding, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Falzetti reviews Marlene Sokolon’s Political Emotions: Aristotle and the 
Symphony of Reason and Emotion and Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary Affects. 
32 Edbauer Rice reviews The Cultural Politics of Emotion by Sara Ahmed, The 
Transmission of Affect by Teresa Brennan; Impersonal Passion: Language as 
Affect by Denise Riley; and The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social ed. Patricia 
Clough. 
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offers an opening for rhetorical intervention. She asserts, “Theories of affect 
suggest a process of disarticulation, or an unsticking of those figures that seem to 
be glued together, followed by a rearticulation, or a new way of linking together 
images and representations that is less oppressive” (210). Rhetorically analyzing 
the discourses around AIDS, Edbauer Rice claims that activists changed the 
public discourse surrounding AIDS away from death and disgust toward life and 
celebration through campaigns and advertisements; the activist community 
reshaped the affectivity attached to AIDS discourse and by extension those 
suffering from AIDS. This process of rearticulation (in this case making images of 
happy, lively people with AIDS the focal point of the public discourse) makes use 
of pathetic strategies to move a public audience from associating AIDS with one 
set of emotions to another. Edbauer Rice thereby gives us our first hint of what it 
looks like to reshape affect rhetorically, and she raises a compelling question that 
captures one dilemma surrounding the study of affect in our field:  
Thus, what underscores civic or rhetorical deliberation is arguably 
an affective element. It is unclear whether merely accounting for 
this characteristic will lead to more critical analyses, although 
expanding our understanding of public affect might help us 
understand why certain rhetorics retain powerful circulation. (211) 
Most of the affect scholarship in the field seems to have “accounted for” the 
“affective element,” yet this hasn’t led to more critical analyses of how rhetorical 
concepts like pathos, for example, work in rhetoric. This distinction is central in 
delineating the work that has been done and remains to be done with affect in our 
field. The more difficult, but I think more fruitful, task is figuring out a better 
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rhetorical understanding of affect and how it works, which is what Edbauer Rice’s 
description of affective rerticulation begins to do.   
Very few scholars have taken up the challenge of studying affect in 
conjunction with rhetorical theories. In respect to pathos, Byron Hawk (2004) 
highlights a common conceptual distinction in our understanding of pathos and 
affect in the field: “Pathos is about using ideas/feelings in an audience to ground 
persuasion or about creating those emotions in an audience. But affect moves us 
toward relations among bodies, which is critical to understanding (discourse in) 
network culture” (“Toward” 843). Traditional theories of pathos don’t account for 
how “bodies also respond ‘emotionally’ not just minds” (“ Toward” 842). Hawk 
captures a general consensus in the field that affect exceeds the work of pathos, 
that pathos, traditionally conceived and talked about, fails to account for 
emotioned bodies and the interrelatedness of bodies. Pathos has been thus far 
used to explain a conscious and intentional understanding of human interaction 
in a rhetorical situation, which doesn’t yet account for the roles affect and 
emotion play in the “media environments” Hawk suggests we can no longer 
afford to ignore. These media environments—which play a central role in not just 
portraying the case of mass hysteria in LeRoy but also in the progression and 
transmission of symptoms—might be best explicated by theories of affect, but as I 
hope to show in later chapters, these rhetorical considerations of affect might also 
become part of our use and analysis of pathos in mediated rhetorical events. 
However, figuring out how affect fits into a theory of pathos requires a better 
understanding of the relationship between affect and emotion. This relationship 
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is largely understood through Massumi’s distinction, which I’ll detail in the 
following section.  
 
The Massumi Affect  
To understand how affect has been brought into the field, we have to begin 
with the oft-cited source: Massumi. Often recognized as the preeminent scholar 
in affect studies since (and interpreter of) Deleuze, Massumi develops his theory 
of affect most extensively in “Autonomy of Affect” (1996), which later became the 
first chapter in Parables for the Virtual (2002). The primary goal of the book is 
to address bodies, their movement, and sensations—considerations that he 
maintains have been neglected in critical and cultural theory. A response to the 
linguistic traditions so popular in poststructuralism, he aims to put bodies back 
in cultural materialism. Theorizing affect, Massumi asserts, can help us achieve 
this. In a little over 20 pages, Massumi uses scientific studies and cultural 
examples to identify affect as a phenomenon that cannot be satisfactorily 
explained solely with recourse to contemporary understandings of bodies, senses, 
or emotions.  
 When scholars in the field reference Massumi’s definition of affect, they 
often begin with his distinction between affect and emotion. Even though 
Massumi spends just a few paragraphs detailing the difference between the two 
in this text, it has arguably become his most prominent contribution to the study 
of affect (quoted, cited, or presumed), as those passages are widely referenced 
across disciplines. In those passages, Massumi makes one of the most direct and 
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urgent claims to come out of his otherwise circuitous writing: “It is crucial to 
theorize the difference between affect and emotion. If some have the impression 
that affect has waned, it is because affect is unqualified. As such, it is not ownable 
or recognizable and thus resistant to critique” (28). Referencing Jameson’s claim 
about the “waning of affect” in our time. Massumi points out the paradox 
inherent in theorizing affect: we ought to study affect but when we bring it into 
consciousness, into language, we qualify it, and through this process, affect is no 
longer affect but is brought into the realm of emotion. One of the problems, he 
says, is that we have no cultural-theoretical vocabulary to discuss affect; we are 
left with theories of signification which adhere to the kinds of structures that 
affect transcends. This almost cryptic definition has been critiqued by a number 
of scholars. Claire Hemming (2005), for example, asserts, “While many will 
concur with Massumi’s scepticism of quantitative research in its inability to 
attend to the particular, we are left with a riddle-like description of affect as 
something scientists cannot detect the loss of (in the anomaly), social scientists 
and cultural critics cannot interpret, but philosophers can imagine” (“Invoking” 
563).  
 Given the bluntness of the claim that “It is crucial to theorize the 
difference between affect and emotion,” amid writing that is famously 
paradoxical and oblique, it’s no surprise that a lot of scholars in our field have 
hung onto this distinction so tightly. Yet, the distinction is often read and 
appropriated as a claim that we ought to theorize affect over or against—or at 
least in addition to but separately from—emotion, suggesting that our 
theorization of emotion has gotten in the way of seeing and appreciating affect. 
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But a closer look at his writing reveals that Massumi sees affect and emotion as 
closely related. Though he clearly privileges affect by bringing it to the fore, it 
turns out, upon closer look, he doesn’t discourage studying emotion. Massumi’s 
distinction between affect and emotion is not of value but degree. What Massumi 
doesn’t like about emotion is what he doesn’t like about poststructuralist theories 
of signification: we already have symbolic structures of emotion that are laden 
with meaning, and thus we lack the power to express or relate to emotion in ways 
that aren’t already confined by symbolic structures. Affect exceeds these symbolic 
structures, but “Emotion is the most intense (most contracted) expression of that 
capture,” the capture of affect (28). Thus, rather than seeing affect and emotion 
as logically distinct, in order to theorize affect at all, we need emotion; we are 
dependent to some extent on emotion, to use its vocabulary to attempt to better 
explicate affect. As further evidence, Massumi’s own affect-focused vocabulary 
isn’t devoid of emotional connotations and resonances: intensity, movement, 
autonomy, fullness, aliveness, etc. 
Massumi illustrates through his examples how closely affect and emotion 
are related. His first example in “Autonomy” is a study of children who watched 
variations of a short film about a snowman melting and his human “friend” who 
leaves him in the mountains so that he could stay “alive” (one version had factual 
narration, one an emotional narration, and one no narration). When attempting 
to measure the affective reactions of the children, intensity (our best way for 
understanding affect) is measured in part through a spectrum of emotions: 
happy-sad. When describing the version of the snowman film that had an 
emotional narrative, he explains: 
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The qualification of emotional content enhanced the image’s effect, 
as if they resonated with the level of intensity rather than 
interfering with it. An emotional qualification breaks narrative 
continuity for a moment to register a state—actually to re-register 
an already felt state, for the skin is faster than the word. (25)  
Thus, an emotional qualification, in this case a narrative, intensifies reactions to 
 the text or increases the affective response to it; the emotional narrative (the use 
 of emotional language; affect captured in language) is not in opposition to the 
 production or existence of affect. Instead, they seem to work in tandem like 
 waves.  
Massumi’s methodology and general attitude toward conceptual 
distinctions similarly suggests that the relationship between affect and emotion 
shouldn’t be interpreted as finite, clear, distinct, or absolute. In his introduction 
to Parables, Massumi explains his approach to writing and research: “when you 
are busy critiquing you are less busy augmenting. You are that much less 
fostering” (13). “Foster or debunk,” he asserts. Though, of course, there is a time 
for both processes, Massumi is much less interested in dismissing past theory 
than in cultivating new theory. This is how he approaches writing: 
The writing tries not only to accept the risk of sprouting deviant, 
but also to invite it. Take joy in your digressions. Because that is 
where the unexpected arises. That is the experimental aspect. If you 
know where you will end up when you begin, nothing has happened 
in the meantime. You will have to be willing to surprise yourself 
writing things that you didn’t think you thought. Letting examples 
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burgeon requires using inattention as a writing tool. You have to let 
yourself get to caught up in the flow of your writing that it ceases at 
moments to be recognizable to you as your own. This means you 
have to be prepared for failure. For with inattention comes risk of 
silliness or even outbreaks of stupidity. But perhaps in order to 
write experimentally, you have to be willing to ‘affirm’ even your 
own stupidity. (18)  
Massumi asserts that he doesn’t devise a theory and then apply it, since 
application just alters the object of study and says nothing about the new theory 
itself; instead, he starts with examples and writes and meditates his way through 
them. An unorthodox approach to academic writing and research, through 
experimentation, Massumi thinks against the traditions and beliefs that have 
bound poststructuralist thought in cultural studies. Thus, for scholars to 
appropriate any of Massumi’s distinctions or concepts as finite (without 
questioning or seeing them as provisional, as becomings, as rhetorical), to pull 
them out of the context of Massumi’s complications, musings, and testings misses 
his argument all together. Making the affect-emotion distinction, for example, is 
useful for Massumi to demarcate the terrain of “affect,” a word that means a lot of 
things to a lot of scholars, but the distinction should also be recognized as an 
experiment in opening our systems of thought. Massumi says of his experimental 
writing and the writing in Parables: “The desired result is a systematic openness: 
an open system” (18). To focus so closely on one aspect of affect (at the expense of 
the carefully layered context) is to close that system.  
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 The nuanced relationship between affect and emotion becomes even 
clearer in Massumi’s 2005 article “Fear (The Spectrum Said).” In it, Massumi 
details how the color-coded terror alert system introduced by George W. Bush’s 
administration following 9/11 modulated fear in the American public. While 
people became affectively attuned to fear, they expressed and acted on it in 
different ways:  
The system addressed the population immediately, at a 
presubjective level: at the level of bodily predisposition or 
tendency—action in its nascent state … It was less a communication 
than an assisted germination of potentials for action whose 
outcome could not be accurately determined in advance—but whose 
variable determination could be determined to occur, on hue (33).  
Here, Massumi explains how fear emerges on the “presubjective level” of “bodily 
predisposition tendency.” Massumi references William James’ famous example of 
fear in which a body reacts to fear before it is consciously aware of it: “We have 
already begun to experience fear nonconsciously, wrapped in action, before it 
unfurls from it and it felt as itself, in its distinction from the action with which it 
arose” (36). So while scholars often point out that the difference between affect 
and emotion is conscious awareness, here, Massumi suggests that is not always 
the case. He spends several pages detailing the fear event, which begins with a 
bodily response: “The experience is in the fear, in its ingathering of action, rather 
than the fear being the content of an experience. At the starting line, the affect of 
fear and the action of the body are in a state of indistinction. As the action 
unfolds, they begin to diverge” (37). The affective intensity continues to grow and 
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it’s only when the action stops that fear is recognized as a feeling of fear. Fear 
before this point is just a growing mass of intensity that “ingathers” or germinates 
potential for action, and it is only when we have a moment to “recollect,” to scan 
the environment that we take note of the object or cause of our fear. Fear 
becomes the content of an experience only after the intensity has lowered. 
Massumi also makes a form-content distinction in Parables, similarly explaining 
it in terms of intensity-qualification, which is then mapped onto affect-emotion. 
But here, we see that an emotion can also be the form or intensity and can occur 
preconsciously. Fear pauses in what Massumi calls the “stop-beat” (during which 
the immediate bodily action has ceased and reflection takes place); in this beat, 
fear turns from intensity to magnitude, and it is no longer lived just through a 
body but is now compared to other experiences with fear. Massumi’s focus on the 
stop-beat shows he’s less interested in pulling affect and emotion apart; rather, 
he’s interested in the exact point of difference, the pause in between: “The 
separation between direct activation and controlled ideation, or affect in its 
bodily dimension and emotion as rationalizable subjective content, is a reflective 
wonderland that does not work this side of the mirror” (40). It’s not so much 
“difference” as the “between” that intrigues Massumi. 
While many have interpreted Massumi’s call to “theorize the difference 
between affect and emotion” as a call to separate and pull those concepts apart, 
we could read it as a call to theorize “the difference,” the complex relations 
between affect and emotion. The complexities of this connection emerge in the 
way he discusses emotions’ relationship to activation. When the fear event is 
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encoded in the memory and we gain distance from it, we begin to see emotion as 
separate from bodily reaction:  
To treat the emotion as separable in this way from the activation-
event from which it affectively sprang is to place it on the level of 
representation. It is to treat it, fundamentally and from the start, as 
a subjective content: basically, an idea. Reduced to the mere idea of 
itself, it becomes reasonable to suppose that a private subject, in 
representing it to itself, could hold it and the aleatory outside of its 
arising as well as the body in live-wire connection with that outside, 
at a rational, manageable distance. It makes it seem comfortably 
controllable. (39)  
Here, we can see how the narrative quality of emotion refigures affect in 
recollection. It is the representational aspect of emotion that makes it less 
powerful than the immediate visceral, affective force. Yet in these examples, 
emotion is a necessary and important part of the overall emotive-affective 
experience.  
 
Affect in Rhetoric 
Divorcing affect from emotion does more than just take liberties with 
Massumi’s theories; it also contributes to a number of other assumptions about 
affect in our field. The divide between affect and emotion extends to how both of 
those concepts are studied rhetorically. Affect a la Massumi is often discussed as 
an unnamable force, an ungraspable excess; thus, this affect becomes useful only 
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in demarcating a dimension we can never access except very indirectly or after 
the fact. Naming an affect at all—as this story goes—brings it into the realm of 
signification and suppresses its unique power. And yet, this exemplifies what 
Edbauer (2005) has called the “false binary between signification and affect,” 
wherein emotion is stuck in the realm of signification and affect embodies all that 
transcends it (“(Meta)Physical” 135). If we hold onto this binary, we fail to see 
that all rhetorical processes involve both affect and signification. The supposed 
theoretical divide between affect and emotion prevents conversations between 
scholars who study either concept, as scholars in the field often devote 
themselves to the pursuit of one over the other.33 Insofar as pathos has been 
attached to emotion, it has seemed that studies of affect are incompatible with 
any rhetorical approach. Even if we accept that Massumi’s definition of affect is 
more dependent upon emotion than scholars in the field often give it credit for, 
where does that leave us in regards to affect and rhetoric?  
More than just highlighting the role of bodies, Massumi’s description of 
affective loops is particularly useful in imagining affect as emergent, and co-
adapting along with the many actors in a rhetorical situation. Our tendency to 
accept emotion primarily as representational prevents us from recognizing the 
organizing properties of emotion: “What we sloppily think of as the idea of an 
emotion, or the emotion as an idea, is in fact the anticipatory repetition of an 
affective event, precipitated by the encounter between the body’s irritability and a 
sign” (“Fear” 40). Because of emotions’ attachment to memory and narrative, we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 A common theoretical move is to choose one term, “affect” or  “emotion,” and 
to claim that one term is more useful given the project. See, for example, Laura 
Micciche (2007) pp. 14-16 or Megan Boler (1999) pp. xvi-xvii.  
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tend to anticipate emotional responses that align with our prior experience. Yet 
affect has what Clough (2007) calls “self-reflexivity” in which 
information/communication systems, archiving machines, capital flows, and 
biopolitical networks are “processes turning back on themselves to act on 
themselves” (“Introduction” 3). This self-reflexivity helps us understand how 
emotion emerges. Often when we think of the role of pathos in the rhetorical 
situation, it is the mark of the beginning and the end, as the rhetor moves the 
audience from one emotion to another. But understanding the rhetorical 
situation as self-reflexive or looped allows us to see emotion as pulling forward 
past emotional experience and fueling future emotional experience. Rather than 
thinking of rhetorical situations as independent, “new” opportunities for 
persuasion, a rhetor might pay particular attention to how past emotional 
experiences shape or set up the audience’s response to pathetic strategies.34  
A self-reflexive or looped understanding of affect responds to one of the 
common critiques of affect—that because it’s preconscious, we have no way to 
access or control it. Leys (2011), for example, asserts, the “new affect theorists” 
believe  
there is a gap between the subject’s affects and its cognition or 
appraisal of the affective situation or object, such that cognition or 
thinking comes ‘too late’ for reasons, beliefs, intentions, and 
meanings to play the role in action and behavior usually accorded to 
them. The result is that action and behavior are held to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 I’ll explore this in more detail in Chapters Three and Four.  
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determined by affective dispositions that are independent of 
consciousness and the mind’s control. (“Turn” 443)  
In this account of affect, we are entirely at its mercy, since cognition and planning 
come too late. However, Leys seems to be describing affect in a linear fashion 
(echoing others who say, for example, affect comes first, emotion second) that 
suggests cognitive and affective processes are happening independently. By 
contrast, Massumi’s articulation of “anticipatory repetition” highlights a system 
in which history, memory, context, and environment emerge and loop together. 
 Seeing emotion (and by extension pathos) in terms of loops, networks, or 
systems allows us to see it beyond the normal confines of cause and/or effect; a 
repetitive, narrative, self-reflexive, and co-adapting concept of pathos is much 
more nuanced than the traditional “rhetorical appeal” (seen as a stimulus in 
search of a response). Following Leys’ critique, we might lament that rhetors 
cannot anticipate, control, or make use of affect in a rhetorical situation, but we’d 
be naïve to suggest that rhetors have ever had much overt control over the 
emotions. While networks and systems are complex, they are not random; in 
order to hold their structure, repetition and patterns emerge (of course, networks 
and loops break down, but another or others emerge to take its place). Paying 
attention to affective loops and networks is one way to access and harness affect 
rhetorically; the AIDS activists Edbauer Rice described, for example, were able to 
intervene in and reroute the affective loops surrounding the public discourse on 
AIDS.  
 Of course, tracing and anticipating the affective loops in a rhetorical 
situation is no easy task. Perhaps Massumi’s theory of affect might be best 
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integrated in the field as it usually is—as part of invention. After all, his theory is 
based on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) assertion that “Affects are becomings” 
(Thousand 256). Following this sentiment, several scholars have begun to 
reshape theories of invention with affect theory.35 But we’d be remiss to think 
that Massumi’s is the only theory of affect worth considering in our field. As I’ll 
illustrate in the following section, Fredric Jameson’s theory of affect has the 
potential to help us better explicate a looped or reflexive nature of the rhetorical 
situation.  
 
The Waning of Affect: Another Approach  
Following his famous claim in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism (1990) about the “waning of affect” in the postmodern era, 
Jameson goes on to define affects as “free-floating and impersonal” (16). Because 
Jameson asserts we are no longer “centered subjects”—postmodernism is the end 
of the “bourgeois ego” or “monad”— affects don’t belong to us but are external 
and embedded in cultural practices and values (15). They circulate like capital 
through mediated contact. Jameson’s theory of affect, of course, grows out of the 
Frankfurt School’s critiques that technologies of mass production and 
postmodern aesthetics in general contribute to a culture industry that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Thomas Rickert (2007), for example, explores affect’s role in invention through 
Plato’s concept chora—what he considered “the matrix of all becoming.” Rather 
than thinking of rhetorical concepts as clear and distinct, in this paradigm, mind, 
body, and environment are fused: “minds are both embodied, and hence 
grounded in emotion and sensation, and dispersed into the environment itself, 
and hence no longer autonomous” (251). Thus, invention is immersed in and 
springs from any confluence of forces. See also Holding (2007), Hawk (2007), 
Davis (2010) for discussions of affect and invention. 
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fundamentally alters the affective resonances of art and our perceptions of it. For 
example, he compares Vincent Van Gogh's “A Pair of Boots” (1887) with Andy 
Warhol's “Diamond Dust Shoes” (1980), saying that a viewer can imagine when 
viewing Van Gough’s weathered, beaten, loosely-tied boots what the leather 
would feel like, how it would feel to put them on and walk around in them. You 
imagine their history, where they’ve been, and where they might be going. In 
contrast, Warhol’s screen-printed representation of monochromatic shoes 
appears flat; there’s a lack of visual depth to the shoes that are juxtaposed against 
a black background. A viewer can’t imagine the shoes’ history or putting them on, 
and the medium of screen-printing makes Warhol’s piece easy to duplicate; it’s 
not unique. This marks: 
the end, for example, of style, in the sense of the unique and the 
personal, the end of the distinctive brushstroke (as symbolized by 
the emergent primacy of mechanical reproduction). As for 
expression and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in 
contemporary society from the older anomie of the centered subject 
may also mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation 
from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a 
self to do the feeling. (Jameson 15)  
Jameson asserts that affectively and emotionally we’ve traded depth for intensity, 
history for fleeting ecstasy. Affective experiences in the postmodern age are 
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reproduced;36 we seek out synthetically created affective experience through 
mass produced media, advertising, even drug use. Just like the reproduction of 
brushstrokes in a mass produced piece of art, our feelings, our emotions are no 
longer unique, personal, or subjective. For Jameson, the waning of affect is also a 
waning of emotions, and he describes a kind of affective background, in which 
many of us are unknowing participants. Affects are not becomings for Jameson; 
they already exist in our time. Affects are structurally imbedded in our media, art, 
and culture, which seep into our moods, feelings, and dispositions. 
Jameson’s theory of affect has been primarily used in the field to discuss 
how we are culturally schooled in emotion. Worsham (1998) suggests “the 
pedagogy of postmodernism offers an extreme version of the dumb view of 
emotion, where emotion no longer can have any appropriate objects, aims, or 
interests” (“Going” 229). The dumb view, which she borrows from Elizabeth 
Spellman, “silences emotion—restricts emotion to the realm of the body (to 
sensation, physical feelings, and involuntary bodily movements) where it remains 
a purely private and internal event” (224). Worsham and Jameson point to a 
generation of people who seek out intense, artificial emotions—a trend especially 
evident in the increase in prescription or illegal drug use. People are chasing what 
Jameson calls “a peculiar kind of euphoria” (16).   
Since the waning of affect is something that we’ve historically and 
culturally inherited, it might seem that we can have little influence on it 
rhetorically as affects seem somewhat imposed on us. But as several scholars in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 We might be reminded here of Walter Benjamin’s “Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction” or Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s critique of 
the culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
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the field have shown, we can and should respond to (in our teaching) this less or 
differently affected era in which we live, in order to address, for example, what 
Worsham calls the hidden curriculum of emotion (“Grief, hatred, bitterness, 
anger, rage, terror, and apathy as well as emotions of self-assessment such as 
pride, guilt, and shame” (“Going” 216)), what Thomas Rickert (2007) calls “the 
climate of resignation” (Acts 191), or what Johnson (2001) identifies as “student 
rage” (“School” 624). Acknowledging the impact of the affective milieu of our era 
might help explain and reframe some of the resistant behavior we see in our 
classrooms and in our students. In a reading of David Bartholomae’s infamous 
Quentin essay37, for example, Rickert (2001) asserts that Quentin’s response 
might be better characterized as “transgressive,” a refusal to communicate in 
ways sanctioned by the university. In refusing to address the assignment or the 
imagined rubric, Quentin subverts academic expectations and conventions and 
performs what Rickert says is an “act”–not merely a writing assignment (“Hands” 
310). What some call “violence” in our classrooms, mostly in the form of 
aggressive or resistant writing, might actually reflect some of the difficulties 
contemporary students face when they try to express emotions in a culture that 
has discouraged personal, unique emotional and affective experiences.   
Jameson’s theory has untapped potential for theorizing emotions and 
affects in a rhetorical situation that is looped, self-reflexive, or generally more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Bartholomae describes a student he calls “Quentin” in “The Tidy House: Basic 
Writing in the American Curriculum” who wrote what some might consider 
vitriolic responses to writing prompts. For example, in response to the prompt, 
“If existence precedes essence, what is man?” Quentin wrote: “About man and 
good and evil I don't care about this shit fuck this shit, trash, and should be put in 
the trash can with this shit” (6).  
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complicated. Emotions and affects are frequently understood to be bound up 
with exigences in rhetoric—what incites or impels a rhetorical situation.38 The 
audience’s emotions toward the event at hand are the impetus for the rhetor’s 
argument, following Bitzer’s (1968) definition of exigence as “an imperfection 
marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a 
thing which is other than it should be” (6). By this understanding, emotions seem 
to mark the beginning and end of a rhetorical situation, as the beginning emotion 
is an “imperfection” and the end emotion is no longer “waiting to be done.” 
However, this role for emotions isn’t very nuanced; we know emotions play a 
larger role than being bookends to the rhetorical situation. In fact, emotions and 
affects also align with Bitzer’s list of common constraints: “beliefs, attitudes, 
documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives” (8). The emotional and 
affective attachments of the individual—which grow out of Jameson’s culturally 
embedded affective background—also contain the rhetorical possibilities of the 
situation.  
As both exigences and constraints, affects and emotions both incite and 
contain the situation; they both drive and restrict its possibilities. As such, we can 
see how one emotion can be both an exigence and constraint, and how an 
emotion can be an exigence for one rhetorical situation and a constraint in 
another. For example, we could take Rickert’s “climate of resignation” in the 
classroom not just as a “something waiting to be done,” the impetus for a new 
pedagogy, but also as a constraint we have to work with, within, and against. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 We can see this especially in how frequently affect and emotion are considered 
in terms of invention. 
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Taking what we might usually consider an affective exigence as a constraint 
broadens our understanding of the rhetorical situation, acknowledging that the 
rhetorical situation is recursive—its constituents always transforming and folding 
into each other. If we consider the rhetorical situation surrounding Jameson’s 
argument in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism as an 
example, we can see how the dulling of the affects and emotions in our era 
embodies both an obstacle to be overcome but also an attitude or feeling that 
limits the possible outcomes of his argument, possible ways of imagining how 
things might be otherwise. In this way, affect recursively fuels more complicated 
kinds of invention,39 as we see new issues and exigences coming to the fore.  
This kind of affective looping is especially useful in theorizing complex 
rhetorical events that encompass what traditionally might have seemed to be 
multiple rhetorical situations. For example, the pervasive fear surrounding the 
LeRoy case was a constraint that prevented the girls from initially accepting their 
diagnosis (doctors were unable to persuade them of a diagnosis), but that same 
fear is an exigence for the news media to shape their stories about the “mystery 
illness”— to persuade the girls of other possible causes and to persuade the public 
audience that this story is significant. A revised theory of pathos invoking this 
understanding of affect would consider more carefully emotional exigences and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Several scholars in the field have made arguments for more complex theories of 
invention.  For example, Anis Bawarshi (2001) suggests, “invention is less an 
inspired mysterious activity and more a location and mode of inquiry, a way of 
positioning oneself in relation to a problem and a way of working through it” (6). 
Debra Hawhee makes a similar claim, asserting that just as the rhetorical subject 
invents an encounter, the encounter invents the rhetorical subject. She calls this 
kind of process “invention-in-the-middle,” which “assumes that rhetoric is a 
performance, a discursive-material-bodily-temporal encounter, a force among 
forces” (24). 
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constraints—and more importantly their recursitvity, how they relate to one 
another, and how they fuel overlapping situations.  
But the work of pathos in rhetoric is more than just reading exigences and 
constraints. It’s also about understanding (in a Burkean sense) the motivations of 
the audience and their emotional attachments. Similar to Massumi, Jameson says 
that affects are free-floating and impersonal, thus these theories of affect don’t 
help us imagine how to tap into the motivations of the individual. However, a 
brief look at the Jacques Lacan’s concept of desire better explicates how we 
personally experience and make affective investments. 
 
The Desiring Subject 
The psychoanalytic tradition—and its take on affect—is another influence 
on the field, as we can see in the work of, for example, Susan Wells (1996), 
Marshall Alcorn (2002), Christa Albrecht-Crane (2003), and Christian Lundberg 
(2012). Rickert (2007) asserts, “Psychoanalytic theory provides an early but quite 
sophisticated attempt to theorize how affective factors structure communication 
in ways that we are only partially aware of at any given moment” (Acts 35). 
Because we know audiences have affective investments, it would seem that 
figuring out what drives those investments—where they come from, how they are 
formed, and thus might be changed—might help us better explicate how, if 
pathos is concerned with motivation (with moving an audience emotionally), we 
can better identify and respond to affective investments rhetorically.  
! 83!
In addition to “affect,” psychoanalysis makes use of several other key 
terms, including desire, enjoyment, pleasure, and emotion. Since explicating the 
differences among these terms would be a dissertation in itself, I’ll focus on 
Lacan’s concept of “desire” here because it seems most useful in uncovering 
rhetorical, affective motivations.40 A look at desire further allows us to consider 
not just what affect is but what it does rhetorically. Lacan’s concept of desire is 
especially interesting in thinking about how the subject desires to identify with 
(to be) the other.  
On the most fundamental level, desire, Lacan asserts throughout his 
Écrits, is the desire for the other. We desire mimetically: both what the other 
desires but also to be the other, meaning that desire stems from identifying with 
the other. During entrance into the symbolic order (for Lacan, the mirror stage), 
the subject experiences lack (when the infant realizes its needs will not always be 
met) and this produces desire, which will never be entirely fulfilled. The symbolic 
order positions us and our desiring; thus, our desires and affective investments 
are not so much our own as the desires and investments of others. Lacan’s theory 
of desire is an incredibly complicated phenomenon, but through just this brief 
look we can see the implications of desire in Burke’s (1969) theory of 
identification, in which “you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying 
your ways with his” (55). All of those gestures, tones, and attitudes are tied up in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Because “desire” isn’t a key concept in this dissertation, it may seem odd that I 
focus on it here. Given more time, I would more carefully integrate and explicate 
this section. However, I think it’s worth taking at least a cursory look at “desire,” 
since it offers another account of how we become affectively engaged with 
rhetoric.  
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any number of symbolic orders in which the rhetor and audience is a part. The 
rhetor doesn’t just desire to persuade the other; she also desires the other, 
identifies with the other. This suggests that identification is not just one avenue 
for persuasion; it’s a necessary avenue for persuasion, a primary mode of 
functioning in the world. Wells (1996) describes Lacan’s theory of desire in 
narrative terms:  
the distance of the desiring subject from the object in which he or 
she is constitutes incites a swerve toward the object of desire, a 
motion which never culminates in triumphant arrival. Desire has to 
do with the unconscious, with what is radically beyond direct 
knowledge, manifesting itself instead in the perturbations of daily 
activity, in unguarded and accidental performances, and in dreams 
(81).  
As Wells points out, the Lacanian understanding of desire is propelled by lack, of 
constantly trying to fulfill an insatiable desire. But this desire isn’t something the 
subject experiences in isolation; desire is what pulls the subject into collectives 
and compels the subject to identify with particular groups.  
Sara Ahmed (2004) describes this circular process of lack and desire 
through the metaphor of “affective economy,” wherein desire is similar to 
demand and emotion is akin to capital. She explains that emotions circulate 
among signifiers rather than actually residing in the subject or in the object of an 
emotion. Ahmed analyzes an excerpt from the Aryan Nation’s website which 
continually attaches feelings of fear, disgust, and rage to the signifiers of 
nonwhite people (immigrants, interracial couples, those incarcerated, etc.) and 
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attaches feelings of love and purity to “white.” Emotions, she says align people 
with communities: “Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions, 
we need to consider how they work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate 
the relationship between the psychic and the social, and between the individual 
and the collective” (“Affective” 119). Ahmed asserts emotions make people 
“adhere” and “cohere” together. Unlike the ways Massumi and Jameson describe 
affects as impersonal, the metaphor of the affective economy encourages us to see 
affects as deeply personal but fundamentally attached to the desires and affective 
investments of others. Ahmed describes,  
This is what I would call the rippling effect of emotions; they move 
sideways (through ‘sticky’ associations between signs, figures, and 
objects) as well as backward (repression always leaves its trace in 
the present—hence ‘what sticks’ is also bound up with the ‘absent 
presence’ of historicity). (120)  
This sort of affective economy is useful in better understanding the emotions and 
affects that are attributed to and accepted by the collective of the girls in LeRoy. 
The historical connotations (weak, vulnerable, out of control) attached to 
“hysteria” would seem to discourage the girls from wanting to join the group. 
However, as I’ll detail more in my final chapter, some reports of the case  
suggest several of the girls’ desired to identify with the collective. Through the 
development of tics and verbal outbursts (through identification with the afflicted 
girls, desiring the girls themselves), the girls joined (became grouped with) the 
collective of hysterical girls.  
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These last two sections on Jameson and Lacan reveal alternate avenues for 
identifying affect, through analysis of the art, media, and discourse of an era or 
through the study of desire and affective economies. Unlike the common 
conception of affect in the field—that it is the unidentifiable—these theories bring 
affect into language without squelching its power. The question that has 
dominated considerations of affect in our field is what is affect? In the way that 
Massumi is often taken up, the answer to this question has been assumed (affects 
are bodily intensities responsible for invention). Turning to other theories, 
however, can help us define affect differently (e.g., as structural, in exigence, 
constraint, desire, identification, economy), extending our understandings of the 
many ways affect infuses rhetoric.  !
 
The Current State of Affect 
Though “affect” is now accepted within the field’s general vocabulary, it is 
frequently used only to qualify other rhetorical objects. Affect is often used to 
describe an abstract, fleeting, or bodily dimension (for example, “affective 
response” “affective stance,” “affective encounter,” or “affective capacity”41). 
While affect in these scenarios suggests an expansion of our rhetorical scope, it 
has no function beyond modifying other actions or dimensions. Invoking affect 
only in this way inhibits our understandings, as it appears that affect’s only 
rhetorical use is signaling an abstract dimension, and thus prevents us from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 For example in Jeff Pruchnic and Kim Lacey (2011), Donna Strickland (2007), 
Christa Albrecht-Crane (2003), or Rachel Riedner (2007). 
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engaging the living whole of the rhetorical situation or a situation, lived 
rhetorically. This contributes to a tenor in the field that both Edbauer (2005) and 
Albrecht-Crane (2003) have written about, in which the turn to affect is 
gloriously celebrated or completely dismissed as another unpractical high-theory 
movement. As Edbauer illustrates through an examination of messages on the 
WPA listserv: “a conversation about composition and affect turned into a critique 
of what was seen as impractical theory-talk” (“(Meta)Physical” 135). The way 
scholars have often seen affect as lying outside the signifying practice of writing 
reflects a “fundamental misunderstanding of the affective dimension” because 
writing is nothing if not the interplay of affect and signification (135-6). In the 
eight years since Edbauer made that claim, “affect” has become much more 
widely used in the field and scholars seem more willing to accept the affective 
elements of writing. Yet rather than pursuing affect’s many rhetorical functions, 
most scholars still use the term in service of other rhetorical projects.  
The question remains then: what does rhetoric need from a theory of 
affect? It seems we need something between an autonomous and fragmented 
subject, between full and impossible communication, between conscious 
intention and randomness, between pushing the limits of the linguistic and 
abandoning it, between purely logical, cognitive, rational persuasion and the 
dissipation of persuasion across networks and systems. A theory of affect for 
rhetoric needs to oscillate between order and chaos—the very definition of 
complexity. As I hope to illustrate in the following chapter, the pull between the 
rhetorical tradition (a tradition that sometimes feels too fixed) and affect theory 
(a theory that often seems too ambiguous) can be a productive one. To better 
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understand the role of affect in rhetoric and how we might use it to revise 
theories of pathos, we need to understand the role affect plays in defining 
rhetorical projects, in the progression (and sustaining) of rhetorical 
situations/events, and in delineating the rhetorical functions (affects) of the 
many bodies that make up complex rhetorical events. The following chapter 
attempts to outline these very roles of affect in rhetoric.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Persuasive Bodies, Phantom Rhetorics:  
A Theoretical Framework 
 
I certainly wasn’t fantasizing the deep ache in what 
had been my right hand. Sometimes I felt as if my fist 
was clamping tighter and tighter until my fingers were 
ready to explode. The pain brought back memories of 
that horrible night in the Humvee. In those moments, 
my hand felt as if it were cupped around a hot object, 
burning and throbbing as it did after the explosion. At 
other times, the Phantom could create the sensation 
of twisted fingers or a bent thumb. Sometimes, it was 
an annoying tickle on the heel of my hand. 
--Michael Weisskopf, Blood Brothers: Among the 
Soldiers of Ward 57  
 
 
The pain was like nothing I had ever known—it was as 
strange and strong and foreign as a terrified scream in 
a voice you don’t recognize. The ache was painful, yet 
it was beyond pain: It was the hollow feeling of loss—
physical, yes, but a more whole body feeling, as if a 
cave had been gouged deep in my leg somewhere, and 
air was blowing—howling—through it. It was like the 
pain of nostalgia—vague but omnipresent, attached to 
everything but nothing in particular. The sensation of 
complete loss.  
--Emily Rapp, Poster Child: A Memoir  
 
 
The phantom limb, if not existing in bone, tendons, and tissue, exists 
affectively. While the limb appears absent, the pain of the phantom limb is very 
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much present, as the epigraphs above suggest. The phantom, an affect, is caught 
between presence and absence. It can feel, it can be touched, but it can’t be 
located. It’s familiar yet foreign, of and not of one’s own body. As both Weisskopf, 
a TIME correspondent who lost his hand in a bombing in Iraq, and Rapp, whose 
leg was amputated because of a congenital birth defect, attest, the phantom is 
fused with memories, longings, feelings of wholeness. It is a fascinating example 
of bodies’ rhetoric, as the phantom seemingly persuades the amputee and others 
of its presence. To carry out the claims of my introduction, I want to imagine 
processes that have previously been explained (or dismissed) as biological, 
neurological, or chemical as rhetorical.42 The phantom limb, like I’ll suggest 
about mass hysteria, can be studied rhetorically, and uncovering these phantom 
rhetorics requires a closer look at how we understand materiality. I begin this 
chapter with the phantom limb because it exposes common ways of theorizing 
bodies, for example, making fixed distinctions between what is and is not of a 
body, clinging to an idea of a whole body, and defining bodies by what is 
materially present. The phantom limb is a powerful metaphor that highlights the 
affects of bodies that are not materially present—invisible bodies that continue to 
persuade.  
Physicians and philosophers have long theorized about phantom limbs. 
One of the earliest to write about the phenomenon was 16th century surgeon 
Ambrose Pare who called it a “false and deceitful sense” (457). Descartes in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Rhetoric scholars have, of course, begun to consider such approaches, most 
notably in the rhetoric of science and in neurorhetorics (see the neurorhetorics 
special issue of RSQ). Yet I want to distinguish my project from studying science 
rhetorically; rather, I seek to study the rhetoricity of bodily phenomena.  
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Meditation VI uses phantom pain as an example to illustrate how pain is felt in 
the soul, present in the brain. Often attributed with coining “phantom limb,” 
physician Silas Weir Mitchell (who also happened to be Charlotte Perkins 
Gillman’s doctor) wrote in 1871 that “A person in this condition is haunted, as it 
were, by a constant or inconstant fractional phantom of so much of himself as 
had been lopped away—an unseen ghost of the lost part” (565). A common 
explanation of phantom pain is that it’s the brain’s way of dealing with the loss of 
a body part; as if in mourning, the brain continues attempting to reach out to the 
missing limb, trying to persuade the body of its wholeness. As Elizabeth Grosz 
explains, “The phantom is an expression of nostalgia for the unity and wholeness 
of the body, its completion. It is a memorial to the missing limb, a psychical 
delegate that stands in its place” (73). The body’s equilibrium is disturbed, 
neurologist and psychoanalyst Paul Schilder asserts, because “[w]e are 
accustomed to have a complete body. The phantom of the amputee person is 
therefore a reactivation of a given perceptive pattern by emotional forces” (qtd. in 
Grosz 73). The desire for the “complete” and “whole” body has permeated 
theories about the phantom limb for centuries. In recent years, neurologists43 
have theorized that phantom pain is caused by maladaptive cortical 
reorganization, plasticity, or remapping, meaning that after the loss of a limb, the 
brain continues to send signals to the missing body part, but another body part 
picks up the signals, causing a reorganization of the body’s sensory map. The 
brain, then, makes up for the loss by remapping the body into a new “whole.” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 See, for example, Elena Nava and Brigitte Röder (2011) or Sylvia Gustin et al. 
(2012). 
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Additionally, therapy for amputees often involves the mirror; in a distorted 
version of Lacan’s “mirror stage,” amputees are asked to study themselves in a 
mirror, to visually reckon with the amputation.44 Both dominant theories and 
therapies are based on the assumption that amputated bodies are not whole, that 
the phantom limb does not exist because it’s not materially present.  
These considerations of existence and reality, of course, quickly become 
philosophical, as perception plays an important role in what we take to be “real.” 
The phantom is stuck in Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual “paradox of immanence and 
transcendence”; the phantom is immanent “because the perceived object cannot 
be foreign to him who perceives” and transcendent “because it always contains 
something more than what is actually given” (“Primacy” 16). The phantom is 
invariably  “more than,” as its pain has no clear origin. While we could easily 
concede that the phantom is real insofar as it is perceived, a recent 
groundbreaking study suggests it may have more material resonances than once 
thought. Tamar Makin et al.’s 2013 study reveals that when amputees who have 
phantom pain were told to move their phantom limbs, they had the same brain 
activity as those moving intact limbs; the amputees have a persisting 
representation of the missing limbs in their brains. This study suggests that the 
limb, while not visibly present, is still materially present in the brain. These 
results cause us to question the correlation between presence and visibility or at 
least to refine/redefine what we mean by “presence.” 
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44 Mirror box therapy is also a common treatment for phantom pain. A mirror is 
used to reflect the image of an intact limb onto the space of the missing limb so 
that the amputee visualizes himself or herself as whole.  
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Rather than reading the brain’s desire for wholeness as a response to the 
exigence of amputation, we have to acknowledge that the amputee body is still in 
some sense whole, that it never registered the loss of the limb because the limb 
was never (completely) lost. When we insist on theorizing bodies as complete 
wholes, we risk assigning it false (rhetorical) intentions. Deleuze and Guatarri 
assert:  
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in 
other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into 
composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, 
either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to 
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in 
composing a more powerful body. (Thousand 257)  
We cannot know the phantom until we know its affects, how it composes and 
decomposes bodies and affects. As the epigraphs illustrate, the phantom destroys, 
and sometimes with the right treatment, can be destroyed.  
More than asking how our assumptions about wholeness and bodies affect 
the way we understand the rhetoricity of bodies, I want to propose that we 
expand our notion of materiality to include those things that are affectively 
present. Following Rickert’s call for a more sophisticated study of affect in 
Ambient Rhetoric, I suggest we resist theorizing affect and matter as somehow 
antithetical (matter is seen, touched, and used; affect is not). Rickert asserts:  
[O]ur concept of the material world and our relation to it must shift 
as well. Affect, materiality, embodiment, world—these all go 
together. Rhetorical theory’s grounding in humanism, particularly 
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its lingering Cartesian assumptions of a subject/object, mind/world 
dichotomy, implicitly blocks this insight and impedes revision of 
many of our key concepts. (21)  
The key concept of this dissertation—pathos—has long fallen victim to Cartesian 
assumptions, and despite many advances in emotion and affect scholarship, 
pathos is still often considered to be logos’ fickle counterpart. A central obstacle 
to this revision is the inability thus far to reconcile or integrate advances in affect 
theory with existing rhetorical theories of pathos. Thus, this chapter puts forth a 
framework to better study affect rhetorically, which I propose hinges on 
considerations of materiality.  
Ways of understanding, describing, and theorizing bodies have a direct 
impact on how we theorize the rhetoricity of bodies and their relations to affect—
not as just ephemeral, pervasive, invisible, but as something that assembles and 
gathers matter. To see affect and bodies in this way, I suggest in this chapter that 
we adopt a Spinozist view of bodies: not defined by form, function, substance, or 
as subject. Rather Deleuze, in his work on Spinoza, asserts “it is the relations of 
motion and rest, speeds and slowness” and “the capacity for affecting and being 
affected” that define a body in its individuality (Spinoza 123). “Body” here, of 
course, extends beyond the human and animal to include any gathering of parts. 
So the phantom limb, because of its capacity to affect and be affected, is a body, 
not only emerging from its biological origins but also entwining with other bodies 
(doctors, mirror boxes, changes in the weather that bring it pain, etc.). Affect is 
central to Spinoza’s theory of bodies, and his notion of affect can help us 
negotiate the line between underdetermination and oversimplification of affect in 
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rhetorical theory. Likewise, defining bodies by their affects—by their rhetorical 
affects and functions—opens opportunities for applying rhetorical theories to 
complex rhetorical events. 
Toward a rhetorical theory of affect, I’ll argue in this chapter that looking 
at ontological approaches to rhetorical study reveals the enmeshment of affect 
and matter. After a consideration of what it means to study rhetoric ontologically, 
I turn to an example of how a theory of “fire objects” is useful for investigating 
complex rhetorical events with many emotional and affective influences. Then, I 
suggest we return to a notion of affect as assembling, specifically with a better 
understanding of Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory. Rather than 
studying affect primarily as a bodily or abstract dimension of something else, 
returning to an understanding of affect as assembling highlights the rhetorical 
work of affect. Finally, I suggest that Spinoza’s theory of bodies places affect at 
the center of the emergence of material and rhetorical bodies—specifically the 
rhetorical relations of human and nonhuman bodies in complex rhetorical 
events.  
 
Rhetoric and Ontology  
Studying an event like the one in LeRoy is not an easy rhetorical task. 
More than just trying to untangle the many variables, forces, and motivations 
that drive the outcomes of the event, one must first back up and try to determine 
what exactly to study. As an object of study, mass hysteria could be understood 
as a clinical diagnosis, as a confluence of symptoms, as inspired by historical and 
cultural understandings, etc. What is more, when attempting to mark out the 
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boundaries of mass hysteria, it may suddenly seem to cease to be an object at all. 
Mass hysteria has no clear beginning or end; it extends and mutates seemingly 
infinitely. In rhetoric, we often don’t talk about our projects as objects. Compared 
to discourse, language, media, and texts, objects seem static, discrete. Studying 
objects has often been the domain of science and philosophy, but a growing body 
of scholarship suggests that ontology offers a unique perspective for rhetorical 
study.  
 Ontological approaches in rhetoric have garnered renewed interest in the 
last several years, as packed audiences at the 2010 and 2012 RSAs and the 2012 
CCCC panels on object-oriented, complexity, and Latourian theories illustrate. As 
a discipline historically concerned with the human rhetor and student writer, a 
heightened interest in objects, materiality, and networks may seem surprising. 
But it is the very turn away from theorizing the human as the fulcrum of a 
rhetorical act that seems to invigorate this scholarship for rhetorical study. 
Rhetoricians who’ve been presenting and beginning to publish in this vein 
(Cooper, Hawk, Rickert, Barnett, Rivers) aim to decenter the human rhetor 
within rhetorical acts; understand the rhetorical act more as an occasion 
materializing within, among, and aligned with other always, on-going occasions; 
expand our understanding of persuasion, such that nonhuman things, too, can 
persuade; and question assumptions about rhetoric by asking what it would 
mean to have a rhetoric of objects. These scholars have elucidated how studying 
rhetoric ontologically changes our understanding of how rhetoric comes into 
being and humans’ role(s) in that becoming. However, despite a number of 
rhetorical inquiries into objects, networks, and nonhumans in the last decade, it’s 
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not yet clear how capacities that have often been thought to be uniquely 
human/animal—sensing, feeling, emoting—fit into object-oriented, materialist, 
or complex rhetorical theories.  
Affect, because it is not unique to humans, is in a prime position to 
transcend boundaries between humans and nonhumans, subjects and objects. 
Jane Bennett writes in Vibrant Matter:  
Over the past decade or so, many political theorists, geographers, 
art historians, philosophers, sociologists, dancers, literary theorists, 
and others have explored the contributions made by affect to public 
culture, whereby affect refers to how moods and aesthetic 
sensibilities influence ethics and politics as much as do words, 
arguments, and reasons. While I agree that human affect is a key 
player, in this book the focus is on an affect that is not only not fully 
susceptible to rational analysis or linguistic representation but that 
is also not specific to humans, organisms or even to bodies: the 
affect of technologies, winds, vegetables, minerals. (61) 
For rhetoric, what this means is expanding not only our understanding of how 
affect gathers matter, things, humans, and objects, but also extending theories of 
pathos to include considerations of objects and matter. Before imagining what it 
might mean for an object to use or intersect with pathos, I’ll consider more 
closely what ontological studies in rhetoric might look like.  
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 One of the most recent and popular strands of this scholarship is object-
oriented ontology (OOO),45 coined in philosopher Graham Harman’s 1999 
dissertation. “OOO,” as its commonly referred to, responds to poststructuralist 
and linguistic philosophies that ignore objects or describe them as secondary to 
humans or human experience; in OOO, by contrast, humans and nonhumans are 
ontologically equal. Since OOO has taken off, several conference panels and blog 
posts have been dedicated to musings on object-oriented rhetoric (OOR).46 Jim 
Brown’s review of the 2010 RSA panel “Toward an Object-Oriented Rhetoric, or 
What Happens When the Human is No Longer the Center of Rhetoric?” incited a 
number of blog responses from central OOO theorists. In a response to Brown’s 
review, philosopher Levi Bryant asserts the main claim of OOR would be that not 
just humans—but also nonhuman objects—persuade. Similarly intrigued by the 
possibilities of OOR, another prominent OOO scholar and computer programmer 
Ian Bogost suggests, “We might also ask a different question under the name of 
object-oriented rhetoric: what is the rhetoric of objects? Do things like traffic 
lights and kohlrabis persuade one another in their interactions? What would it 
mean to understand extra-human object relations as rhetorical?” These are 
provocative questions to say the least and in some ways they mirror some of my 
own, yet OOO/R because of its ties to Latour, actor-network theory, and 
complexity theory, is much more interested in the functioning of technological 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Though OOO scholars mark several distinctions between it and previous 
ontologies or ontological projects, OOO is often included under the umbrella of 
speculative realism or lumped in with new materialism and new vitalism. 
46 The most substantial consideration of this is Scott Barnett’s “Toward an 
Object-Oriented Rhetoric,” a review of Harman’s book and then subsequent 
responses to that review. 
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and natural-cultural systems than in consciousness, sensations, or feelings. OOR 
scholarship doesn’t yet explain if or how central rhetorical concepts might be 
mapped onto an object’s rhetoric. It’s unclear for instance how pathos would 
exist in OOR. But a closely related vein of scholarship that emerges more from a 
Spinozist-Deleuzian tradition—new materialist theory—better accounts for the 
roles that affects and emotions play or can play in rhetoric. 
In new materialist theory, affect is part of the becoming of matter and 
what matters; it can help us better imagine how pathos fits into materialist, 
object-oriented, complex rhetorics. A true revision of pathos, using affect theory, 
must extend beyond the human, linguistic, and discursive. Though rhetoricians 
have only just begun to publish in this vein,47 it’s a growing area of 
interdisciplinary scholarship. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost explain the main 
tenets of new materialism in their introduction to the 2010 anthology New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics:  
In sum, new materialists are rediscovering a materiality that 
materializes, evincing immanent modes of self-transformation that 
compel us to think of causation in far more complex terms; to 
recognize that phenomena are caught in a multitude of interlocking 
systems and forces and to consider anew the location and nature of 
capacitates for agency. (9) 
Mirroring Massumi’s argument for augmenting rather than critiquing, a new 
materialist approach is interested in production, in thinking our way around !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Scholars in rhetoric have begun to identify with this scholarship only in the last 
few years. Many of them also study OOO/R. Rickert’s (2013) and Hawk’s (2007) 
works are preeminent examples of a new materialist rhetoric.  
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humanist assumptions about the world: “It avoids dualism or dialectical 
reconciliation by espousing a monological account of emergent, generative 
material being” (8). Coole and Frost assert that a new materialist ethos is 
“positive and constructive”; rather than concerning themselves with a critique or 
a dismissal of Cartesianism, new materialists attempt to think beyond it. In the 
“material turn,” matter becomes vibrant, active, resistant, productive. Coole and 
Frost mark Einstein’s theory of relativity as a transition from theorizing matter as 
inert and immobile unless acted upon (inspired by Euclidean geometry and 
Newtonian physics) to theorizing matter and force as inseparable. In this 
transition, rather than explaining cause and effect by the classic billiard ball 
example, in which both cause and effect are easily identifiable, causes and effects 
become more difficult or impossible to pull apart.  
Despite much enthusiasm for the potentials of OOO and new materialist 
scholarship, there is no shortage of concern about invoking these theories in 
rhetoric. Two central concerns emerge for scholars who see rhetoric as a human 
enterprise: 1) extending rhetorical study infinitely outward to encompass the 
study of any thing makes rhetoric lose its distinctiveness and power, and 2) if we 
give objects agency, we take agency and control away from humans. These 
concerns reflect two already, ongoing debates in rhetoric about Big Rhetoric and 
agency. Here, I’ll briefly respond to each of these concerns in hopes of 
complicating existing conceptions of what it means to pursue new materialist 
theory in rhetoric.  
Some argue if rhetoric is no longer a human enterprise interested in public 
discourse and persuasion, it’s no longer rhetoric. This claim echoes the Big 
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Rhetoric debate of the ‘90s, when scholars like Thomas Farrell, Dalip 
Parameshwar Goankar, and Lloyd Bitzer responded to the popularization and 
expansion of rhetorical studies. The oft-cited quote from Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics by William Keith, Steve Fuller, Alan Gross, and Michael Leff 
captures the critique of Big Rhetoric: “If everything is rhetoric/rhetorical, then it 
is neither informative nor interesting [to] be told that a 
practice/discourse/institution is rhetorical. si omnia, nulla” (1999, 331). “If 
[rhetoric is] everything, [rhetoric is] nothing”. Underlying much of this critique is 
the idea that rhetoric, born from the desires of the human rhetor, simply isn’t 
equipped to and shouldn’t be concerned with studying phenomena that is extra-
discursive or extra-linguistic. This reflects the idea that persuasion are a uniquely 
human capacity. But this critique also reflects a disciplinary insecurity, as 
Edward Schiappa suggests in “Second Thoughts on the Critiques of Big Rhetoric.” 
There, he outlines the critique of Big Rhetoric in this way: “1. Definitional—If 
rhetoric is everywhere, it is nowhere. 2. Evaluative—Big Rhetoric contributes to 
weak scholarship. 3. Political—Without a clear disciplinary history and discrete 
identity, the discipline of rhetoric is threatened” (267). Rather than seeing the 
popularization of rhetoric as a threat, Schiappa suggests we see it as an 
opportunity: “What is significant about the rhetorical turn is not that ‘everything 
is rhetoric,’ but that a rhetorical perspective and vocabulary potentially can be 
used to understand and describe a wide range of phenomena” (268). A new 
materialist rhetoric is an opportunity to shed light on a variety of phenomena but 
perhaps more importantly to question and extend existing rhetorical theories and 
applications.  
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Rather than assuming that humans are the producers of rhetoric, we might 
see humans as being folded into rhetoric. As both Davis and Rickert have 
suggested, rhetoricity precedes us. Our task, then, is not to ask what is rhetoric; 
it is not, we know, one thing. Rather we are left to carve out rhetorical projects, to 
figure out what we can interpret as rhetorical in any phenomenon and what that 
process might teach us about what rhetoric can be. Hawk’s Counter-History of 
Composition takes up this sort of investigation, both extending traditional 
boundaries of rhetoric and illustrating how a counter-history inspires us to ask 
questions about long-standing rhetorical theories. He argues, “The seemingly 
simple, static logic of the enthymeme and the abstract power of language over us 
need to give way to a more complex middle ground” (187). A complex vitalist 
perspective, he suggests, reveals rhetoric as a self-organizing complex adaptive 
system, wherein the human subject is a node in a network, not rhetoric’s 
orchestrator. Hawk asserts that a closer look at our history shows a tradition of 
valuing complex relationships among minds bodies, and environments, relating, 
for example, Aristotle’s entelechy to an ecological, layered process of 
development. If we accept that humans are no longer the orchestrators of 
rhetoric, this means paying attention to how affects and emotions are produced 
and transmitted by nonhumans, as Hawk asserts, “any understanding of rhetoric 
in the contemporary world needs to understand rhetoric at the level of affect. 
Like language, new media make new affections and new relations possible” (190). 
Affect theory is an avenue for humanistic rhetorical traditions to be merged with 
recent studies of objects, matter, or the nonhuman.  
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Another popular critique of ontologically focused theories in rhetoric is 
that they take away agency from humans. However, a number of theorists have 
made compelling arguments that our understanding of human agency has been 
flawed all along. Bennett addresses just this “The Agency of Assemblages.” She 
argues that human-centered notions of agency are inadequate. In her scheme, 
assemblages are made up of groupings of actants, some of which, she suggests, 
have sufficient coherence to appear as entities; others, because of 
their great volatility, fast pace or evolution, or minuteness of scale, 
are best conceived as forces […] Within this materialism, the world 
is figured as neither mechanistic nor teleological but rather as alive 
with movement and with a certain power of expression. (447) 
The problem, she says, with popular conceptions of agency is that they celebrate 
human intentionality and a presumed superiority; it is centered around “the 
rational, intentional human subject” (453). A phenomenological approach, by 
contrast, as inspired by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, recognizes the 
embodiment and intersubjectivity of all human actants. Bennett offers what she 
calls “a distributive theory of agency,” which does not ignore the human ability to 
reflect and make judgments but she asserts:  
[I]t attempts a more radical displacement of the human subject 
from the center of thinking about agency. It goes so far as to say 
that effective agency is always an assemblage: even what has been 
considered the purest locus of agency—reflective, intentional 
human consciousness—is from the first moment of its emergence 
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constituted by the interplay of human and nonhuman materialities. 
(453) 
This doesn’t mean that humans no longer have agency (as some critics have 
suggested) but rather that we must acknowledge the nonhuman aspects of human 
agency; a human agent never makes a choice without other materialities. 
Within our own field, Marilyn Cooper takes up Bennett’s theory of agency, 
in her article “Rhetorical Agency As Emergent and Enacted.” Cooper, too, 
criticizes a popular understanding of agency as conscious intention and free will. 
Instead, she suggests, “though the world changes in response to individual action, 
agents are very often not aware of their intentions, they do not directly cause 
changes, and the choices they make are not free from influence from their 
inheritance, past experiences or their surround” (421). Cooper urges that we see 
agency as “an emergent property of embodied individuals” (421). Even though 
agents plan and reflect on their actions consciously and while this consciousness 
plays a role, Cooper claims this agency is based in “individuals’ lived knowledge 
that their actions are their own” (421). We often attribute our actions and words 
simply to conscious choices that we made rather than considering the agency also 
of our surroundings and other nonhuman agents. Complex systems, Cooper says, 
shift our focus from cause-effect to “the dance of perturbation and response as 
agents interact” (421). For example, calling one of the LeRoy girls an agent 
recognizes her as an independent entity functioning in a larger system. It doesn’t 
mean that she necessarily is conscious of her agency or that she has the ability to 
will her symptoms to stop or control the way she is represented. Her agency 
emerges based on her interactions with other agents (girls, media, doctors, 
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medication). Traditionally we might have privileged the girl herself (as a coherent 
body, a subject, a participant in society) as an independent agent, but an agency 
that emerges and is enacted acknowledges that the girl is made up of agents, 
some that are contained and some that spill out of her, that interact with other 
agents. Agency is the actions that are possible, in breathing or not, in ticking or 
not, in accepting a diagnosis or not.  
I turn to these two critiques of studying rhetoric ontologically not only to 
dispute popular misconceptions of this vein of scholarship but also to highlight 
the ways in which affect and emotion have not yet fully entered the conversation. 
Affect and emotion tie new materialist theories more closely to rhetorical theory 
but also incite rhetorical theory to do some revising of its own. Only a few 
rhetorical scholars thus far (e.g., Hawk, Rickert, Edbauer) have begun to make 
connections between these “new” ways of seeing the world, in terms of complex 
systems, networks, ecologies, and affect/emotion. One way to bridge 
considerations of affect and matter is through assemblage theory which I’ll will 
pursue later in this chapter, but first I return to the question posed at the 
beginning of this section: what is the object “mass hysteria”? 
 
Fire Objects 
 If this question seems impossible to answer, it’s likely because we think of 
objects as lifeless, static, and discrete, the opposite of something as complicated 
as the outbreak in LeRoy. For this reason, some scholars prefer terminology other 
than “object,” choosing “thing,” a la Heiddegger, or phenomena, like Barad. 
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Though I’m not particularly invested in the terminology debate,48 I’m taking time 
to consider the outbreak in LeRoy as an object because of some provocative 
scholarship in science, technology, and society studies. Two theories—the fluid 
object and fire object—help us pin down the objects of mass hysteria. 
 The theory of fluid objects, put forth by Marianne de Laet and Annemarie 
Mol in “The Zimbabwe Bush Pump: Mechanics of a Fluid Technology,” 
emphasizes objects’ flexible, adaptable nature. The pump, which De Laet and Mol 
describe as a brilliant and valuable technology, is so successful because of its 
fluidity; its relatively simple and intuitive design allows people to easily replace 
missing or broken parts with a variety of materials, including sticks. Because its 
boundaries are neither solid nor sharp, the pump is a fluid object which 
continues to work with a changing makeup. As the boundaries change, different 
identities emerge for the pump. We can see how mass hysteria might benefit from 
being studied as a fluid object, as its makeup is continually adapting. However, 
John Law and Vicky Singleton’s concept “fire object,” captures even more of the 
complexities and conflicting identities of an object like mass hysteria.  
In their article “Object Lessons,” Law and Singleton explain the difficulties 
they faced studying the management of alcoholic liver disease in a particular 
healthcare system. These difficulties arose not because of the many perspectives 
(doctors, patients, social workers, etc.) from which the phenomenon could be 
studied but because the object itself was in constant flux; alcoholic liver disease is 
an example of what they call a “messy object.” A typical approach to studying the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 I use mostly the terminology “body” and “assemblage” because they most easily 
traverse and encompass the varying traditions in this scholarship.   
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disease and its context would be epistemological, wherein researchers would 
consider how an object means different things to different people, how it comes 
to be known. However, Law and Singleton decide to study the disease 
ontologically, actually thinking about “the nature of objects in the world—about 
what counts as an object” (334). To do this, they suggest, we need to acknowledge 
that “realities, messy or otherwise, are enacted into being” and “in part at least, 
such enactments take place in the practices of getting to know those realities” 
(334). So while something like alcoholic liver disease may seem to cease to be an 
object at all, it only seems that way because our methods for studying it don’t 
allow us to recognize it as such.  
Law and Singleton suggest that alcoholic liver disease could be studied as 
de Laet and Mol’s fluid object or as a networked object (as constituted by its 
relations which allows it to hold its shape for a period of time), but they also offer 
a new theory of a fire object to better capture the disease.49 They assert the “fire 
object” is a way to better account for the presences and absences of an object: 
“The present object implies realities that are necessarily absent, that cannot be 
brought to presence; that are othered. So, to put it slightly differently, an object is 
a pattern of presences and absences” (342-3). There are aspects of the object that 
are absent but still generative. For example, when studying the disease on the 
level of a body, the other realities of the disease (its object on the hospital or 
societal level) are necessarily absent. They write, “The argument in part is that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 It’s worth noting that the fire object doesn’t exclude an object from being fluid 
or networked. Law and Singleton are not proposing “fire object” as the best 
theory of objects, but as one possible way to rethink the multiplicity of objects.  
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fires are energetic and transformative, and depend on difference—for instance 
between (absent) fuel or cinders and (present) flame. Fire objects, then, depend 
upon otherness, and that otherness is generative” (344). The object of the disease 
on the level of a body (its cause and its prognosis) inform the object of the disease 
on the level of society (its social beginnings and treatments) and vice versa. They 
go on: “We are arguing, then, that alcoholic liver disease and its treatment in the 
hospital are fire-like objects. They are generated in juxtaposition with realities 
that are necessarily absent, even though they bring versions of those realities to 
presence” (345). As I will show more extensively in the following chapter, mass 
hysteria, too, can be studied as a fire object.  
Like alcoholic liver disease, mass hysteria becomes multiple objects with 
generative presences and absences. If we were to take an epistemological 
approach, as Law and Singleton explain, to studying mass hysteria, we might 
focus on how we come to know illness (as doctors, through media outlets, first-
hand accounts, etc.). But an ontological approach would consider how the 
hysteria changes itself based on the presence, absence, and otherness of its 
identities. For example, in a psychologist’s office, mass hysteria is evidence of 
trauma, a disorder of the mind, something to be overcome (perhaps with a 
change in life circumstance and therapy); on various TV programs, it becomes a 
mystery illness, an environmental contagion, a plight of girlhood, or a curse; and 
among the girls themselves, it is something that binds them, a manifestation of 
their bond (of their struggles, material circumstance, etc). Mass hysteria’s 
objectness emerges through these series of presences and absences. Even when 
two afflicted girls are alone, when the object of mass hysteria is an identification 
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or a mark of a confluence of painful life circumstances (despite differences in 
their pasts, lifestyles, and bodies), the historical and cultural object of mass 
hysteria is necessarily absent but never gone. Even if the object of mass hysteria 
is in one moment an identification, an acknowledgement of suffering, its 
objectness as dysfunction, abnormality, or girlhood irrationality is absent but still 
generative.  
I draw attention to the fire object because it is one specific example of how 
ontological approaches to defining objects could change how we approach 
rhetorical projects. The theory of fire objects acknowledges the impossibility of 
defining a discrete object of study but it also points our attention to how we can 
identify multiple predominant objects in what we study. Of course we can never 
grasp all of the objects of mass hysteria or any other phenomenon, but identifying 
the predominant objects and how they come into presence and go into absence 
(and how each of those objects is part of a different rhetorical situation) gives us a 
fuller picture of what we study. It might seem that an object like mass hysteria 
exceeds the purview of rhetoric, that there are too many variables (biological, 
psychological, environmental, etc.) whose purposes or agency we can’t account 
for, echoing in many ways the concerns of the Big Rhetoric and agency debates. 
However, the theory of fire objects isolates different manifestations of 
phenomena so that we can consider various rhetorical purposes and affects in a 
given situation, isolating, for example, mass hysteria as a psychological 
syndrome, a mystery illness, or an identification.  
Popular understandings of affect often suggest that we can’t bring affect 
fully into presence, that if affect is a preconscious bodily intensity (a la Massumi), 
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bringing it into presence—recognizing it, naming it—pulls affect into the realm of 
emotion. But just as presence is fueled by absence, so too is emotion fueled by 
affect, the visible fueled by the invisible, and the phantom fueled by the limb. The 
fire object calls attention to the generative relationship between presence and 
absence and the rhetorical aims and affects of those presences and absences. 
Before we can study affect rhetorically, before we can study the affects of mass 
hysteria, we have to do a better job of pinning down its multiple objects. Each 
object has its own affects, and in this way, affect is central in defining and 
assembling objects—“messy” or otherwise.  
 
Assembling Affect 
 Early theories of affect often emphasized its power as a verb; affect wasn’t 
invoked so much as a companion to emotion, sensation, or feeling as much as it 
was considered an action, movement, and force. A lot of recent scholarship uses 
“affect” to qualify other things,50 for example “affective lives,” “the affective 
component of writing and reading,” “affective potential,” “affective dimension,” 
or “affective capacity.”51 In these examples, affect qualifies other phenomena or 
denotes a realm we can’t readily access or understand. Though there’s nothing 
inherently wrong with this, as a stand-in for anything extralinguistic, affect’s 
rhetorical work is less clear; “affective” often refers to a more abstract, new, or 
sophisticated level of whatever is being studied. The question that many scholars !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Two excellent exceptions are Daniel Smith (2003) and Jenny Edbauer Rice  
(2004). 
51 These phrases can be found among Worsham (1999), Pruchnic and Lacey 
(2011), Strickland (2007), Crane (2003), Rachel Riedner (2007) 
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have pursued in the field is what can we do with affect? But a question like this 
mischaracterizes affect itself. Instead, we ought to be asking what does affect do 
to us? One answer to this question is it assembles. Whereas assemblage theory 
was central for theorizing affect for Deleuze (whose theory is rooted in Spinoza), 
it was less so for Massumi. Scholars who turn only to Massumi for a theory of 
affect might miss the rhetorical potential that exists in considering the 
assembling power of affect.  
Although Deleuze and Guattarri spend little over 20 pages discussing 
assemblages in their otherwise exhaustive work, A Thousand Plateaus, 
proponents of the theory claim Deleuze develops his assemblage theory through 
his entire oeuvre. Scholars across disciplines use the assemblage generally to 
describe dynamic, heterogeneous collectives of humans and nonhumans. As 
opposed to some conceptions of the network, the assemblage never has a fixed 
identity but is always collecting, becoming, composing, and decomposing. One of 
the most prominent assemblage theory scholars is social scientist Manuel De 
Landa who puts forth an assemblage-based ontology in A New Philosophy of 
Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity. Uprooting persisting 
understandings of individuals and societies in social theory, assemblage theory, 
De Landa argues, offers a new paradigm. An assemblage, while it is a whole, is 
not a totality; it’s not seamless and has no essence. Rather the assemblage has 
synthetic and emergent properties, resulting from the interaction of its parts. A 
part can be a member of multiple assemblages; De Landa calls this “Relations of 
exteriority” which “guarantee that assemblages may be taken apart while at the 
same time allowing that the interactions between parts may result in a true 
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synthesis” (11). He discourages thinking of any assemblage in terms of interiority 
because it perpetuates the idea of essence. Of the many concepts that are caught 
up in assemblages for Deleuze and Guatarri, I will focus on just two here that I 
think are especially relevant to affect and rhetoric: double articulation and 
territorialization. The following is a brief, and therefore necessarily reductive, 
explanation of both.  
To understand the assemblage rhetorically, we must first figure out how it 
comes into being. Double articulation is a dual process of creation that “is so 
extremely variable,” Deleuze and Guattari claim, they “cannot begin with a 
general model, only a relatively simple case” (40). They go on to explain:  
The first articulation chooses or deducts, from unstable 
particleflows, metastable molecular or quasi-molecular units 
(substances) upon which it imposes statistical order of connections 
and successions (forms). The second articulation establishes 
functional, compact, stable structures (forms), and constructs the 
molar compounds in which these structures are simultaneously 
actualized (substances). (41) 
Their initial example is a geological stratum, in which the first articulation is 
sedimentation; the sediment is deposited in a statistical order. Then, in the 
second articulation, the sediment stabilizes into rock. While the first articulation 
selects, sorts, and orders substances (formed matter), the second articulation 
produces a more stabilized form; the assemblage is actualized, and this is where 
integration, unification, and hierarchization happens and where qualities and 
capacities emerge. The first is concerned with “content” and the second 
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“expression,” though neither content nor expression is preexisting; they emerge 
together (inseparably) in each becoming. De Landa delineates the two 
articulations by suggesting the first is nondiscursive and the second discursive or 
is a process of coding. Because assembling is a recurring process that is never 
complete, there is always slippage in the process of sorting and stabilizing, and 
assemblages can always fall apart. Territorialization (and relatedly, 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization) is part of the process of the first 
articulation in which matter (human and nonhuman) is sorted. De Landa 
explains that territorialization defines and sharpens (spatial or nonspatial) 
boundaries or territories; he gives the example of people being sorted and 
included/excluded in groups and organizations.  
 In another example, Deleuze and Guattari put forth some “general 
conclusions on the nature of assemblages” and they map double articulation onto 
axes: 
On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, 
one of content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a 
machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an 
intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other hand 
it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, 
of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on the 
vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or 
reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of 
deterritorialization, which carry it away. (88)   
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On the horizontal axis, the assemblage is formed through the arrangement and 
collecting of bodies, actions, and passions; on the vertical axis, the assemblage is 
further recognized as an independent entity which has particular boundaries. In 
social organizations and assemblages, shared identities, values, and motivations 
bind people for a period of time.  
 While undoubtedly a complicated process that can never be fully pulled 
apart for examination, the formation of assemblages is useful for studying events 
that have many parts or variables; we can begin to understand rhetorical 
situations as assemblages, whose parts are pulled in and articulated differently 
depending on the situation, or how parts fulfill varying rhetorical functions in 
assemblages or are called to function rhetorically differently. For example, the tic 
of a hysterical girl in an assemblage of other girls identifies her with them; in the 
assemblage of a body, the tic is an exigence to address an underlying problem; or 
in the assemblage of the Dr. Drew show, the tic is a representation of mystery, 
dysfunction, or performance. In a hysterical body, through the process of double 
articulation, bodily matter, material circumstance, psychological state, and 
exposure (along with innumerable other parts) gather to manifest in a tic; 
intensities from inside and outside the individual collide to create the becoming 
of hysteria. Then, of course, as more girls exhibit symptoms, they too are being 
assembled and sorted by healthcare professionals, peers, and the news media, to 
become the group of hysterical girls. We can see how the assemblages grow and 
change and die, encompassing many parts.  
The relationship between cause and effect in assemblage theory is an 
emergent, productive relationship. Rather than thinking of one entity or body 
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being the cause of a given effect, De Landa asserts, in assemblage theory the 
cause is a change, action, or movement. The possible affects of a body become the 
causes (the changes) that form new relations. To think of affect in terms of the 
assemblage is to think of it as becoming. As Deleuze and Guattari explain:  
To every relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness 
grouping together an infinity of parts, there corresponds a degree of 
power. To the relations composing, decomposing, or modifying an 
individual there correspond intensities that affect it, augmenting or 
diminishing its power to act; these intensities come from external 
parts or from the individual’s own parts. Affects are becomings. 
(256) 
This explanation highlights the relational and ecological aspects of affect, 
specifically how in relations and movement, parts of an assemblage come 
together and diverge, altering each part’s power to act. Relations are constantly 
composing and decomposing, allowing or restricting an individual’s capacity to 
influence. For rhetoric, then, affect is part of what is becoming the available 
means (of persuasion) in a given situation. It is what propels parts into grouping 
but also what gives and removes power. Affects are not random forces that 
pervade everything, but are instrumental in the becoming of humans, objects, 
rhetoric—assemblages of all kinds. Merleau-Ponty offers a prime example of the 
assembling power of a nonhuman affect in his writing about honey. He explains, 
“Honey is a particular way the world has of acting on me and my body” (World 
47). Honey, an assemblage of pollen, nectar, bees, bee-keepers, shop owners, and 
taste buds, is not inert; rather “we are moved or compelled to treat it in certain 
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way . . . it has a particular way of seducing, attracting or fascinating the free 
subject who stands before us” (47). More than just explaining how matter comes 
together, assemblage theory is important to understanding what affect does.  
  
Defining Bodies by their Affects 
 One of the primary reasons scholars across disciplines have turned to 
affect theory is because it demands that we begin accounting for the role of 
bodies, not just how existing within a body shapes the way we perceive the world 
but also how processes like learning, rationalizing, and persuading are embodied. 
A heightened focus on bodies for rhetoric means considering how our bodies 
persuade and are persuaded, yet to entertain these considerations, we must 
determine what makes up a body, where a body begins and ends. Might our 
bodies extend to the media we use and consume, as Marshall McLuhan has 
suggested or might bodies be made up of machinic, nonhuman parts as Donna 
Harraway’s cyborg suggests? Rhetoric might seem to be an odd discipline for 
debates about bodies and materiality, as Celeste Condit asks in “The Materiality 
of Coding,”  
Surely, speaking and writing are not material in the same sense 
genetic coding is? Except in war and lovemaking, human beings do 
not use the physical conformations of their bodies and direct 
contact with other physical substances to communicate in the direct 
fashion used by amino acids and other molecules. Yet further 
reflection suggests that communication is every bit as material. 
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Speaking is an act of breathing, of the physical vibration of air 
molecules, of hearts supplying blood for hand motions and body-
lean. (327) 
But as Condit and scholars like Hawhee have asserted, just acknowledging that 
these physical and material elements exist doesn’t do enough to advance our 
rhetorical theories. The more difficult task is figuring out what it means to 
account for bodies in rhetorical theory—a consideration that might be best 
theorized in relation to affect.  
Following Deleuze and Guattari, bodies compose and decompose based on 
how they affect and are affected by other bodies. Affects are central to the 
formulation, arrangement, exigence, and dissolution of bodies—human, textual, 
rhetorical, mediated, etc. Bodies, in this configuration, are human and 
nonhuman and are made up of an infinite number of parts. Edbauer (2004) 
explains this as a sort of expanding: “It is the experience that we are not 
a/lone(ly), but that we exist in relations beyond what we may recognize or even 
wish.” These relations with other human and nonhuman bodies constitute the 
coming together and falling apart of any event: “Affect marks the lived duration 
between two states experienced by one body that is affected by another body” 
(Edbauer). This view of affect is very much grounded in Spinoza, wherein a 
body’s individuality is defined by, as Deleuze explains in Spinoza: Practical 
Philosophy, “relations of motion and rest, speeds and slowness” and its “the 
capacity for affecting and being affected” (123).  
Subverting the definition of bodies by a physical or visible border or limit, 
Spinoza defines bodies by their affective potential. Because bodies, for Spinoza, 
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are made up of an infinite number of particles, “whole” would never be an 
accurate description of a body because wholeness implies stability. Deleuze gives 
the example of how a plow horse is more similar to an ox than a racehorse 
because their affects are similar. This introduces a new way of categorizing 
bodies, in which affects are the central mode of definition; we are defined by what 
we can do, say, and incite. For Spinoza, affect is a capacity; as any event or 
assemblage changes, so does our power to affect, to persuade. As Spinoza writes 
in his Ethics, “By affect I understand the affections of the body, by which the 
power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered, 
together with the ideas of these affections” (106). We transition from one state to 
another toward more or less perfection, an increase or decrease in the power to 
act. As bodies move from one state to another, their rhetorical abilities to act are 
created and diminished. 
To accept these propositions means that we resist defining bodies by their 
forms; rather, bodies are in a constant state of composing and decomposing: “The 
important thing is to understand life, each living individuality, not as a form, or a 
development of form, but as a complex relation between differential velocities, 
between deceleration and acceleration of particles. A composition of speeds and 
slownesses on a plane of immanence” (Spinoza 123).  Even if we were to 
acknowledge a human body as discrete, its makeup constantly changes—through 
the consumption of nutrients, illnesses that subsume it or are overcome, levels of 
exertion, absorption of chemicals and topical treatments, changes in climate, etc. 
A body’s border similarly changes to include things like hearing aids, tumors, 
body hair, etc. And because, as Deleuze writes, “all bodies are in extension,” parts 
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of a human body extend out to other bodies and may leave ours for another (114). 
The tic of a hysteric girl extends into the space around her but also extends to 
other girls who consume and develop the tic; similarly, the tic extends into the 
news media that seek to capture it. The tic is an affect that both defines the 
hysteric girl but also extends beyond her to have other rhetorical affects, as it 
becomes for example, the focal point52 of the news media interviews.  
 Studying the possible affects of bodies in a situation is a chiefly rhetorical 
task. This approach is important for thinking about intersecting rhetorical 
situations, in which bodies can have multiple roles (as exigences and constraints 
for example) depending on their affects. Similarly, affects are central in emerging, 
categorizing, and identifying bodies. When a LeRoy girl develops a tic—when tics 
are one of her affects—she becomes a hysteric. But when she appears on the Dr. 
Drew show and her tics cease, people question whether she really is a hysteric. 
No identity is static. Through individual (and cultural) narratives and memories, 
some affects (especially those that don’t make sense given our experience) spur 
strong emotional reactions. The fear, for example, surrounding hysteria is in part 
a fear of its affects. This fear grows only because we can never fully know our 
affective capacities:  
That is why Spinoza calls out to us in the way he does: you do not 
know beforehand what good or bad you are capable of; you do  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 In fact, when one of the interviews failed to capture the tic—when one of the 
girls being interviewed failed to exhibit symptoms—the viewing audience used it 
as evidence that the girls were faking the syndrome.  
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not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given 
encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination. (Spinoza 
125) 
While this may seem to suggest that we have no control over our bodies and 
affects, we have to remember that patterns emerge; all bodies are in relation. We 
might not be able to predict with much accuracy what affects we and others will 
have in the future, but we can better understand the available affects of bodies in 
a rhetorical situation in the moment.  
 
Affective Agency 
 An understanding of affect through Spinoza, Deleuze, and Guattari 
suggests that affects are the very basis for what is rhetorically possible. Within 
this framework, rhetorical concepts and theories have no essence—only affects. A 
rhetor, audience, or text is defined by its affects and its capacities in any given 
situation, so a rhetor is a rhetor only because she has an audience, the ability to 
persuade, to recognize and respond to an exigence, etc. This means, of course, 
that a rhetor doesn’t have to be human. As long as a body has the affects of a 
rhetor, given its relation to other bodies, it is a rhetor. Thus, this framework could 
be used to describe almost anything as rhetorical but also to consider central 
rhetorical theories and concepts in different light, to ask for example, What are 
the affects we assume a rhetor, text, or audience has? What possibilities do we 
allow and deny through our assigning of affects?  
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If we understand affects to be what is possible for any body in any 
situation, we can harness these possibilities, rhetorically, in different ways. While 
we have little control over some affects, others affects we can change and control. 
Think for example about our relation to the earth. One affect we can hardly avoid 
is stepping, trampling, or driving on the earth, yet there are other affects we have 
on the earth we can control, e.g. mowing, composting, or reducing our carbon 
imprint. We know that the affects we have on the earth change our relation to it, 
change the body of the earth and our bodies. One could even consider global 
warming as the world’s affect on us—an emergence of many chemical, ecological, 
human bodies. Affects are closely tied to theories of agency, as a body’s affects 
(both the affects that are available and not to a body) enable its agency. This sort 
of emergent, agential affect aligns closely with physicist Karen Barad’s theory of 
agential realism, which she writes about in Meeting the Universe Halfway: 
Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. She argues 
representationalism is problematic because it “separates the world into 
ontologically disjoint domains of words and things, leaving the dilemma of their 
linkage” (137). However, similar to assemblage theory, she introduces a theory of  
“intra-action” which describes the process by which phenomena53 emerge; agency 
in this configuration is also emergent:  
Agency is not held, it is not a property of persons or things; rather, 
agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Barad uses “phenomena” as the primary ontological unit rather than “thing” or 
“object” because those concepts suggest separation and individuality; phenomena 
on the other hand are “dynamic topological 
reconfigurings/entaglements/relationalities/(re)articulations of the world” (142). 
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entanglements. So agency is not about choice in any liberal 
humanist sense; rather, it is about the possibilities and 
accountability entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive 
apparatuses of bodily production, including the boundary 
articulations and exclusions that are marked by those practices. 
(“Interview” 58)   
Thus, similar to Cooper, Barad asserts agency is enacted. Rhetorically, it’s a 
matter of figuring out how our and others’ affects can “reconfigure 
entanglements.” Defining affect in this way resists an understanding of affects as 
free-floating or representational; they assemble and dissemble us and rhetoric 
into bodies. In this way, affect and matter are closely entwined; as Bennett has 
suggested, “I equate affect with materiality, rather than posit a separate force that 
can enter and animate a physical body.” (xiii). This helps us understand how 
phenomenon like the phantom limb, regardless of its material presence (as an 
appendage or in the brain), is affectively present and persuasive, through the 
affect of pain. This kind of rhetorical affect is what I hope to highlight in the 
application of my theoretical framework in the following chapter, to reveal some 
of the multifaceted ways that affects and emotions work in a complex rhetorical 
events.   
Perhaps these theories of affect sounds like the “impractical theory-talk”54 
that so many scholars bemoan. Yet they capture both affect’s complexity (that we 
can never really grasp all of the affects that surround us) but also its work in a 
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54 As referenced in Edbauer Rices’s examples from the WPA Listserv thread in 
“(Meta)Physical Graffiti: ‘Getting Up” as Affective Writing Model.” 
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rhetorical situation, as its various parts (bodies) come into being only in their 
relations with one another, in their capacities to affect and be affected. If we take 
this version of affect to consider the work of pathos in a rhetorical situation, we 
can see how it becomes more than just a tool to be invoked, a twist in style, a flair 
in delivery. Rather than being primarily the impetus for a situation or the desired 
result of rhetoric, affects and emotions become the very circumstance in which all 
things (rhetorical and not) come together, the very basis of change. This view is 
actually not so far off from Aristotle’s two millennia ago: pathe, the emotions “are 
all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are 
also attended by pain or pleasure.” The emotions neither begin nor end in a 
human body; they emerge among the relations of rhetor, audience, exigence, and 
constraint, and each of these entities is limited by the possible feelings, the 
affects, it can elicit. This theory of affect, while not transparent, allows us to 
imagine what it might entail to see pathos as the very foundation for rhetoric. ! ! !!!!!!!!!
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
A Rhetorical Analysis of Mass Hysteria  
 
 
 !
The debate surrounding the outbreak of mass hysteria in LeRoy could 
have ended January 11, 2012. On that day, Dr. Gregory Young presented the 
results of the New York State Department of Health’s investigation to over 150 
concerned community members in the LeRoy High School auditorium. Dr. Young 
reported that no infectious or environmental causes could be found, but citing 
HIPPA regulations, claimed he wouldn’t release the real diagnosis—conversion 
disorder turned mass psychogenic illness. When Dr. Young repeatedly refused to 
reveal the diagnosis for the girls (what he said would be a breach of privacy), an 
unafflicted student named Jessica confronted Dr. Young in the front of the group: 
“You think it’s unethical for you not to give us the cause. I think it's wrong for you 
not to tell us . . . You're not telling us the truth because you don't really know 
what's going on” (Owens). The Department of Health, school administration, and 
doctors treating the girls all hoped this meeting would mitigate the community’s 
concerns, but the overwhelming sentiment toward the report might be best 
summed up by Jim Dupont, one of the parents who was interviewed by local 
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news media after the meeting: “Well in my opinion we've only just begun. If you 
haven't found anything then we have to turn some more stones and we need to 
have another investigation that is not government related” (Brean).  
If parents, girls, and local residents had accepted the diagnosis (despite 
Dr. Young’s refusal to publicly name it, most in the community knew several of 
the girls had begun successful treatment for conversion disorder), this case could 
have slowly come to an end—the girls could have continued treatment at Dent 
Neurological Institute, and their symptoms could have ceased. But when parents 
decided to create a support group and turn to the national news media, this 
became a whole other event; news reporters swarmed the town, conspiracy 
theorists plead their cases, fear in the community escalated, symptoms worsened, 
and the number of afflicted more than doubled to twenty-four. 
Similarly, a rhetorical study of this case might have ended with the report 
from the New York State Department of Health. A traditional rhetorical study of 
this case might begin with choosing the central texts in this event. I might have 
begun by close reading the report and a few other articles and interviews, looking 
for rhetorical appeals and strategies. I would have considered the persuasive 
effects of these texts, the strength of their evidence, and to whom they were 
written. If that report, whose dual purpose was presenting scientific findings to a 
lay-audience and mitigating fear in the community, had been the end of this 
story, it could have been the end of my analysis. But instead, the report was the 
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impetus for parents—who have been described by anthropologist Ryan Cook55 as 
“concerned but poorly informed” (3)—to ask the national news media for help. 
This decision produced a case of mass hysteria that has never been seen before—
wherein news and social media became the main site for transmission of the 
symptoms. 
Between January and February 2012, hundreds of international articles 
and news segments covered the “mystery illness” in LeRoy. The most sustained 
coverage (and arguably most sensational) came from Dr. Drew Pinksy, who Cook 
describes, “enthusiastically positioned himself as [the girls’] advocate” (3). On his 
talk show, he had an almost daily report on the girls for several weeks. It seemed 
that for every news report that asserted the girls were suffering from mass 
psychogenic illness, there were twice as many that introduced conspiracy theories 
about the cause of the symptoms. As Cook describes: “For their part, news 
organizations continued to emphasize the mysteriousness of the illness even after 
it was officially labeled MPI, and they circulated dramatic videos on TV and the 
internet of the afflicted exhibiting tics.” (4). Meanwhile, the public, through blogs 
and internet comments, weighed in on the cause of the symptoms, offering any 
number of modern-day ills—environmental pollution, vaccines, social media, 
atheism, premarital sex, etc. By the middle of March, the news media went 
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55  One of only a few scholars who have published about the case, Cook does an 
ethnographic study called “”I Didn’t Want to Be One of the Contaminated 
People”: Confronting a Mystery Illness in a Rural American Landscape.” 
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silent.56 Only a few local news stories have covered the girls since—all suggesting 
there’s not much to report. The girls have been treated and are better. 
The study of this case, as I’ve suggested, requires a new kind of approach 
and methodology. My analysis is informed by the study of approximately fifty 
newspaper articles and blog posts on the case (including thousands of 
comments), twelve television news reports on the girls (including several 
interviews), and the report issued by the New York State Department of Health. 
But I won’t be turning to those articles, interviews, and stories as central texts of 
my analysis. In keeping with my desire to pursue a study of more than the 
discourse surrounding the event, I’ll turn to these texts in support of finding the 
emotions and affects that propelled this case, to identify new kinds of persuasion 
and rhetorical relations. I won’t be studying this event as a traditional rhetorical 
object per se; rather my approach begins in the middle to discern what objects, 
bodies, assemblages, and affects are holding the event together. While 
unorthodox, this isn’t such a new approach; scholars in critical and cultural 
rhetoric have been arguing for similar methodologies for decades. In his seminal 
argument for critical rhetoric Raymie McKerrow (1989), for example, argues 
against “universalist” approaches to rhetorical criticism that “privilege reason 
above all else” (124); he, instead, asserts,  
To approach mediated communication as rhetorical is to see it in its 
fragmented, unconnected, even contradictory or momentarily 
oppositional mode of presentation . . . The process one employs is 
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56 This was most likely because the girls’ physicians were finally able to convince 
them that interacting with the news media was making their symptoms worse. 
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thus geared to uncovering the ‘dense web’ (Moscow), not by means 
of a simple speaker-audience interaction but also by the means of a 
‘pulling together’ of disparate scraps of discourse which, when 
constructed as an argument, serve to illuminate otherwise hidden 
or taken for granted social practices. (134)  
The analysis that follows aims to study more than the many speaker-audience 
interactions in this event; instead, it hopes to “pull together disparate scraps of 
discourse”—cultural, mediated, bodily, emotional discourses—to reveal some of 
the emotional and affective arguments and influences in this case. Though not all 
events need be studied on the level of affect and emotion, I’m interested in 
considering what this would look like. What could we uncover, if we began our 
studies not by imposing theories of persuasion, the rhetorical situation, or 
rhetorical appeals onto our objects of study, but by looking for the objects, 
bodies, assemblages, and affects at the core of our studies?  
Thus, this chapter applies the framework put forth in the previous chapter 
alongside analysis of reports of the case and situated among some of vast 
scholarship on hysteria, which has influenced popular and medical 
understandings of the syndrome.57 By situating analysis of the case within some 
of this literature, I hope to point out the recursivity of historical and cultural 
connotations of hysteria as they inspired some of the mediation and reception of 
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57 We mustn’t forget, for example, in the 19th century, hysteria was touted as the 
most common illness treated by physicians in Western Europe and the U.S. 
Hysteria was called both the “The English Malady” by physician George Cheyene 
and “American Nervousness” by physician George Beard. At that time, hysteria 
was still believed to be a somatic disorder, often attributed to the nerves. 
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this case. As a syndrome, hysteria has a long history of being described in 
emotional terms. Understanding how hysteria has been suffered, diagnosed, and 
treated historically is important for making sense of the cultural mythology 
surrounding this baffling syndrome. 
 
Defining Rhetorical Objects 
Just as a traditional case study would begin by defining its object of study, 
I, too, will begin considering mass hysteria as an object. After consideration of 
how it’s been historically conceived as an object, I’ll use Law and Singleton’s 
theory of fire objects to reveal how mass hysteria becomes different objects in 
different venues and with different relations. Historically, hysteria has often been 
described as an excess of emotion, a disease that inflicts those who cannot 
appropriately handle or control their feelings and desires (Shorter 1993, Scull 
2009). Seventeenth century physician Thomas Sydenham, for example, blamed 
hysteria on “the passions”; he said of his hysterical patients, “All is caprice. They 
love without measure those whom they will soon hate without reason” (quoted in 
Scull 33). He understood hysterics to be impulsive, weak, and easily affected. 
Today, despite a better medical understanding of hysteria,58 we still think of 
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58 Since the APA dropped “hysteria” as a diagnosis in 1952, it has introduced a 
number of new disorders that explain what were previously considered hysterical 
symptoms (psychogenic and psychosomatic illnesses, like conversion disorder 
and somatization disorder). While some physicians believe hysteria has simply 
waned in the 20th century (like small pox, polio, or gout), others argue that 
hysteria is as widespread as ever; it has just slipped into disguise. Recently, 
scholars suggest that PTSD, chronic fatigue syndrome, and borderline personality 
disorder may be new manifestations of the syndrome.  
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emotionally (and often sexually) maladapted people, as psychoanalyst 
Chirstopher Bollas points out:  
When we think of hysteria we think of people who are troubled by 
their body’s sexual demands and repress sexual ideas; who are 
indifferent to conversion; who are overidentified with the other; 
who express themselves in a theatrical manner; who daydream 
existence rather than engage it; and who prefer the illusion of 
childlike innocence to the worldliness of adulthood. (1)  
Bollas captures a common way of thinking about hysterics, as both excitable and 
weak, which prevails in descriptions of the LeRoy girls. Susan Dominus’ exposé 
 in The New York Times Magazine describes the scene in LeRoy: “Parents wept 
as their daughters stuttered at the dinner table. Teachers shut their classroom 
doors when they heard a din of outbursts, one cry triggering another, sending the 
increasingly familiar sounds ricocheting through the halls.”  There is a 
hopelessness that pervades these kinds of descriptions, but also a hint of 
annoyance—doors have to be closed in order for everyday life to continue. This 
annoyance can quickly become resentment, as we can see in a comment from 
Lorie Longhany, the chairwoman of the Genesee County Democratic Committee: 
“Without laying any blame on any of these families — they’re going through their 
private hell with this. But it’s not private hell, it’s public hell. It’s almost like a 
depression has just settled over Le Roy” (quoted in Dominus). The fact that this 
case of mass hysteria was so public contributes to the emotional climate of the 
whole town. Underlying this annoyance or resentment seems to be a critique of 
the girls themselves; because the illness is psychological (the outbursts 
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illustrating, to some, a lack of restraint), the girls’ inability to stop the symptoms 
seems to indicate a lack of psychological fortitude. 
As many looked on at the seemingly out-of-control girls, one central 
emotion emerged—pity. And it is the spurning of onlookers’ pity that seems to 
keep girls and their families from accepting the illness, that fuels comments from 
parents like Heather Parker who said, “That mass psychogenic illness—that’s just 
a bunch of hoggy” (quoted in Dominus). An environmental or infectious cause for 
the symptoms is much easier to digest because it places the cause of the illness in 
the environment, not originating within the girls’ themselves, in bodies that can’t 
control themselves. This is an understanding of hysteria (a historical object of 
hysteria) that has existed for centuries; Ruth Graham of Slate notes how closely 
the outbreak mirrors historical connotations of hysteria: “As archetypes go, the 
Salem events hold up quite well, even from a distance of 320 years. Victims of 
mass hysteria are so often female that gender imbalance is one clue doctors use to 
differentiate hysteria from poisoning.” But holding onto these archetypes, 
accepting this object of mass hysteria, comes at a cost; it fails to capture the 
complexity of the realities of mass hysteria that are brought to the fore in this 
event. Different versions of this object emerge depending on whether mass 
hysteria is portrayed on the national stage as a site of mystery, in the doctor’s 
office, or between two girls. A theory of fire objects, however, shows how mass 
hysteria as an object changes over time but also how it can be multiple objects 
simultaneously.  
Recognizing a thing or a phenomenon as a fire object means paying 
attention to the invisible work and realities of an object. When one of the versions 
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or objects of mass hysteria comes into presence, the others become necessarily 
absent; they are “discontinuous realties that cannot be held together or brought 
to presence” (Law and Singleton 344). These sets of absences are “othered,” 
suggest Law and Singleton, and it is the otherness and difference that is so 
generative in creating and sustaining a complex syndrome like mass hysteria. 
Like Law and Singleton assert about alcoholic liver disease, this case 
encompasses versions of mass hysteria that are made up of presences and 
absences—each of which have varied emotional and affective influences. Mass 
hysteria is an object that spreads across mind, body, and society. Looking at the 
different objects of mass hysteria at work in this event explains why there is so 
much disagreement among parties who grappled with the definition, cause, 
treatment, and significance of this syndrome. Though there are many objects of 
mass hysteria that are prominent in this event, I’ll look specifically at objects the 
news media produces and also the objects that come into being when the girls 
interact with each other.  
On the level of the news media, many of the reports and interviews made 
the object of mass hysteria a mystery, as we can see in headlines like “Corinth 
Girl’s Tics Are a Medical Mystery”; “Mysterious Illness At Leroy High School”; 
“Le Roy Student Speaks out about Illness, Lack of Answers”; “Facial Tics, Verbal 
Outburts Perplex Community”; “The Mystery of 18 Twitching Teenagers in Le 
Roy New York”; “Mystery Malady; No known Cause.”59 When we accept this 
version of mass hysteria as a mystery illness what is absent is a diagnosis, which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 These headlines come, in order, from the following news organizations: WNYT 
13, WKBW, WGRZ, USA Today, The New York Times Magazine, Nightline ABC. 
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inspires fear, intrigue, or suspicion, depending on who you are. (For the 
individual this might fuel the denial of an underlying issue.) This version of the 
illness is dependent upon the presence of symptoms, which opens opportunities 
to diagnose and/or analyze their meaning. With the emergence of conspiracy 
theories, the news media has an opportunity to (in denying the real diagnosis and 
making it absent) continue reporting on a story that remains intriguing only 
because a diagnosis is absent. But the “mystery illness” can only be sustained for 
so long; once the diagnosis is widely accepted among the news media, the 
absence of mystery closes off particular opportunities and understandings of the 
syndrome. When the mystery is absent, the story is no longer interesting to the 
general public. The news media, in choosing to highlight the “mystery illness,” 
produced an object that inspired fear, intrigue, and curiosity in the general 
viewing audience; this object, because of its mystery, incited a unique kind of 
emotional investment in the viewing audience.  
Not all new organizations insisted this case was a mystery; some reporters 
accepted and reported the diagnosis. Though this object of mass hysteria would 
seem to simply be the medical diagnosis, these portrayals often suggested mass 
hysteria is rooted in the difficult (emotional) experience of being a teenage girl on 
the brink of adulthood. Dominus’ article presents this object of mass hysteria, as 
does the accompanying cover photo on The New York Times Magazine. Two of 
the girls (Thera and Katie) sit on a bed in a room that by all indications is a girl’s: 
the wall is painted a loud yellow; the comforter is colorfully striped and the bed is 
accented with bright pink pillows and blankets (one says “LOVE” on it in the 
fashion of the Victoria’s Secret PINK line). Above their heads hang large collages 
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of pictures; groups of girls are pasted together with other memorabilia, including 
a peace sign sticker. The setting of the photo suggests these are just girls—the 
kind who paste their memories and dreams above their beds. Yet what the girls 
wear and how they are posed suggests they are on the precipice of womanhood. 
Both girls appear to have dressed up for the event: their hair is styled, they’re 
wearing make up, Thera wears a silk shirt, and Katie wears a fashion scarf. They 
sit, shoulders touching, legs intertwined, closing in toward each other, in way that 
appears both comforting but also slightly erotic (it’s a pose we rarely see adult 
women or men in). However, at the same time, we are reminded of their youth by 
their distressed blue jeans and brightly patterned fashion socks sticking out 
toward the camera.  
The photo captures the girls in their everyday environment—surrounded 
by symbols of girlhood—yet the environment is juxtaposed with the seriousness 
of their faces, a reminder of their current trials and the severity of their illness. 
This version of mass hysteria brings innocence, beauty, and potential into 
presence, but wild, inappropriate outbursts and movements threaten to spoil this 
potential. There’s a sense, in this version of mass hysteria, that so much could be 
lost. Viewers seemed to be transfixed with the idea that as parent Jim DuPont put 
it, “These kids are totally normal, and the next thing you know their arms are 
swinging and they can't control themselves.” We’re reminded of the fragility of 
health, of how quickly youth and beauty can be spoiled. This take on hysteria can 
be seen in as early as Freud’s famous study of Dora.60 Dora was, Freud explains, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 In his 1905 An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (often just referred to as Dora), 
Freud set out to analyze a typical case of hysteria. He writes a detailed account of 
! 135!
“in the first bloom of youth—a girl of intelligent and engaging looks” (38) yet 
“unmistakably neurotic” (34). Freud’s first bloom metaphor suggests more than 
Dora’s youth, promise, and innocence; every bloom closes and wilts. In this same 
way, hysteria risks spoiling the first bloom of womanhood. This alternate version 
of mass hysteria, while it may seem to more accurately portray the illness, is used 
by the news media to incite a different kind of emotion—not the fear of contagion 
of a mystery illness but a sadness for the girls, a sadness for what they lost and 
might still lose.  
While the way mass hysteria was portrayed in the news media (and to 
what ends) is important for understanding this event, we can’t ignore the object 
of mass hysteria on the level of the girls, whose identities change throughout the 
case. As the event progresses and as more parties (doctors, TV personalities, 
community members, conspiracy theorists, etc.) join the public discourse 
surrounding the illness, various identities of the girl emerges; the girl herself, 
doctors, and the news media all play a role in calling particular identities into 
presence and pushing others into absence. Before the girl develops symptoms, 
her identity is as a healthy girl and the absent realities of her identity are 
minimal. While she understands that she (like anyone) could become ill, she has 
likely never experienced the debilitating involuntary symptoms that she soon 
will. When the girl develops symptoms, a number of identities emerge: the 
hysteric, the girl suffering from mystery symptoms, the faker of symptoms, etc. 
Depending on what situation she’s in—in a doctor’s office, on the Dr. Drew Show, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
his perceptions and diagnosis of Dora who suffered from difficulty breathing, loss 
of voice, heavy coughing, and headaches, paired with social avoidance and 
depression. 
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on facebook—different identities for the girl become prominent. These changing 
and multiple identities would be understandably confusing and frustrating for 
anyone. Even when the girl is cured, the realities of her illness—the version of her 
that was broadcast on national television, the way she was treated as an example 
of a mystery illness, the way her parents, community members, physicians, and 
strangers alike fought over what she was (a hysteric, a faker, a site of pity)—may 
be absent but are still generative. When contemplating the emotional experience 
of the girl, we can see how her various identities (both assigned to her and 
personally accepted) allow her to be represented in different ways. Fear—the 
predominant emotion in much of this case—was propagated by the uncertainty of 
the girl’s identity.  
When different versions of the girls were portrayed in the media, the 
stakes of taking on one identity over another became high for the girls, especially 
as they chose which treatment to receive. Dominus explains the tension that 
arose when some of the girls, instead of continuing treatment at the Dent 
Neurological Institute for conversion disorder, decided to see Dr. Rosario 
Trifiletti who asserted the syndrome was PANDAS, an autoimmune disorder:  
After that, more lines were drawn in Le Roy. Some girls, including a 
few who had been receiving treatment at Dent, started seeing 
Trifiletti and taking the medications he prescribed. Others 
remained with their original neurologists, and were bullied on 
Facebook by those who were now taking the antibiotics: if you got 
better without the pills, you had surely been faking all along. The 
accusations invariably exacerbated the symptoms. 
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These clashes reflect what was really at stake for the girls in accepting a 
diagnosis. The news media’s involvement didn’t end with spinning the case in a 
number of ways (invoking a number of emotions) to maintain a viewing 
audience; the ways in which the news media pitted the diagnoses against each 
other had real implications on how the girls—and if the girls—would seek proper 
treatment for their illness. 
When we study complex events like this rhetorically, we make choices to 
draw out particular objects and realities. Of course, it’s not always as simple as 
making a conscious choice to privilege one object over another. The hysteric girl, 
for example, waiting for a diagnosis doesn’t have the control to become the 
healthy girl (though arguably once the diagnosis is given, she has the choice to 
accept it and start the becoming of the cured girl or not), but the news media has 
a choice to highlight particular realities—to bring into presence the focus of their 
story and to push into absence what will be generative. For example, if the 
hysteric girl is brought into presence, the generative absences of the healthy girl 
can be used—loss of innocence, control—to construct an emotionally moving 
narrative. And this work has clear emotional and affective resonance as we can 
see different emotions attached to each version of the illness (pity, fear, sadness).  
Typically, we might look for the role of pathos in an event like this to see 
which emotions are being represented or incited by particular parties in the 
event; however, studying mass hysteria as a fire object, we can also see how the 
defining of an object itself, in drawing out what we consider to be a rhetorical 
object is a task that privileges some emotional realities of the object and ignores 
others. For example, if we choose to focus solely on the fear and pity that is 
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associated with one version of mass hysteria, we overlook how among the girls 
(as we can see in their social media reprimands) this illness is also embroiled 
with social belonging and social standing. Studying a complex object like this 
means not just taking the first object of mass hysteria that comes into view—the 
historical or popular objects that inspire fear or pity—but also looking for other 
objects which might drive a different array of emotions.  
 
Complicated Situations: Rhetorical Assemblages  
As I’ve suggested in previous chapters, traditional notions of the rhetorical 
situation don’t fully capture an event like this. Fortunately, several scholars in our 
field have already theorized better ways of mapping complex rhetorical 
situations, in terms of networks, systems, and ecologies that emerge and overlap 
with other situations. Complexity theory has been a primary avenue for these 
pursuits, which is detailed in the 2004 special issue of JAC, in which guest 
editors Thomas Rickert and David Blakesley claim complexity theory “promises 
to challenge and transform great swaths of our received knowledge concerning 
rhetoric, culture, social organization, and composition” (822). Within complexity 
theory, controlled rhetorical situations, in which rhetor, audience, and message 
are discrete entities, become complex adapting systems, co-evolving with, 
against, among any number of nodes and networks. Relying namely on Mark C. 
Taylor’s The Moment of Complexity and his interdisciplinary look at emerging 
network culture, the authors in the JAC special issue suggest the rhetorical 
situation is no longer a “situation” at all, as it extends innumerably outward. No 
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doubt, theorizing a complex, emergent, ecological rhetorical situation is not 
simple. It subverts what Hawk (2004) has called “the desire for simplicity” that 
has “haunted rhetoric and composition for most of its history” (“Toward” 831). 
Accepting complexity means, as Elizabeth Birmingham (2004) suggests, “we 
must be willing to develop a rhetoric that values untidy and misshapen 
arguments” (1002). Complexity theory troubles our understandings of the role of 
the rhetor in, and the boundaries of, the rhetorical situation.  
The rhetor is no longer the orchestrator of a situation but another system 
that emerges with and against the situation; some scholars have described this in 
terms of the writing process. As Hawk (2011) suggests, “the subject of writing is 
the network that inscribes the subject as the subject scribes the network” 
(“Reassembling” 75). The writer, then, is constructed through a circular process, 
along with the other components in the network. The writer and the product 
emerge together. Noah Roderick (2010) calls this new subject an “eco-subject”: 
“Under this new metaphysical goalpost, then, the writing act can be described as 
being a function of network behavior rather than an effect of generalizable mental 
processes.” The writer does not simply turn inward to identify motivations and 
ideas for writing; rather the writing and the writer emerge from the many 
interlocking social, political, historical, and emotional networks in which she is a 
part. This same approach can be applied to the rhetor’s role in the rhetorical 
situation, which, as Edbauer Rice (2005) has suggested, might be better studied 
as an “ecology.”61  She asserts, “An ecological, or affective, rhetorical model is one 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 See Margaret Syverson’s (1999) The Wealth of Reality: An Ecology of 
Composition for more on ecologies of writing.  
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that reads rhetoric both as a process of distributed emergence and as an ongoing 
circulation process” (“Unframing” 13). More traditional formulations of the 
rhetorical situation overlook the fluidity and emergence of rhetoric; they don’t 
explain how rhetoric spreads, moves, or how it’s generative. In these scholars’ 
recharacterizations of the rhetor’s role and situation, it seems emotions and 
affects are dispersed across people, things, and environments. Assemblage 
theory, as I suggested in the previous chapter, might best capture the 
interrelated, emergent nature of situations, along with the role of affect. 
Theorizing a rhetorical situation as an assemblage highlights how nonhuman 
variables in the situation also hold an event together.  
With Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory, through the process of 
double articulation, we can see the becoming of mass hysteria. In the first 
articulation, variables—life experience, exposure, chemicals, bones, tendons, 
vocal chords, etc.—become organized in such a way to give rise to the symptom, 
and the actual symptom, the expression, is the second articulation. Through 
double articulation, bodily symptoms emerge, and through territorialization, the 
symptoms are recognized as an expression of hysteria; 62 then, as more girls 
exhibit symptoms, they are grouped into a collective of hysterical girls, which in 
turn attracts the attention of other assemblages (health departments, school 
boards, conspirators, etc.). The assemblage of girls grew as more began taking on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 “Hysterical symptoms” are, of course, not fixed. Historian Edward Shorter 
(1993) suggests that symptoms of hysterical disorders adapt based on cultural 
acceptance; for example, swooning was prominent in the 18th century, fits and 
paralysis in the 19th century, and eating disorders and chronic fatigue in the 20th 
century. Similarly, feminist scholar Rachel Maines (1999) suggests that eating 
disorders, for example were once considered hysterical but have since been 
deemed an independent disease (8).  
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the symptoms (affects) of other girls. Even Dominus, in her exposé, describes the 
spread of the illness in terms of joining a social group (or assemblage). The first 
girls to fall ill, she describes, were those of higher social status (cheerleaders and 
honor roll students) and those who developed the symptoms later (who joined 
the assemblage later) tended to be of lower social status in the high school. She 
writes, “Mass psychogenic illness, whatever its mysterious mechanism, seems 
deeply connected to empathy and to a longing for what social psychologists call 
affiliation: belonging.” Taking on the symptoms of someone else (joining the 
assemblage) is a way of empathizing and belonging.63  
A theory of rhetorical assemblages allows us to see how parts of this event 
that we might previously have studied as external to the event—namely news and 
social media—became part of the event itself. At first glance, we can see the role 
of the news media was to report the event, providing the girls, families, and 
community alternate explanations of the syndrome. But this reporting also 
influenced the possible outcomes of this case (will the girls accept particular 
diagnoses or not), and in the case of social media, allowed the girls to document 
symptoms, debate diagnoses, and also open themselves up as a site for public 
commentary. News and social media played a much larger role in this event than 
has been documented in other cases of mass hysteria. In a historical and 
psychological analysis, Robert Bartholomew, Simon Wessely, G James Rubin 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Neurologists might explain this using a theory of mirror neurons, which 
suggests that we unconsciously mimic those around us, but perhaps most those 
with whom was want to identify. For an analysis of mirror neurons’ role in mass 
hysteria, see Yao-Tung Lee and Shih-Jen Tsai (2010).  
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suggest the case illustrates what might be a new way of transmitting mass 
psychogenic illness:  
We may be witnessing a milestone in the history of MPI where the 
primary agent of spread will be the Internet and social media 
networks. Communication with the neurologists treating 12 of the 
victims supports this view. ‘As soon as the media coverage stopped, 
they all began to rapidly improve and are doing very well,’ they 
report. At the time of writing, all but one of their patients ‘are free 
of tics and vocalizations.’ (511)  
In a traditional rhetorical analysis of this case, we might have studied the news 
media as having an independent, external role in reporting and sensationalizing 
this case. However, as many of the physicians involved in the case suggested, the 
news media became part of the syndrome itself. Dominus also highlights the 
intersecting parties (assemblages) that came together in the creation of the story: 
“Now, though, the girls’ writhing and stuttering suggested something troubling, 
either arising from within the community or being perpetrated on it, a mystery 
that proved irresistible for onlookers, whose attention would soon become part of 
the story itself.” Dominus describes how the attention the girls gained from the 
general public contributed to the worsening and progression of the syndrome. In 
this way, the various commentaries from “onlookers” were taken on (actually 
subsumed in the assemblage of the girls’ bodies) and then responded to, in many 
cases, with worsening symptoms (changing affects).   
Interestingly, though, the girls also used social media in a way that some 
described as an effort to control the portrayal of their syndrome. This also 
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contributed to the way the symptoms spread, as David Lichter, professor of 
neurology at the University of Buffalo, who treated some of the girls, told MSNBC 
in an interview:  
It's remarkable to see how one individual posts something, and 
then the next person who posts something not only are the 
movements bizarre and not consistent with known movement 
disorders, but it's the same kind of movements. This mimicry goes 
on with Facebook or YouTube exposure. This is the modern way 
that symptomology could be spread. (Velasquez) 
If we look at the actual illness and symptoms as rhetorical, as I’ve suggested, an 
understanding of the rhetorical situation must extend to consider social media 
not external to the bodily manifestation of the illness, but to see how it joined the 
assemblage of the illness. Through the connections that social media allows, the 
physical, biologic symptoms were spread remotely—through what we might call 
an assemblage of the bodily, material, networked, affective.  
Studying rhetoric in terms of assemblages allows us to see how events can 
be held together by things or actions that might not traditionally be considered 
rhetorical, for example, the tic. In the assemblage of the girl’s body, the tic 
prompts family and friends to be concerned; it is the reason doctors and experts 
enter the story, bringing in an entire medical assemblage with various histories of 
treatment. When the news media assemblage joins, each station/show (with its 
own approaches, tactics in dealing with the portrayal of the tic), render the tic for 
its viewing audience. While the growing attention to the tics made the symptoms 
worse and more pronounced as the assemblages were growing together, when the 
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tics stopped, the event itself broke down; the news media dropped away, girls no 
longer became afflicted, the parental assemblage no longer reached out for 
answers, the high school administration no longer investigated, and the girls 
were no longer bound in the same way. Studying this case rhetorically means 
looking beyond voluntary, conscious forms of persuasion, to also think about how 
objects, affects, and bodies are persuading us.  
What’s particularly interesting about the assemblage for studies of 
emotion is how emotion propels not just the discourse of the event but is also 
part of the development of the syndrome itself. Studying hysteria as an 
assemblage, we can see how the emotional looping of doubt and mistrust often 
fuels symptoms; emotions almost seem like a separate agent in the assemblage, 
as they work to both intensify, and fuel skepticism toward, symptoms.64 Dominus 
describes the doubt surrounding the diagnosis in the community: “To many 
parents, the diagnosis was woefully inadequate, even insulting. ‘It’s a very hard 
pill for me to swallow—what are we, living in the 1600s?’ the guardian of one of 
the girls said.” Similarly, Nicholas Jackson in The Atlantic, described the LeRoy 
community’s response to the diagnosis: “And yet many continue to question the 
diagnosis; they can't seem to take conversion disorder seriously.” This doubt is 
what several doctors suggested was fueling the development and worsening of the 
symptoms. Freud even describes this phenomenon in his treatment of Dora, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Chelsey Dumars, one of the suffering girls describes her debilitating symptoms 
paired with her perceptions that the community is doubting her: “I couldn’t stop 
stuttering. And then throughout the day, I got worse, and I started twitching and 
everything. I hate when it happens because my body is sore. Sometimes it gets me 
to the point where I want to cry from twitching so much . . . Like I said, I don't 
like even going into stores, because I feel like people are staring at me and 
making fun of me.” 
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suggesting that when the hysteric is surrounded by people who doubt and 
mistrust her, she consumes those emotions and her physical symptoms are, 
arguably, a response. Dora’s father told Freud her symptoms resulted from “a 
phantasy that has forded its way into her mind” rather than a legitimate trauma 
(41). This doubt, Freud asserts, magnified Dora’s symptoms.65 The syndrome 
itself often arises and subsists because of an inability to make narrative sense of 
trauma, as psychiatrists Howard Waitzkin and Holly Magana observed in “The 
Black Box in Somatization; Unexplained Physical Symptoms, Culture and 
Narratives of Trauma.” When Waitzkin and Magana received an influx of patients 
who had migrated to the U.S. from war-torn countries in Central America 
suffering from somatic symptoms without physical disease, they set out to better 
understand the root of these symptoms. The inability to construct a coherent 
narrative, they suggest, often heightens symptoms: “the mechanism by which 
trauma is transformed into somatic symptoms often involves an incoherence in 
narrative structure, because of which the traumatic experience cannot be told as a 
coherent whole” (818). Several of the news stories about the girls hint at their 
underlying personal trauma: absent fathers, debilitating parental illness, poverty, 
teen pregnancy, etc. When so many in the community were unable to make sense 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Here, Freud suggests hysteria is a phenomenon neither contained in the mind 
nor body but that it is held together by a number of influences: Dora’s 
interactions with the source of her anxiety (a family friend who made an 
unwanted sexual advance), her interaction (or lack thereof) with peers, and even 
her therapy with Freud. He explains hysterical symptoms require psychical 
significance or meaning and somatic compliance: “hysterical symptoms are the 
expression of their most secret and repressed wishes” (22). Thus, Freud’s 
treatment of hysteria involved an investigation into the psyche—both uncovering 
the root of the symptoms and convincing the patient that the symptoms have 
purpose. 
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of the symptoms (especially in the case of denying the diagnosis), the girls were 
prevented from believing that whatever underlying psychological issues they 
might be dealing with were legitimate and worthy of serious attention.66  Viewing 
this case of mass hysteria in terms of assemblages allows us to see these emotions 
and the role of social and news media as central (rhetorical) parts of the event 
itself—rather than external forces.  
 
Rhetorical Bodies 
Following a Spinozist theory of defining bodies by their affects allows us to 
see how (human and nonhuman) bodies are persuasive. As I’ve already noted, 
there’s a way in which the physical bodies of the girls in LeRoy persuaded 
themselves, those around them, and viewers. Dominus describes this kind of 
persuasion by highlighting the “language”—the symptoms—the girls use:  
As their parents and the media and town officials conducted a 
conversation all around them, the girls in Le Roy seemed to be 
sharing a language that maybe even they did not fully understand. 
That so many people in town were more preoccupied with 
environmental waste than the homes of the affected young people 
suggests that their message may have been hard for some of the 
adults to hear, too.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 We can see this sentiment in comments from some of the girls. For example, 
Traci Leunbar, reported, “A lot of people say we are faking it”; Thera Sanchez 
illustrates her own doubt with the diagnosis: “I don’t think this is in my head. I 
don’t think I can wake up from a nap and this can happen.” 
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Dominus points to the rhetorical purpose of the symptoms, that there was 
something the girls were trying to express—something they couldn’t express 
verbally—that reflected the economic and cultural state of the town itself.67 
Viewing these symptoms as rhetorical recognizes the syndrome as purposeful and 
the girls as agents, not just as passive vessels—how hysterics have been studied 
historically. Even the way the girls turned to the news media (acknowledging the 
possible rhetorical affects of that body) illustrates an awareness of their rhetorical 
possibilities in this event. As Bartholomew, Wessely, and Rubin put it: “This is 
the first case in which, to our knowledge, those affected have been able to ‘put 
their case’ directly to the wider public” (511). To return to the notion of “affective 
agency” discussed in the last chapter, there’s a way in which the girls try to 
“reconfigure the entanglements” (to use Barad’s terms) of their story. This move 
to take control of their own narrative, may have backfired to some extent given 
the way the syndrome spread via social media, yet this is an example of using 
one’s affects to change one’s own body and the public discourse surrounding the 
case. We can read the girls’ affects—bodily, mediated, and otherwise—as 
rhetorical.  
While it might seem unethical to read or assign purposes to another 
person’s body, ignoring what bodies might be saying, in some cases, seems 
equally risky. Recently, scholars have argued that we expand our rhetorical scope 
to study unintentional texts and discourses, like objects, animals, and things, yet 
bodily processes are rarely considered rhetorical. Perhaps this is because of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 As Dominus and others described in their reports of this story, the town of 
LeRoy, once a booming manufacturing town, is now struggling with higher rates 
of poverty, unemployment, and single-parent households. 
! 148!
politics surrounding the study of human bodies. We know that this can quickly 
become dangerous, as we can see, for example, in ancient theories of hysteria, 
which were based on the belief that wombs were wandering around women’s 
bodies.68 Plato69 and several Hippocratic authors thought the womb was capable 
of strangling or suffocating a woman as it moved around her body. To avoid this, 
Christopher Faraone writes in “Magical and Medical Approaches to the 
Wandering Womb in the Ancient Greek World,” women were encouraged to 
marry young and have many children to always keep the womb in place. The 
womb was described variously as a sentient being, a wild animal, or a defective 
organ; in a Greek Magical Handbook from 4 CE, the womb is even described as 
biting and chewing the insides. In the case of a wandering womb, physicians 
often tried to persuade it back into place with fumigations (foul ones at the nose 
and sweet smelling at the vagina) or loud noises. Despite how bizarre these ideas 
now seem, we still talk about “hostile” wombs or cervixes whose intentions are to 
prevent fertilization and incubation, similarly implying that the cervix has its own 
motives and functions separate from the rest of the body. We often talk about our 
human bodies in rhetorical terms, saying things like “my body is trying to tell me 
something.”  
To really take up the calls of complexity, assemblage, and affect theories 
means paying attention to what might seem to be involuntary or coincidental. As 
is made so clear in the way the LeRoy girls’ symptoms are variously analyzed and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 The “wandering womb” was frequently blamed for hysterical symptoms in 
ancient times. Before human dissections, physicians had no way of knowing 
where wombs were located.   
69 Some scholars have debated this. See, for example, Mark Adair’s “Plato’s View 
of the ‘Wandering Uterus.’” 
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portrayed, these symptoms mean something. In keeping with my analysis of a tic, 
we can see how it might be a call for psychological help and perhaps a call for 
social acceptance among a group of girls. The tic is an exigence (in Bitzer’s terms 
“an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle”), but it’s also a 
constraint for the girl’s body. The tic is an argument that many other bodies 
responded to in different ways given their purposes: to highlight environmental 
concerns, the personal struggles of the girls, the (il)legitimacy of doctors and 
other experts, etc. Accepting something like a tic as rhetorical suggests that any 
body (human or not) can persuade; we no longer need the conscious and 
intentional rhetor.  
If we accepted that any body or thing can persuade, there’s a way in which 
everything is rhetorical, every becoming, every combining of parts would be 
rhetorical. This aligns with those who’ve argued rhetoricity and affects precede 
us. For example, Diane Davis suggests in Inessential Solidarity, there is an 
affectability that precedes symbolicity and is necessary for persuasion to take 
place. Similarly Rickert (2013) echoes Davis when he asserts affect and 
persuadability is “the condition of the possibility for rhetoric’s emergence” (159). 
These claims become especially apparent then we decide to study an event like 
the one in LeRoy rhetorically. The rhetoric in this event doesn’t appear just in the 
discourses that emerged when various parties debated about this “mystery 
illness.” Even the news media picked up on the “language” of the girls’ symptoms, 
suggesting that the illness itself was persuasive, rhetorical.  
A close study of this case encourages us to question not just what we 
define as rhetorical, but also the role of affects and emotions. We can see, for 
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example, with the theory of fire objects how defining a rhetorical object calls forth 
particular emotional realities. Paying attention to the various versions of mass 
hysteria at work in this case reveals not just the obvious emotions at work—fear, 
pity, sadness—but also emotions attached to the girls’ sense of belonging and the 
questioning of their symptoms’ legitimacy. Similarly, the way that news and 
social media become part of this syndrome (this assemblage) reflects the power 
of media to produce and transmit affects and emotions in a way that hasn’t really 
been seen before. The doubt and mistrust that spread through those networks 
was consumed by and reflected in the syndrome itself, ultimately helping to 
determine which diagnosis the girls accepted and which treatment they sought. 
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Postscript 
 
 
Toward a Revised Theory of Pathos 
 
 
 
As emotions were the first motives which 
induced man to speak, his first utterances were 
tropes (metaphors). Figurative language was 
the first to be born, proper meanings were the 
last to be found. 
 –Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essay on the 
Origins of Languages 
 
 
 
 
Rousseau captures the tension at the heart of this dissertation: emotions 
are the impetus for language, communication, and expression of human 
experience, yet language is never enough to capture the all of human experience. 
Many scholars of emotion studies have cited this tension, claiming our lack of 
vocabulary or “proper meanings” prevents us from adequately theorizing the 
emotions. While the advent of affect theory seems to be a response to that dearth 
of vocabulary, as it claims to better capture the visceral, embodied, and sensual 
aspects of human experience, the pursuit of “proper meanings” often seems to be 
a distraction in itself. This distraction—specifically debates over terminology and 
theoretical tradition—prevents us from the kinds of insights that might emerge if, 
rather than beginning with static definitions and seeking out evidence of their 
existence, we begin our rhetorical studies, as Massumi suggests, in the middle.  
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My main objective in this dissertation was to take seriously the call from 
scholars who have studied both affect and emotion in our field: to carefully 
(re)consider how we discuss and use both terms. Perhaps more importantly, I 
wanted this work to culminate in a revised theory of pathos, into a theory that 
would be useful—and not seemingly external—to rhetorical theory. The difficulty 
I faced (as have others who’ve taken up this sort of study) is figuring out how to 
reconcile theories of affect with rhetorical studies. I, too, was swept up in the 
pleasure—the exciting emotional experience—of re-thinking many of the ideas 
and theories that were the basis for my understanding of the world and rhetorical 
theory’s role therein. I wanted to figure out how to accept this way of seeing the 
world—seeing the world through its relations rather than as consisting of 
independent entities—in a way that would help me and others become better 
rhetoricians. I quickly realized this would not be an easy task, and though in 
many ways, I’ve only just begun (as I end) this project, in this postscript, I’ll  
outline some of the main tenets of a revised theory of pathos and look forward to 
consider what future research might address.  
A revised theory of pathos should 1) accept that affect and emotion are 
intimately related, 2) acknowledge the numerous theories of affect and emotion 
that might be used for differing rhetorical purposes, and 3) invoke an 
understanding of rhetorical situations and events that are malleable, layered, and 
recursive. Returning to the arguments of my early chapters, a revised theory of 
pathos should resist the desire to treat affect and emotion as separate concepts 
that refer to fundamentally different phenomena. The most obvious problem this 
theoretical division creates is a fissure in the scholarship, resulting in two 
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seemingly separate traditions in the field with scholars who study one concept 
but not the other (e.g. scholars like Laura Micciche, Daniel Gross, or Michael 
Hyde and Craig Smith who pursue studies of emotion independent from 
scholarship on affect). The dearth of conversation between scholarship on affect 
and emotion prevents the theoretical advancement of both areas of study—and 
especially reconfigurations of the concept pathos in our field.  
If we understand that affects and emotions are defined in numerous ways, 
for numerous purposes, it would seem in our best interest to examine our 
tendencies to rely on particular traditions and to question what blind spots might 
be revealed through an expanded understanding of both concepts. As I suggested 
in Chapter Two, there are a number of prominent affect theories (several of which 
I didn’t even detail in this dissertation, e.g. Lawrence Grossberg’s or Eve 
Sedgwick’s) that allow us to isolate different aspects of rhetoric. When someone 
mentions “affect” in our field, most are quick to assume it means the fleeting 
bodily intensity associated with Massumi. But just as there are times when 
Massumi’s version of affect seems most useful in isolating a particular aspect of 
rhetoric, there are times when an understanding of affect as exigence and 
constraint might produce more diverse analyses. When we make this decision—in 
choosing one version of affect or emotion to inform our studies—we ought to also 
consider which versions we are overlooking and to what ends. Might we be—
purposefully or not—leaving out versions of emotion or affect that could continue 
to complicate (in some cases, trouble) our rhetorical investigations? In my albeit 
brief analysis of the case in LeRoy, I tried to employ understandings of affect and 
emotion that at times seemed incompatible, but in doing so, I hoped to reveal 
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how we might see the affects and emotions of this case as primary forces, not as 
after-the-fact responses to what happened in the event.  
Affect theory encourages us to seek out more complicated rhetorical 
projects and objects of study. But we need to be careful about defining and 
choosing these objects, knowing that the objects we isolate are attached to affects 
and emotions that we also choose to foreground or not. In keeping with this 
sentiment, my analysis of LeRoy did not draw out finite borders of the event or 
focus on isolated rhetor-audience interactions. This produced a case study that, 
following Massumi and many other scholars I’ve referenced in this dissertation, 
was more exploratory in nature. I hoped to find the affects and emotions in this 
event that existed beyond and slipped between traditional discourse—to call 
attention to, for example, how news and social media contributed to the 
progression and transmission of the symptoms, emerging prior to and along with 
the more traditionally rhetorical aspects of this case. A truly revised theory of 
pathos should work against traditional humanistic approaches to rhetorical 
study, which means (re)considering what is rhetorical in the first place.   
 
 Looking Forward 
In keeping with the longstanding ethical aims of pathos, I hope this 
project has created an opening to more carefully think about the ethics of 
studying more recent conceptualizations and theories of affect and emotion. As I 
emphasized in my final chapter, ethics become important when deciding what it 
means to identify and study particular rhetorical objects. Though there has been 
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no shortage of scholars who have suggested that we expand our rhetorical studies 
to include nontraditional texts, discourses, and objects, no one has yet considered 
the emotional and affective stakes of doing so. I hope that my analysis of the case 
in LeRoy illustrates that the ethics of pathos aren’t contained just in the ways that 
the news media used emotional appeals or in the way I used emotional appeals to 
describe the case. I hope that what also became apparent is that choosing an 
object of study has ethical implications for the emotions that we highlight and 
ignore. For example, there are emotions, among the girls themselves—desires to 
belong or for acknowledgement of their symptoms as legitimate—that 
contributed to the development of the case. Focusing our attention just on the 
most obvious emotions in this case—fear and pity—fails to capture its emotional 
and affective complexity. 
As I look forward in my own studies, I’d like to more thoroughly pursue 
psychoanalytic theories of affect and desire. In my unfortunately brief study of 
psychoanalytic approaches, I realized that “desire” would likely be an important 
addition in a revised theory of pathos that would more extensively account for the 
affective investments of each of us and might give clues into how rhetoricians can 
better identify and make use of those investments. Because there are many 
central terms in psychoanalysis that describe the work of affect and emotion, this 
sort of study would begin by mapping out the relationships among concepts like 
enjoyment, pleasure, desire, affect, and emotion. 
The final opening I hope this dissertation has produced is for rhetorical 
analyses of how emotions and affects are biologically experienced and 
transmitted. Perhaps most closely related to Massumi’s understanding of affect 
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as bodily intensity, these analyses would be useful in better investigating how we 
might consider biological processes as rhetorical. Teresa Brennan’s The 
Transmission of Affect is an incredible work that takes many of the first steps in 
considering how affects are transmitted biologically and relatedly how affects 
play a primary role in agency and persuasion. The “transmission of affect,” she 
suggests “capture[s] a process that is social in origin but biological and physical 
in effect” (3). Her theory accounts for the physiological aspects of affect 
(hormones and phermones passed between us), but also recognizes these 
processes as inextricably social—an understanding that seems especially 
important for studying rhetorical events that emerge through biological, social, 
mediated, and discursive interactions.  
Further study into the biological transmission of affect would also 
encourage us to focus our attention on the role of the senses. Brennan suggests 
that we rely on all our senses (especially smell) to produce knowledge. However, 
contemporary theories of the “self-contained individual,” she asserts, prevent us 
from acknowledging the role affect plays in knowledge-making and other 
processes we often consider to be solely cognitive. Like many others cited in this 
dissertation, Brennan suggests a major obstacle in theorizing affect is the lack of 
language and vocabulary to sufficiently describe affective experience: 
At present we only have a rudimentary language for connecting 
sensations, affects, and words, for connecting bodily processes and 
the conceptual understanding of them. The development of that 
language requires an attention to the pathways of sensation in the 
body, and attention that is more concentrated and sustained than 
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the attention received by the body hitherto. This is the precondition 
of beginning to formulate bodily knowledge more accurately and to 
pass it on by the verbal means that increases the rapidity of human 
understanding. (153) 
Focusing our attention on “pathways of sensation in the body” has potential not 
just for better understandings of bodily knowledge; these pathways are avenues 
for communication and persuasion. Further studies might consider the role these 
pathways play in rhetorical relations—especially as they contribute to the 
production, expression, and experience of emotion. 
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